SMU SOE Seminar (September 8, 2023): Stalling, Conflict, and Settlement

Please click here if you are unable to view this page.

ABSTRACT A widely-held assumption in the study of litigation and settlement is that if litigation is costly and settlement bargaining is costless, then in a complete-information setting, all disputes will settle with no need even for a lawsuit to be filed. This assumption is mistaken. Even with complete information, perfectly rational parties may fail to settle without the plaintiff first spending resources to file suit, only for the parties thereafter to settle the filed lawsuit. This ineffient outcome occurs because, outside of litigation, a strategy of stalling may be optimal for a defendant, and the plaintiff’s only alternative is (costly) litigation. In this paper, I present a simple model demonstrating how the threat of stalling leads to costly lawsuits even in a complete-information environment, derive empirical predictions from the model, and discuss policy implications for case management, discovery, and the use of prejudgment interest as tools to encourage settlement. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER William Hubbard The University of Chicago
		RESEARCH FIELDS Courts Judicial Behaviour Litigation and Settlement Civil Procedure and Arbitration
		DATE: 8 September 2023 (Friday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903