SMU SOE Seminar (October 26, 2023): Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Private Information

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ABSTRACT We study a Bayesian persuasion problem where an agent learns private information gradually in two stages. We find that the optimal persuasion scheme may offer different experiments to different types of agents. This finding contrasts with the optimality of public persuasion in scenarios where the agent’s private information is static. We identify sufficient conditions that allow the information designer to strictly improve upon public persuasion, as well as conditions where public persuasion remains optimal. Our results demonstrate that time can be utilized as an instrument to achieve information discrimination. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Wei He The Chinese University of Hong Kong
		RESEARCH FIELDS Microeconomic Theory Game Theory Mechanism Design
		DATE: 26 October 2023 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903