SMU SOE Seminar (August 17, 2023): Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification

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ABSTRACT A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents always want the object. Agents hold private signals about the allocation payoff to the principal and an information designer can influence agents’ signal distributions. Based upon the designed information, the principal designs a mechanism to maximizes her payoff monetary transfer is not available but the principal can verify any agent’s private signal at a cost. We find the agent-optimal information and the principal-optimal information. Moreover, with a single agent, any agent-optimal information is principal-worst. The latter facilitates the discovery of optimal robust mechanisms in general settings. Click here to view the paper. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Gaoji Hu Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
		RESEARCH FIELDS Matching/Market Design Mechanism Design Revealed Preference Analysis
		DATE: 17 August 2023 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903