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TOPIC:
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Random Assignment: Redefining the Serial Rule
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ABSTRACT
We provide a new, welfarist, interpretation of the well-known Serial rule in the random assignment problem, strikingly different from previous attempts to define or axiomatically characterize this rule.
For each agent i we define ti(k) to be the total share of objects from her first k indifference classes this agent i gets. Serial assignment is shown to be the unique one which lexicographically maximizes the vector of all such shares (ti(k)).
This result is very general; it applies to non-strict preferences, and/or non-integer quantities of objects, as well.
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Presenter
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Research Fields
Microeconomic Theory: Game Theory, Cooperative games, Social Choice, Mechanism Design, Matching and Assignments, Networks
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Date:
20 Aug 2014 (Wednesday)
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Time:
4pm - 5.30pm
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Venue:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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