SMU SOE Online Seminar (Oct 1, 2020, 4pm-5.30pm): Weak Monotone Comparative Statics

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ABSTRACT We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on weak set order, or in short weak monotone comparative statics, and identify the enabling conditions in the context of individual choices, Pareto optimal choices for a coalition of agents, Nash equilibria of games, and matching theory. Compared with the existing theory based on strong set order, the conditions for weak monotone comparative statics are weaker, sometimes considerably, in terms of the structure of the choice environments and underlying preferences of agents. We apply the theory to establish existence and monotone comparative statics of Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities and of stable many-to-one matchings in two-sided matching problems, allowing for general preferences that accommodate indifferences and incomplete preferences. Click here to view the CV.		This seminar will be held via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 30 September 2020.
		PRESENTER Jinwoo Kim Seoul National University
		RESEARCH FIELDS Microeconomics Mechanism Design Auctions Matching
		DATE: 1 October 2020 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm