SMU SOE Online Seminar (Sep 8, 2022, 10.00am-11.30am):The Core in Housing Markets with Indifferent Preferences

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ABSTRACT In the housing market model, when agents’ preferences are not strict, the strong core may be empty, while the nonempty weak core may be inefficient and larger than the set of intuitively reasonable allocations. We solve this problem by proposing two new core concepts through rectifying behavioral assumptions on the participation of unaffected agents in blocking coalitions. The two cores are nonempty, efficient, and coincide with the strong core whenever the strong core is nonempty. We generalize the concept of competitive allocations and show that there exist competitive allocations in the two cores. Click here to view the speaker's profile.		This seminar will be held virtually via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 7 Sep 2022.
		PRESENTER Jun Zhang Nanjing Audit University
		RESEARCH INTERESTS Game Theory Market Design
		DATE: 8 September 2022 (Thursday)
		TIME: 10.00am - 11.30am