|
{HtmlEncodeMultiline(EmailPreheader)} | GODFATHER POLITICIANS AND ORGANIZED VIOLENCE |
|
|
|
|
| ABSTRACT We analyze the ironic breakdown of social order when good politicians replace flawed ones. A corrupt politician (“Godfather”) may arbitrate otherwise violent conflicts peacefully for extralegal personal benefits, while eradicating such politicians leads to social unrest. Utilizing a unique natural experiment that systematically removed corrupt officials, a difference-in-differences test shows that organized violence surged by an additional 15 percentage points in cases where local officials were found colluding with organized criminals. The violence surge was not due to their successors’ increased monitoring intensity, government failure, or gangster infightings, thus highlighting the institution design – not moral characters – that shapes politicians’ behavior. |
Keywords: Organized Crime, Violence, Corruption, Politician, Godfather. JEL: P16, D73, D74, P48. |
Click here to view the CV. |
|
|
PRESENTER Fan Xinyu Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business |
RESEARCH FIELDS Political Economy Organizational Economics Economic History |
DATE: 14 May 2025 (Wednesday) |
VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903 |
|
|
|
|
| | © Copyright 2025 by Singapore Management University. All Rights Reserved. Internal recipients of SMU, please visit https://smu.sg/emailrules, on how to filter away this EDM. For all other recipients, please click here to unsubscribe. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|