showSidebars ==
showTitleBreadcrumbs == 1
node.field_disable_title_breadcrumbs.value ==

SMU SOE Seminar (Aug 28, 2019): The Signaling Role of Parental Leave

Please click here if you are unable to view this page.

 

 

TOPIC:  

THE SIGNALING ROLE OF PARENTAL LEAVE

 

This paper provides empirical tests of signaling theory in the context of workers choosing to forgo paid parental leave to signal value to employers. Using administrative data from Denmark and an unanticipated increase in the maximum allowed duration of parental leave, I show how signaling contributes to a divergence in wages due to the information that workers’ choices convey upon a leave extension. In contrast to human capital theory, an individual can take longer leave but gain in wages as long as their relative leave position in the population decreases. The results demonstrate unanticipated impacts of parental leave policies and highlight the importance of asymmetric information in the labor market.
 
Click here to view the CV.
 

 

Linh T. Tô

Boston University
 
Labor Economics
Behavioral Economics
 

28 August 2019 (Wednesday)

 

4pm - 5.30pm

 

Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903