Random Assignment: Redefining the Serial Rule

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ABSTRACT We provide a new, welfarist, interpretation of the well-known Serial rule in the random assignment problem, strikingly different from previous attempts to define or axiomatically characterize this rule. For each agent i we define t_i(k) to be the total share of objects from her first k indifference classes this agent i gets. Serial assignment is shown to be the unique one which lexicographically maximizes the vector of all such shares (t_i(k)). This result is very general; it applies to non-strict preferences, and/or non-integer quantities of objects, as well.
		Presenter Anna Bogomolnaia University of Glasgow
		Research Fields Microeconomic Theory: Game Theory, Cooperative games, Social Choice, Mechanism Design, Matching and Assignments, Networks
		Date: 20 Aug 2014 (Wednesday)
		Time: 4pm - 5.30pm
		Venue: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903