SMU SOE Seminar (Sep 14, 2017): Farsighted Stability with Heterogeneous Expectations

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ABSTRACT This paper analyzes farsighted stable sets when agents have heterogeneous expectations over the dominance paths. We consider expectation functions satisfying two properties of path-persistence and consistency. We show that farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations always exist and that any singleton farsighted stable set with common expectations is a farsighted stable set with heterogeneous expectations. We characterize singleton farsighted stable sets with heterogeneous expectations in one-to-one matching models and voting models, and show that the relaxation of the hypothesis of common expectations greatly expands the set of states which can be supported as singleton farsighted stable sets. JEL Classification: C71, D72, D74 Keywords: Farsighted stable sets, Heterogeneous expectations, One-to-one matching, Voting, Effectivity functions Click here to view the paper. Click here to view his CV.
		PRESENTER Francis Bloch Paris School of Economics
		RESEARCH FIELDS Public Economics Social and Economic Network Game Theory Industrial Organisation Digital Economy
		DATE: 14 September 2017 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Seminar Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903

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