SMU SOE Seminar (October 6, 2022): A Network Solution to Robust Implementation: the Case of Identical but Unknown Distributions

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ABSTRACT We consider mechanism design environments in which agents commonly believe that others’ types are identically distributed, but we do not assume that the actual distribution is common knowledge, nor that it is known to the designer. Under these assumptions, we study partial and full implementation questions. First, we characterize the transfers which are incentive compatible under these assumptions, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for partial implementation. Second, we characterize the conditions under which full implementation is possible via direct mechanisms, and the transfer schemes which achieve it whenever possible. The latter results are obtained from showing that the full implementation problem in our setting can be transformed into one of designing a network of strategic externalities, subject to suitable constraints which are dictated by the incentive compatibility requirements. Keywords: Robust Full Implementation, Rationalizability, Network Design, Uniqueness, Strategic Externalities, Spectral Radius. JEL Codes: D62, D82, D83 Click here to view the CV. Click here to view the paper.
		PRESENTER Antonio Penta Barcelona School of Economics
		RESEARCH FIELDS Game Theory Mechanism Design Auctions Bounded Rationality Decision Theory
		DATE: 6 October 2022 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903