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SMU SOE Seminar (December 2, 2022): Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-peaked Domains
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TOPIC:
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PREFERENCE RESTRICTIONS FOR SIMPLE AND STRATEGY-PROOF RULES: LOCAL AND WEAKLY SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
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ABSTRACT
We show that if a rule is strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous and tops-only, then the preferences in its domain have to be local and weakly single-peaked, relative to a family of partial orders obtained from the rule by confronting at most three alternatives with distinct levels of support. Moreover, if this domain is enlarged by adding a non local and weakly single-peaked preference, then the rule becomes manipulable. We finally show that local and weak single-peakedness constitutes a weakening of known and well-studied restricted domains of preferences.
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view the CV.
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PRESENTER
Jordi Massó
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Social Choice
Mechanism Design
Matching
Game Theory
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DATE:
2 December 2022 (Friday)
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TIME:
10am - 11.30am
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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