SMU SOE Online Seminar (Apr 22, 2021, 4pm-5.30pm): Optimal Queue Design

Please click here if you are unable to view this page.

TOPIC:

OPTIMAL QUEUE DESIGN

ABSTRACT We study the optimal design of a queueing system when agents’ arrival and servicing are governed by general Markov processes. The designer of the system chooses entry and exit rules for agents, their service priority—or queueing discipline—as well as their information, while ensuring that agents have incentives to follow the designer’s recommendations not only to join the queue but more importantly to stay in the queue. The optimal mechanism has a cutoﬀ structure—agents are induced to enter up to a certain queue length and no agents are to exit the queue once they enter the queue; the agents on the queue are served according to a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served (FCFS) rule; and they are given no information throughout the process beyond the recommendations they receive from the designer. FCFS is also necessary for optimality in a rich domain. We identify a novel role for queueing disciplines in regulating agents’ beliefs, and their dynamic incentives, revealing a hitherto unrecognized virtue of FCFS in this regard. Keywords: Queueing disciplines, information design, mechanism design, dynamic matching. JEL Codes: C78, C61, D47, D83, D61. Click here to view the paper. Click here to view the CV.		This seminar will be held virtually via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 21 April 2021.
		PRESENTER Olivier Tercieux Paris School of Economics
		RESEARCH FIELD Microeconomic Theory
		DATE: 22 April 2021 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm

© Copyright 2024 by Singapore Management University. All Rights Reserved.