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{HtmlEncodeMultiline(EmailPreheader)} | PRODUCT RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRICE PARITY CLAUSES |
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| ABSTRACT A seller can offer an experience good directly to consumers and indirectly through an intermediary. When selling indirectly, the intermediary provides recommendations based on the consumer’s match value and the prices at which the product is sold. The intermediary faces the trade-off between extracting rents from consumers who strongly care about the match value versus providing less informative recommendations but also serving consumers who do not. We analyze the allocative and welfare effects of prohibiting price parity clauses and/or regulating the intermediary’s recommender system. Prohibiting price parity clauses is always welfare decreasing in our model. |
Keywords: Intermediation, Digital Platforms, Price Parity, Recommender System, MFN Clause, E-Commerce. JEL Codes: L12, L15, D21, D42, M37. |
Click here to view the CV. Click here to view the paper. |
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PRESENTER Martin Peitz University of Mannheim |
RESEARCH FIELDS Industrial Organization Microeconomic Theory Regulation and Competition Policy |
DATE: 24 October 2024 (Thursday) |
VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903 |
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