SMU SOE Seminar (Jan 30, 2020): Collective Decision on Social Values and Distribution: An Integrated Approach

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ABSTRACT Many models of collective decision-making aim to aggregate various types of inputs submitted by individuals (e.g., Arrovian social choice) or to allocate resources among a group of agents based on their characteristics (e.g., claims problems). We propose a general model that subsumes a wide range of aggregation and resource allocation problems as special cases. Examples include preference aggregation, voting (deterministic or probabilistic), approval voting, claims problems, income redistribution, classification, probability aggregation, algebraic aggregation. Our focus is on axioms that have been central to the two strands of literature but been studied without connection to each other: independence (Arrow, 1951) for aggregation problems; and reallocation-proofness and decentralizability (Moulin, 1985, 1987) for resource allocation problems. We establish the equivalence of the three axioms and characterize the family of rules satisfying them (imposing no further axioms). Then we apply our main results to the examples above and obtain several existing theorems as corollaries. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Wonki Jo Cho Korea University
		RESEARCH FIELDS Microeconomic Theory Mechanism Design Game Theory
		DATE: 30 January 2020 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903