Paulo Daniel Salles Ramos
PAULO DANIEL SALLES RAMOS
Ph.D Candidate in Economics
I am a job market candidate and I will be available for interviews.
REFERENCES
Professor Shurojit CHATTERJI
Email: shurojitc@smu.edu.sg
Tel: +65 68280314
Professor Jingyi XUE
Email: jyxue@smu.edu.sg
Tel: +65 68085466
WORKING PAPERS
"Compellingness in Nash Implementation", with Takashi Kunimoto and Shurojit Chatterji (Job Market Paper)
A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism in which every Nash equilibrium induces outcomes specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. We call a mixed strategy equilibrium “uncompelling” if its outcome is strictly worse for any agent than that induced by the SCF. We show that if the finite environment and the SCF to be implemented jointly satisfy what we call Condition COM, we construct a finite mechanism which Nash implements the SCF in pure strategies and its any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium outcome is either uncompelling or consistent with the SCF. Our mechanism has several desirable features: transfers can be completely dispensable; only finite mechanisms are considered; integer games are not invoked; and agents’ attitudes toward risk do not matter. These features make our result quite distinct from many other prior attempts to handle mixed strategy equilibria in the theory of implementation.
RESEARCH PAPERS
"Minimum Reversals Domains: a link between median rules and monotonicity”, (revised and resubmitted at Games and Economic Behavior)
We show that any monotonic, anonymous, unanimous and tops-only rule defined on a MAT-connected domain must be a median voter rule on a tree. Moreover, a median voter rule on a tree is monotonic if and only if the domain is a minimum reversals domain, which is a weakening of known preference domains. These two results are combined to obtain a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of monotonic, anonymous, and unanimous rules on a MAT-connected domain.