SMU SOE Online Seminar (Nov 25, 2021, 4.00pm-5.30pm): Collective Information Acquisition

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ABSTRACT We consider the problem faced by a group of players who bargain over what public signal to acquire before deciding on a collective action. The players differ in their privately known state-dependent payoffs from taking the action, and therefore differ also in their willingness to pay for the public signal. We take a mechanism design approach to characterize the efficient frontier of outcomes achievable via bargaining over information. We identify novel distortions in the optimal information structure that arise from the information asymmetry and from the fact that after the signal is realized, the outcome is determined in equilibrium of a subsequent voting game. Click here to view the speaker's profile.		This seminar will be held virtually via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 24 November 2021.
		PRESENTER Kfir Eliaz Tel-Aviv University
		RESEARCH FIELDS Behavioral economics Bounded rationality Mechanism-design Interesting theoretical questions
		DATE: 25 November 2021 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm