SMU SOE Seminar Series (August 22, 2024): Deception under the Veil of Noise

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ABSTRACT

We study a dynamic predator-prey game where a prey decides whether or not to hide in its burrow based on the noise in the environment: if the state is safe then the noise is i.i.d., but if the state is dangerous, then some of that noise is optimally made by a predator as it gets closer to the prey. In any equilibrium, the prey's beliefs change with the observation of noise or silence iff the predator is impatient, while beliefs are frozen until the anticipated time of attack iff the predator is patient. The equilibrium noise strategy of a perfectly patient predator is to perfectly mimic the safe environment, whereas an impatient predator’s noise will not be i.i.d and will exhibit streaks of noise.

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