SMU SOE Online Seminar (Nov 19, 2020, 4pm-5.30pm): Implementation in Undominated Strategies with Applications to Auction Design, Public Good Provision and Matching

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ABSTRACT This paper considers implementation in undominated strategies by finite mechanisms, where multiple outcomes may be implemented at a single state of the world. We establish a sufficient condition for implementation applicable in a general environment with private values. We apply it to three well-known environments and obtain strikingly permissive results. In the single-object auction, the second-price auction with a reserve price can be outperformed in terms of revenue. In the public good provision problem, the Vickrey--Clarke--Groves mechanism can be outperformed from the viewpoint of a designer who wishes to minimise deficit subject to efficiency. In the two-sided matching environment where preferences on one side of the market are private information, the social choice correspondence that outputs all stable matchings at every preference profile, is implementable. Click here to view the CV.		This seminar will be held via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 18 November 2020.
		PRESENTER Arunava Sen Indian Statistical Institute
		RESEARCH FIELDS Game Theory Social Choice Theory Mechanism Design Voting and Auctions
		DATE: 19 November 2020 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm