SMU SOE Seminar (December 2, 2022): Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-peaked Domains

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ABSTRACT We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences. Click here to view the paper. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Jordi Massó Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
		RESEARCH FIELDS Social Choice Mechanism Design Matching Game Theory
		DATE: 2 December 2022 (Friday)
		TIME: 10am - 11.30am
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903