SMU SOE Seminar Series (April 4, 2024): Monotone Equilibrium Design for Matching Markets with Signaling

Please click here if you are unable to view this page.

ABSTRACT We study how a planner can design a monotone equilibrium with a choice of an interval of feasible reactions, in markets for matching between receivers and senders with signaling. We provide a method for monotone equilibrium design that uncovers novel insights into a planner's optimal equilibrium choice. Pooling externalities arise on both sides of matching markets due to a common value of a sender's type within a match. The pooling region continuously increases in the weight on the receiver utility in the planner's welfare function. This contrasts to the findings in optimal signal structures for market segmentation in private-value environments. Our results have broad policy implications in macroeconomics, finance, and applied microeconomics. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Seungjin Han McMaster University
		RESEARCH FIELDS Microeconomic Theory Game Theory Mechanism Design Applied Matching
		DATE: 4 April 2024 (Thursday)
		TIME: 3pm - 4.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903