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SMU SOE Seminar (September 1, 2022):Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring
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TOPIC:
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DYNAMIC CONTRACTING WITH FLEXIBLE MONITORING
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ABSTRACT
We study a principal's joint design of optimal monitoring and com-pensation schemes to incentivize an agent by incorporating information design into a dynamic contracting framework. The principal can flexibly allocate her limited monitoring capacity between seeking evidence that confirms or contradicts the agent's effort, as the basis for reward or punishment. When the agent's continuation value is low, the principal seeks only confirmatory evidence. When it exceeds a threshold, the principal seeks mainly contradictory evidence. Importantly, the agent's effort is perpetuated if and only if he is sufficiently productive.
JEL: D86 D82 G39 J33 M52
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view the CV.
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PRESENTER
Ming Yang
University College London
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RESEARCH FIELDS
Finance Theory
Economic Theory
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DATE:
1 September 2022 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4pm - 5.30pm
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VENUE:
Meeting Room 5.1
School of Economics Level 5
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
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