showSidebars ==
showTitleBreadcrumbs == 1
node.field_disable_title_breadcrumbs.value ==

SMU SOE Online Seminar (Oct 29, 2020, 4pm-5.30pm): Are the Players in an Interactive Belief Model Meta-certain of the Model Itself?

Please click here if you are unable to view this page.

 

 

TOPIC:  

ARE THE PLAYERS IN AN INTERACTIVE BELIEF MODEL META-CERTAIN OF THE MODEL ITSELF?

 

In an interactive belief model, are the players “commonly meta-certain” of the model itself? This paper explicitly formalizes such implicit “common meta-certainty” assumption. To that end, the paper expands the objects of players’ beliefs from events to functions defined on the underlying states. Then, the paper defines a player’s belief generating map: it associates, with each state, whether a player believes each event at that state. The paper formalizes what it means by: “a player is (meta-)certain of her own belief-generating map” or “the players are (meta-)certain of the profile of belief-generating maps (i.e., the model).” The paper shows: a player is (meta-)certain of her own belief-generating map if and only if her beliefs are introspective. The players are commonly (meta-)certain of the model if and only if, for any event which some player believes, it is common belief that player i believes the event. This paper then asks whether the “common meta-certainty” assumption is needed for an epistemic characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts. The paper shows: if each player is logical and (meta-)certain of her own strategy and belief-generating map, then each player correctly believes her own rationality. Consequently, common belief in rationality alone leads to actions that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated actions.
 
Keywords: Belief, knowledge, common belief, common knowledge, intro-spection, epistemic game theory.
 
JEL Codes: C70, D83.
 
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view the CV.
 
 
 

This seminar will be held via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 28 October 2020.
 

Satoshi Fukuda

Bocconi University
 
 
Microeconomic Theory
Game Theory
Information Economics
Mechanism Design
 
 

29 October 2020 (Thursday)

 
 

4.00pm - 5.30pm