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SMU SOE Seminar (November 17, 2022): Directed Search on a Platform: Meet Fewer to Match More?
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TOPIC:
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DIRECTED SEARCH ON A PLATFORM: MEET FEWER TO MATCH MORE?
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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between market transparency and efficiency in a directed search market intermediated by a profit-maximizing platform. We first provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which efficiency requires imperfect transparency such that each seller is not observed by all buyers. Full transparency is not optimal for either buyers or sellers. In particular, buyers prefer the minimum level of transparency. We then show that the platform can implement the efficient outcome. Our key insight is robust to the introduction of a second chance for unmatched buyers to search.
Keywords: meeting technology, directed search, platform, intermediation
JEL Codes: D83, J64, M37
Click here to view the CV.
Click here to view the paper.
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PRESENTER
Makoto Watanabe
Kyoto University
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Industrial Organization
Applied Theory
Macroeconomics
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DATE:
17 November 2022 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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