SMU SOE Seminar (November 4, 2022): Moral Hazard and Special Interests in Congress

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ABSTRACT We exploit the quasi-random timing of natural disasters to study the connection between public attention to politics and legislative support for special interests. We show that when a disaster strikes, the news media reduce both their coverage of politics in general as well as that of individual legislators in particular. At the same time, members of the House of Representatives become significantly more likely to adopt the positions of special-interest donors as they vote on bills. Taken together, the evidence we present suggests that politicians are more inclined to take actions that benefit special interests when the public is distracted. More broadly, our findings suggest that attention to politics improves electoral accountability, even in an environment with stringent transparency and disclosure requirements. Click here to view the CV.
		PRESENTER Haishan Yuan University of Queensland
		RESEARCH FIELDS Political Economy Development Economics Labor
		DATE: 4 November 2022 (Friday)
		TIME: 4pm - 5.30pm
		VENUE: Meeting Room 5.1, Level 5 School of Economics Singapore Management University 90 Stamford Road Singapore 178903