SMU SOE Online Seminar (Aug 27, 2020, 4pm-5.30pm): Interim Strategy-proofness with an Application to Voting

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ABSTRACT We study voting mechanisms in a setting where there are two alternatives, the agents’ preferences are interdependent, and the underlying type space is rich. The focus is on three incentive compatibility conditions that each captures a notion of robustness. First, we show that strategy-proofness (SP) is restrictive, as typically it permits nothing but constant mechanisms. Ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC), which is a weakening of SP, is more lenient, but only so in finite type spaces — when the type space is continuous, non-constant mechanisms are again ruled out under weak conditions. In view of this, we propose an alternative weakening of SP: interim strategy-proofness (ISP). ISP requires that every agent has a weakly dominant strategy conditional on her private information. We show that nontrivial ISP choice rules always exist, and moreover they are robustly implementable in a parsimonious mechanism. Click here to view the CV.		This seminar will be held via Zoom. A confirmation email with the Zoom meeting link will be sent the registered email by 26 August 2020.
		PRESENTER Qinggong Wu Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
		RESEARCH FIELD Game Theory
		DATE: 27 August 2020 (Thursday)
		TIME: 4.00pm - 5.30pm