SMU SOE Seminar (February 23, 2023): Pick-an-object Mechanisms

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TOPIC:

PICK-AN-OBJECT MECHANISMS

ABSTRACT We introduce a new family of mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, denoted pick-an-object (PAO) mechanisms. When implementing an allocation rule via PAO, agents are asked to pick an object from individualized menus. These choices may be rejected later on, and these agents are presented with new menus. When the procedure ends, agents are assigned the last object they picked. We characterize the allocation rules that can be sequentialized by PAO mechanisms, as well as the ones that can be implemented in a robust truthful equilibrium. We justify the use of PAO as opposed to direct mechanisms by showing that its equilibrium behavior is closely related to the one in obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms, but implements commonly used rules, such as Gale-Shapley DA and top trading cycles, which are not OSP-implementable. We run laboratory experiments comparing truthful behavior when using PAO, OSP, and direct mechanisms to implement different rules. These indicate that agents are more likely to behave in line with the theoretical prediction under PAO and OSP implementations than their direct counterparts. Keywords: Market Design, Matching, Sequential Mechanisms, Experiments, Obvious Strategyproofness. JEL Codes: C78, C73, D78, D82 Click here to view the CV. Click here to view the paper.
		PRESENTER Inácio Bó Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
		RESEARCH FIELDS Microeconomic Theory Matching Theory Market Design Experimental and Behavioral Economics
		DATE: 23 February 2023 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903

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