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TOPIC:
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COLLECTIVE DECISION ON SOCIAL VALUES AND DISTRIBUTION: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
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ABSTRACT
Many models of collective decision-making aim to aggregate various types of inputs submitted by individuals (e.g., Arrovian social choice) or to allocate resources among a group of agents based on their characteristics (e.g., claims problems). We propose a general model that subsumes a wide range of aggregation and resource allocation problems as special cases. Examples include preference aggregation, voting (deterministic or probabilistic), approval voting, claims problems, income redistribution, classification, probability aggregation, algebraic aggregation. Our focus is on axioms that have been central to the two strands of literature but been studied without connection to each other: independence (Arrow, 1951) for aggregation problems; and reallocation-proofness and decentralizability (Moulin, 1985, 1987) for resource allocation problems. We establish the equivalence of the three axioms and characterize the family of rules satisfying them (imposing no further axioms). Then we apply our main results to the examples above and obtain several existing theorems as corollaries.
Click here to view the CV.
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PRESENTER
Wonki Jo Cho
Korea University
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Microeconomic Theory
Mechanism Design
Game Theory
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DATE:
30 January 2020 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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