showSidebars ==
showTitleBreadcrumbs == 1
node.field_disable_title_breadcrumbs.value ==

SMU SOE Seminar (April 20, 2023): Strategic Information Disclosure in Markets for Technology

Please click here if you are unable to view this page.

 

 

TOPIC:  

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY

 

Markets for technology can provide important opportunities for firms to reinforce their competitive position. However, participating in markets for technology can also reveal important information to competitors. In this paper, we study this tension by exploring the strategic disclosure of patent acquisitions and the conditions under which firms will trade the benefits of competitor deterrence for those of secrecy. We develop a model where firms choose their optimal disclosure policy based on the costs of imitation and the effectiveness of competitor deterrence. We test the predictions of the model using data on patent assignments and examining the recording lag between execution date and registration date with the USPTO. We find that the recording lag for patent assignments is high for newer technologies, and when the assignee lacks a reputation for enforcement. Additional analyses reveal that a) an increase in the enforceability of business method and software patents reduces the recording lag for assignments including such patents, and b) regulatory changes increasing patent disclosure, and thus that lower imitation costs, reduce the recording lag in patent assignments.
 
Click here to view the CV.
 

Carlos Serrano

HEC Paris
 
Innovation
Strategy
Entrepreneurship
 

20 April 2023 (Thursday)

 

4pm - 5.30pm

 

Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903