SMU SOE Seminar (March 9, 2023): Comparison Shopping: Learning Before Buying from Duopolists

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ABSTRACT We explore a model of duopolistic competition in which consumers flexibly learn about the fit–both relative and absolute–of each competitor’s product. When information is cheap, increasing the cost of information decreases consumer welfare; but when information is expensive, this relationship flips: cheaper information hurts consumers. When the sellers’ goods are both high and low value with positive probability, as information frictions vanish, the limiting equilibrium is ex post efficient, in contrast to the monopoly model studied by Ravid et al. (2022). Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Mark Whitmeyer Arizona State University
		RESEARCH FIELDS Microeconomic Theory Information Economics
		DATE: 9 March 2023 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903