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SMU SOE Seminar (August 3, 2023): Attention Capture
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ABSTRACT
We study the extent to which information can be used to extract attention from a decision maker (DM). All feasible stopping times—random times DM stops paying attention—are implementable by giving DM either full information at random times, or null messages which make DM increasingly uncertain. We then introduce a designer with nonlinear preferences over DM’s stopping time and characterize the set of achievable welfare outcomes. Designer-optimal structures leave DM with zero surplus and have a block structure in which DM is indifferent at the boundaries and receives no information in the interior. When the designer has super/sub-modular preferences over both actions and stopping times, we completely characterize the optimal design for the binary state/action case. This highlights a tradeoff between attention extraction and persuasion. Our results speak directly to the attention economy.
Click here to view the CV.
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PRESENTER
Andrew Koh
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Economic Theory
Financial Economics
Industrial Organization
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DATE:
3 August 2023 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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