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TOPIC:
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Inclusive Collusion Neutrality on Networks
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ABSTRACT
In the context of cooperative games with transferable utility, an inclusive collusion grants each colluding player access to resources of all colluding players and therefore transforms a given game. Inclusive collusion neutrality requires that no group of players can change their total payoff with an inclusive collusion. Assuming that collusion formation is governed by a network defined over players, we show that if the network is cyclic, no solution satisfies inclusive collusion neutrality, efficiency, and the null-player property. Tree (acyclic) networks allow us to escape the impossibility: affine combinations of the hierarchical solutions satisfy the three axioms. Further, we establish that the latter family of solutions are characterized by the three axioms and linearity.
JEL Classification Numbers: C71
Key Words: inclusive collusion neutrality, hierarchical solution, network
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Presenter
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Research Fields
Economic Theory, Social Choice Theory, Public Finance, Game Theory, Mechanism Design
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Date:
20 April 2016 (Wednesday)
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Time:
4pm - 5.30pm
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Venue:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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