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SMU SOE Seminar (November 9, 2023): Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms
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TOPIC:
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RANK-PRESERVING MULTIDIMENSIONAL MECHANISMS
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ABSTRACT
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. Symmetric and incentive-compatible mechanisms for heterogeneous objects are rank preserving, i.e., higher-valued objects are assigned with a higher probability. In the identical-objects model, every mechanism is rank preserving. This facilitates the equivalence, which we use in three applications.
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PRESENTER
Debasis Mishra
Indian Statistical Institute
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Theory of auctions and mechanism design
Social choice theory
Game theory
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DATE:
9 November 2023 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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