SMU SOE Seminar (November 17, 2022): Directed Search on a Platform: Meet Fewer to Match More?

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ABSTRACT This paper explores the relationship between market transparency and efficiency in a directed search market intermediated by a profit-maximizing platform. We first provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which efficiency requires imperfect transparency such that each seller is not observed by all buyers. Full transparency is not optimal for either buyers or sellers. In particular, buyers prefer the minimum level of transparency. We then show that the platform can implement the efficient outcome. Our key insight is robust to the introduction of a second chance for unmatched buyers to search. Keywords: meeting technology, directed search, platform, intermediation JEL Codes: D83, J64, M37 Click here to view the CV. Click here to view the paper.
		PRESENTER Makoto Watanabe Kyoto University
		RESEARCH FIELDS Industrial Organization Applied Theory Macroeconomics
		DATE: 17 November 2022 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903