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SMU SOE Online Seminar (Oct 8, 2020, 4pm-5.30pm): Assortative Information Disclosure
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TOPIC:
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ASSORTATIVE INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
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ABSTRACT
We consider a standard persuasion problem in which the receiver’s action and the state of the world are both one-dimensional. Fully characterizing optimal signals when utilities are non-linear is a daunting task. Instead, we develop a general approach to understanding a key qualitative property of optimal signals: their assortative structure, which describes the overall pattern of what states are pooled together. We derive simple conditions—driven by intuitive economic proper-ties, such as supermodularity and submodularity of preferences—for the optimality of positive and negative assortative patterns of information disclosure. Our approach unifies a wide range of previous findings and generates new applications.
Keywords: Persuasion, information design, assortative matching.
JEL Codes: C78, D82, D83.
Click here to view the paper.
Click here to view the CV.
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This seminar will be held via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom details will be sent to the registered email by 7 October 2020.
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PRESENTER
Anton Kolotilin
University of New South Wales
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RESEARCH FIELD
Microeconomic Theory
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DATE:
8 October 2020 (Thursday)
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TIME:
4.00pm - 5.30pm
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