SMU SOE Online Seminar (Mar 31, 2022, 4.00pm-5.30pm):Bayesian Persuasion Followed by Receiver's Mechanism Design

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ABSTRACT In Bayesian persuasion, Receiver simply plays an action after Sender's public signaling. However, in some applications, Receiver could elicit more information by offering a screening contract. This contracting stage may make both Sender and Receiver better off than in Bayesian persuasion: Sender prefers "being further screened". The outcome is most efficient with weak commitment (where Sender privately acquires full information), less so with strong commitment (where Sender jointly designs both public and private signals), and least in Bayesian persuasion. This suggests that economic predictions based on the standard Bayesian persuasion model might be biased toward overly inefficient outcomes. Click here to view the paper. Click here to view the speaker's profile.		This seminar will be held virtually via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 30 March 2022.
		PRESENTER Shuguang Zhu Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
		RESEARCH INTERESTS Microeconomic Theory
		DATE: 31 March 2022 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm