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TOPIC:
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INFORMATION DESIGN IN MULTI-STAGE GAMES
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ABSTRACT
We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals about past and current states, past actions, and past and current signals (including the additional past signals). We interpret our results as revelation principles for information design problems. We apply our characterization to bilateral bargaining problems.
Keywords: Multi-stage games, Information design, Communication equilibrium, Sequential communication equilibrium, Information structures, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Revelation principle
JEL Codes: C73, D82
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view the CV.
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PRESENTER
Ludovic Renou
Queen Mary University of London
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Economic Theory
Mechanism and Information Design
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DATE:
30 August 2018 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Seminar Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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