SMU SOE Seminar (Sep 20, 2018): Games of Love and Hate

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ABSTRACT A game of love and hate is one in which a player’s payoff is a function of her own action and the payoffs of other players. For each action profile, the associated payoff profile solves an interdependent utility system, and if that solution is bounded and unique for every profile, we call the game coherent. Coherent games generate a standard normal form. Our central theorem states that every Nash equilibrium of such a game is Pareto optimal, in sharp contrast to the general prevalence of inefficient equilibria in the presence of externalities. While externalities in our model are restricted to flow only through payoffs, there are no other constraints: they could be positive or negative, or of varying sign. We further show that our coherence and continuity requirements are tight. Click here to view the paper. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Rajiv Vohra Brown University
		RESEARCH FIELDS Economic Theory Game Theory
		DATE: 20 September 2018 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903