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TOPIC:
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PROFITS AND MISSION: PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES IN A MULTI-GOAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION
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ABSTRACT
The impact of performance pay in institutions with multiple goals depends on the degree of complementarity between tasks achieving each goal. Workers of a microcredit-centered development institution were randomly assigned to one of two bonus schemes, incentivizing either the performance of a microcredit program that contributed to its sustainability (credit bonus), or social mobilization, the institution’s mission (social bonus). We find that the credit bonus improved credit-related outcomes but it undermined the mission. In contrast, the social bonus advanced the mission without compromising the microcredit program but only for employees working alone, as it impacted negatively the performance of employees working in teams. We conclude that a fixed wage is the optimal contract if the institution cares both about sustainability and its mission.
Keywords: Mission, Incentives, Intrinsic motivation, Teamwork, Field experiment.
JEL Codes: C93, D86, J33, M52, M55
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view his CV.
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PRESENTER
Slesh Shrestha
National University of Singapore
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Development Economics
Labor Economics
International Economics
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DATE:
8 Mar 2017 (Wednesday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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