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| ROBUST AUCTIONS FOR SELLING MULTIPLE GOODS |
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| ABSTRACT I study a mechanism design problem for selling multiple goods to multiple bidders when the designer has limited distributional information. Adopting a minimax regret approach, I define the expected regret of a mechanism, given a joint distribution over value profiles and an equilibrium, as the difference between the full surplus and the expected revenue. The designer aims to find a minimax regret mechanism —— one that minimizes the worst-case expected regret across all feasible joint distributions and equilibria. I show that a separate second-price auction with random reserves achieves this objective. In this mechanism, the designer conducts independent auctions for each good, with each auction being a second-price auction with random reserve. |
Click here to view the CV. |
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PRESENTER Wanchang Zhang Chinese University of Hong Kong |
RESEARCH FIELDS Mechanism Design Information Design Game Theory Microeconomic Theory |
DATE: 27 February 2025 (Thursday) |
VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903 |
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