SMU SOE Online Seminar (Apr 15, 2021, 4pm-5.30pm): A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

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ABSTRACT We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current perspective. Agents may update their so-called strategic plan as the game progresses, and, at any point, for the called-for action to be simply dominant, it must lead to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple mechanisms in general social choice environments both with and without transfers, including canonical mechanisms such as ascending auctions, posted prices, and serial dictatorship-style mechanisms. As a final application, we explain the widespread popularity of the well-known Random Priority mechanism by characterizing it as the unique mechanism that is efficient, fair, and simple to play. Click here to view the paper. Click here to view the CV.		This seminar will be held virtually via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 14 April 2021.
		PRESENTER Marek Pycia University of Zurich
		RESEARCH FIELDS Market Design Economic Theory
		DATE: 15 April 2021 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm