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TOPIC:
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DESIGNING (BREXIT) REFERENDUM: AN ECONOMIST'S PESSIMISTIC PERSPECTIVE
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ABSTRACT
Recently, there is a trend all over the world (e.g., in Colombia, Italy, Switzerland, and U.K.) that referendums are used to determine social decisions. This paper studies designing a referendum. In several setups (e.g., different solution concepts and different types of mechanisms), we prove three impossibility results, i.e., a social goal can be achieved if and only if it is dictatorial.
In a petition to U.K. Parliament singed by more than 2.5 million people, it is proposed that a second referendum will be held if the result of the first referendum does not meet a pre-determined condition. We also provide a possibility result, which fully characterizes when such an option of a second referendum may help us achieve a non-dictatorial social goal.
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view his CV.
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PRESENTER
Siyang Xiong
University of Bristol
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Microeconomic Theory
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DATE:
2 Feb 2017 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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