| |
TOPIC:
|
ARE THE PLAYERS IN AN INTERACTIVE BELIEF MODEL META-CERTAIN OF THE MODEL ITSELF?
|
ABSTRACT
In an interactive belief model, are the players “commonly meta-certain” of the model itself? This paper explicitly formalizes such implicit “common meta-certainty” assumption. To that end, the paper expands the objects of players’ beliefs from events to functions defined on the underlying states. Then, the paper defines a player’s belief generating map: it associates, with each state, whether a player believes each event at that state. The paper formalizes what it means by: “a player is (meta-)certain of her own belief-generating map” or “the players are (meta-)certain of the profile of belief-generating maps (i.e., the model).” The paper shows: a player is (meta-)certain of her own belief-generating map if and only if her beliefs are introspective. The players are commonly (meta-)certain of the model if and only if, for any event which some player i believes, it is common belief that player i believes the event. This paper then asks whether the “common meta-certainty” assumption is needed for an epistemic characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts. The paper shows: if each player is logical and (meta-)certain of her own strategy and belief-generating map, then each player correctly believes her own rationality. Consequently, common belief in rationality alone leads to actions that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
Keywords: Belief, knowledge, common belief, common knowledge, intro-spection, epistemic game theory.
JEL Codes: C70, D83.
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view the CV.
|
|
This seminar will be held via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 28 October 2020.
|
PRESENTER
Satoshi Fukuda
Bocconi University
|
RESEARCH FIELDS
Microeconomic Theory
Game Theory
Information Economics
Mechanism Design
|
DATE:
29 October 2020 (Thursday)
|
TIME:
4.00pm - 5.30pm
|
|
|
