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{HtmlEncodeMultiline(EmailPreheader)} | ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY |
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| ABSTRACT We study a principal-agent model of spatial learning. The principal must make decisions across a continuum of problems, but lacks complete knowledge of how each problem maps to its solution. This mapping is represented by the realized path of a Markov process. The principal, facing a fixed number of agents, assigns one problem to each agent, who can privately exert effort to solve the assigned problem. We characterize the optimal assignment of problems to agents and the compensation scheme that robustly implements effort by all agents. The model highlights a trade-off that shapes organizational boundaries in a knowledge economy. |
Keywords: Team Incentives, Monitoring, Information Acquisition, Full Implementation. JEL: D82, D83, D86, L23, L25. |
Click here to view the CV. Click here to view the paper. |
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PRESENTER Fei Li University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill |
RESEARCH FIELDS Economic Theory Information Economics Industrial Organization |
DATE: 9 October 2025 (Thu) |
VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903 |
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