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SMU SOE Seminar Series (February 27, 2025): Robust Auctions for Selling Multiple Goods

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TOPIC:

ROBUST AUCTIONS FOR SELLING MULTIPLE GOODS

ABSTRACT

I study a mechanism design problem for selling multiple goods to multiple bidders when the designer has limited distributional information. Adopting a minimax regret approach, I define the expected regret of a mechanism, given a joint distribution over value profiles and an equilibrium, as the difference between the full surplus and the expected revenue. The designer aims to find a minimax regret mechanism —— one that minimizes the worst-case expected regret across all feasible joint distributions and equilibria. I show that a separate second-price auction with random reserves achieves this objective. In this mechanism, the designer conducts independent auctions for each good, with each auction being a second-price auction with random reserve.

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PRESENTER

Wanchang Zhang
Chinese University of Hong Kong

RESEARCH FIELDS

Mechanism Design
Information Design
Game Theory
Microeconomic Theory 

DATE:

27 February 2025 (Thursday)

TIME:

4pm - 5.30pm

VENUE:

Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903

 
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