SMU SOE Online Seminar (Nov 26, 2020, 4pm-5.30pm): Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games

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ABSTRACT What outcomes can be implemented by the choice of an information structure in binary-action supermodular games? An outcome is partially implementable if it satisfies obedience (Bergemann and Morris (2016)). We characterize when an outcome is smallest equilibrium implementable (induced by the smallest equilibrium) and fully implementable (induced by all equilibria). Smallest equilibrium implementation requires a stronger sequential obedience condition: there is a stochastic ordering of players under which players are prepared to switch to the high action even if they think only those before them will switch. Full implementation requires sequential obedience in both directions. Our characterization of smallest equilibrium implementation can be used to solve the information design problem with adversarial equilibrium selection. Keywords: Information design, supermodular game, smallest equilibrium implementation, sequential obedience, potential game. JEL Codes: C72, D72. Click here to view the CV.		This seminar will be held via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 25 November 2020.
		PRESENTER Daisuke Oyama University of Tokyo
		RESEARCH FIELDS Game Theory Microeconomic Theory Applications
		DATE: 26 November 2020 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm