SMU SOE Seminar (November 9, 2023): Rank-preserving Multidimensional Mechanisms

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ABSTRACT We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. Symmetric and incentive-compatible mechanisms for heterogeneous objects are rank preserving, i.e., higher-valued objects are assigned with a higher probability. In the identical-objects model, every mechanism is rank preserving. This facilitates the equivalence, which we use in three applications. Click here to view the CV. Click here to view the paper.
		PRESENTER Debasis Mishra Indian Statistical Institute
		RESEARCH FIELDS Theory of auctions and mechanism design Social choice theory Game theory
		DATE: 9 November 2023 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903