# From Local Utility to Neural Networks 

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#### Abstract

By formalizing a preference-based notion of local linearity in the spirit of Machina (1982), we introduce two utility representations. Both are equivalent to continuous finite piecewise linear functions. In the first, it is as if the decision maker has an optimistic self and a cautious self playing a zero-sum game. In the second, the decision maker evaluates an alternative through a neural network. The representations are easy to apply and estimate, can be used for local utility analyses and analyzing choices under ambiguity, and nest the constant loss aversion model and models with hierarchical subjective product attributes as special cases.


## 1 Introduction

Linear utility functions are widely used in economics. For example, expected utility functions are linear in probability, and empirical research often uses utility functions that are linear in products' attributes. It is perhaps not surprising that these linear utility functions may not describe people's choice behavior well. Therefore, more descriptive nonlinear utility functions have been proposed, such as the constant loss aversion model of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in which a product's utility depends on whether each of their attributes is in the gain region or the loss region.

One of the most prominent nonlinear utility functions was introduced in a seminal paper by Machina (1982), who, rather than assuming linearity, assumes that the utility function is differentiable. Differentiability ensures the existence of a local expected utility function

[^0]in an infinitesimal neighborhood of any risky prospect. In other words, the decision maker's utility function exhibits a form of local linearity. It has been argued that the main insights of several important results of expected utility theory continue to hold under differentiable utility functions, and these functions can generate behavior consistent with empirical findings that linear utility functions cannot. ${ }^{1}$

Despite Machina's (1982) ingenious and insightful analysis of nonlinear utility functions, several important issues remain unaddressed. First, it is unclear what axioms a decision maker's preference should satisfy to have a differentiable utility representation. The notion of local linearity is a natural relaxation of global linearity, but ideally we may want local linearity to be defined in terms of the decision maker's choice behavior, rather than in terms of the utility representation directly. Second, differentiable utility functions in general do not offer a simple interpretation of people's choice behavior, and therefore, it is not easy to identify special cases that match behavioral phenomena. Third, empirically, it is not obvious how one should estimate a general differentiable utility function.

In this paper, we take an alternative approach to study local linearity that addresses the above issues. Our theory is based on notions of local linearity imposed directly on choice behavior. Similar to Machina (1982), local utility analyses can be performed under our theory. Moreover, our theory has several advantages. First, compared to differentiable utility functions, the representations of the decision maker's preference that we characterize have a simple and natural axiomatic foundation, and are easier to interpret and apply. Second, our theory applies to many choice settings, and hence can accommodate a wider range of empirical findings. Third, our theory provides a useful framework for us to better understand a variety of choice axioms and decision models. Last, there are well developed and widely used methods to estimate some of our representations.

Specifically, the linearity of utility functions is characterized, for example, by the independence axiom from expected utility theory. Using a variation of the Allais paradox, we argue that although independence does not hold globally, as shown in the original Allais paradox, it does seem reasonable to assume that some notion of independence holds locally. Directly assuming that independence holds locally everywhere, however, will simply bring us back to linear utility functions. Therefore, we first weaken independence, then require that it hold locally everywhere. Roughly speaking, fixing any alternative $x$, we require that in some neighborhood of $x$, for any mixtures with $x$, the independence property holds.

We introduce two kinds of such weakening - weak local independence and weak local bi-independence - derived from relaxation of two equivalent axioms that characterize linear

[^1]utility functions: independence and bi-independence, respectively.
Together with the standard weak order and continuity axioms, we first show that weak local independence implies that the decision maker's preference must exhibit piecewise independence, which means that the set of alternatives can be divided into several regions, and independence holds in each region. More importantly, under these axioms, generically, the preference does not have any differentiable utility representations. Thus, our notion of local independence/linearity that is defined based on choice behavior leads to a different class of functions from those of Machina (1982). Nonetheless, we show that the powerful local utility analysis introduced by Machina (1982) continues to work under our axioms.

It might seem that a preference that exhibits piecewise independence can be represented by a continuous finite piecewise linear (CFPL) function, but this is not true in general. Rather, weak local bi-independence, which is stronger than weak local independence, together with the same standard axioms, characterizes CFPL functions, which is an extremely important class of functions in many academic fields. Hence, the local linearity property of the utility function we derive from our behavioral definition of local independence is that the utility function is locally exactly linear almost everywhere.

We introduce two useful representations of the decision maker's preference that are equivalent to CFPL functions. The first is called the cautiously optimistic linear utility (COLU) representation, whose equivalence to CFPL functions follows from a result by Tarela and Martínez (1999) and Ovchinnikov (2002). A preference has a COLU representation if there are affine functions $U_{1}, \ldots, U_{n}$ and $I_{1}, \ldots, I_{m} \subseteq\{1, \ldots, n\}$ such that the decision maker's preference is represented by $\max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} U_{i}$. To interpret the COLU representation, it is as if the decision maker has two conflicting selves playing a sequential zero-sum game. The first takes an action (i.e., chooses some set $I_{j}$ ) to maximize the utility of the alternative, and the second takes an action (i.e., chooses some $i$ from the set $I_{j}$ chosen by the first self) to minimize the utility of the alternative. One may interpret the first self as the decision maker's optimistic self and the second as her cautious self when it comes to evaluating an alternative. ${ }^{2}$

A recent paper by Arora, Basu, Mianjy, and Mukherjee (2018) from the computer science literature shows that neural-network functions with rectified linear units are identical to CFPL functions. Following this observation, our second representation, which is equivalent to CFPL functions, features one of the most powerful ingredients of machine learning: neural networks. We call this representation the neural-network utility (NU) representation. In an

[^2]NU representation, the decision maker takes an alternative and outputs the utility of the alternative through a feedforward neural network. A feedforward neural network may have multiple hidden layers, and each hidden layer may have multiple neurons. Each neuron first aggregates its child neurons' values in an affine fashion. If the outcome of aggregation is above the normalized threshold-zero-this neuron is activated and the aggregation value may be passed to neurons in the next hidden layer. Otherwise, this neuron remains inactive and has zero value. A neuron in the first hidden layer affinely aggregates all components of the alternative, and the values of neurons in the last hidden layer are aggregated into the utility of the alternative.

To interpret this representation, think of $X$ as a space of products characterized by their attributes. Under the NU representation, first, the decision maker considers multiple ways to evaluate a product, captured by the first-hidden-layer neurons. It is as if the decision maker uses the raw attributes of the product to form multiple advanced subjective attributes. Some of these subjective attributes may be active and some may be inactive. The decision maker may continue to consider multiple ways (captured by the second-hidden-layer neurons) to aggregate those active subjective attributes, which enables her to form more advanced subjective attributes. This process continues until she reaches a final evaluation of the product.

Similar to the COLU representation, the NU representation is easy to apply. Another advantage of the NU representation is that the empirical methods for estimating neuralnetwork models are well developed and widely used in practice. We have seen substantial evidence of the practical success of neural-network models when paired with a large amount of data. Therefore, it is quite likely that the NU model will significantly outperform traditional economic models in prediction and help us identify behavioral phenomena that would be difficult to identify using traditional methods.

As we introduce the representations, we also present several useful applications of our theory. First, we show that the COLU representation provides a useful framework that helps us understand classic axioms from the ambiguity literature in a new way. Second, we show that the constant loss aversion model is a special case of the COLU representation. Writing the constant loss aversion model as a COLU representation gives the model a new interpretation, and suggests natural ways to generalize it. Third, we show how to construct neurons in a simple and intuitive way in the NU representation to capture behavioral effects, such as the decision maker's bias toward risk-free alternatives, which captures the certainty effect. Last, we present an NU representation in which the decision maker uses raw attributes of the product to form hierarchically more advanced/complex subjective attributes, which is an intuitive model of how people evaluate multi-attribute products.

### 1.1 Related Literature

A growing literature combines economic theory with machine learning. Fudenberg and Liang (2019) use a decision tree algorithm to study the initial play of games. By studying games the algorithm predicts well-but other economic models do not-they identify a new parameter that, if introduced to the best model, improves the model's performance. Cho and Libgober (2021) study a problem in which an agent uses historical data and algorithms to provide action recommendations to a sequence of players in order to maximize their average longrun payoffs. Caplin, Martin, and Marx (2022) and Ke, Wu, and Zhao (2022) analyze the questions of how to model machine learning and how to model people learning from complex machine learning algorithms, respectively.

Our main representations are equivalent to CFPL functions. The closest paper to ours is by Ellis and Masatlioglu (2021), who characterize a categorical thinking model. Fixing any reference point, they assume that bi-independence is preserved for any two cells of an exogenously given partition of the choice domain and allow the preference to be discontinuous across cells. We focus on continuous preferences and identify endogenously a finite number of cells that preserve bi-independence pairwisely from the preference.

In the Anscombe-Aumann choice domain, Siniscalchi (2006) has also characterized CFPL functions that satisfy the C-independence axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Chandrasekher et al. (2022) introduce the dual-self expected utility representation by dropping uncertainty aversion from Gilboa and Schmeidler's model. Both the dual-self expected utility representation and the maxmin expected utility representation of Gilboa and Schmeidler become special cases of CFPL functions that satisfy C-independence if the number of priors is finite.

Our paper is related to non-expected utility theory. As summarized by Karni, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2015), there are three approaches to relax the expected utility model: the axiomatic approach, the descriptive approach, and the local utility analysis. Our theory, if we focus on the probability simplex as the choice domain, falls into the intersection of all three. Machina (1982) introduces the notion of local linearity and local utility and studies smooth utility functions. Due to differentiability, the utility function can be approximated by affine functions locally everywhere. However, as discussed before, first, local linearity is not defined on choice behavior directly. Second, the smooth utility function does not have a simple interpretation and thus is not easy to apply. Third, it is not obvious how to estimate a smooth utility function from data. Our approach addresses these issues. We provide two notions of local linearity defined on preferences. In sharp contrast to Machina's smooth utility functions, our notions of local linearity lead to utility representations that are generically nondifferentiable. Our COLU representation and the NU representation both have natural
interpretations, and we offer simple application examples. The NU representation can be estimated using standard machine learning techniques.

Within the framework of expected utility theory and maintaining independence, Hara, Ok, and Riella (2019) characterize several new representations by relaxing completeness, transitivity, and continuity. The main representation, coalitional expected utility representation, only imposes reflexivity and independence. There is a set of sets (called coalitions) of expected utility functions such that a lottery $x$ is preferred to another lottery $y$ if and only if every coalition has a utility function that ranks $x$ above $y$.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate and introduce our behavioral definition of local linearity. Section 3 presents results based on weak local independence. Section 4 provides the characterization and uniqueness results for the CFPL representation of the decision maker's preference. Sections 5 and 6 introduce the COLU and NU representations, and discuss applications of these representations. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Locally Linear Preferences

Consider a convex and compact choice domain $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{N}$ with nonempty interior. Each choice alternative $x=\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{N}\right) \in X$ is an $N$-tuple. For example, when $X$ is a space of products described by their attributes, $x_{i}$ is the value of attribute $i$. When $X$ is the probability simplex in $\mathbb{R}^{N}, x \in X$ is called a lottery over $N$ prizes, with $x_{i}$ indicating the probability of prize $i$. We use $x, y, z$ to denote generic choice alternatives. For any $\lambda \in[0,1]$, we use $\lambda x y$ as shorthand for the convex combination $\lambda x+(1-\lambda) y$. The decision maker has a preference $\succsim$ on $X$. Its asymmetric and symmetric parts are denoted by $\succ$ and $\sim$, respectively.

We know from expected utility theory that $\succsim$ on $X$ satisfies the following axioms if and only if it has a linear utility representation-that is, there exists an affine function $U$ such that $x \succsim y \Longleftrightarrow U(x) \geqslant U(y)$.

Axiom 1 (Weak Order) $\succsim$ is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity) For any $x \in X,\{y \in X: y \succsim x\}$ and $\{y \in X: x \succsim y\}$ are closed.
Axiom 3 (Independence) For any $x, y, z \in X$ and $\lambda \in(0,1), x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z$.
The idea of independence is simple - if $x$ is better than $y$, mixing $x$ and $y$ with any weight should also be better than mixing $x$ with $z$ with the same weight, and vice versa. This idea can be expressed in an equivalent way that will be crucial in our paper.

Axiom 4 (Bi-independence) For any $x, y, z, z^{\prime} \in X$ with $z \sim z^{\prime}$ and $\lambda \in(0,1), x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow$ $\lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z^{\prime}$.

If we require $z=z^{\prime}$, bi-independence implies independence. Conversely, by applying independence twice, we can obtain bi-independence.

Among these axioms, usually (bi-)independence is the one that is violated. For example, a well-known violation of (bi-)independence comes from the Allais paradox in the choice domain with objective uncertainty-i.e., when $X$ is the probability simplex in $\mathbb{R}^{N}$ and each $x \in X$ is a lottery over $n$ prizes. Confronting the following two pairs of lotteries, most decision makers choose the left-hand lottery from the first pair and the right-hand lottery from the second:

| First pair |  | Second pair |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $100 \%: \$ 1 \mathrm{M}$ | $3 \%: \$ 0$ | $87 \%: \$ 0$ | $90 \%: \$ 0$ |
|  | $87 \%: \$ 1 \mathrm{M}$ | $13 \%: \$ 1 \mathrm{M}$ | $10 \%: \$ 1.5 \mathrm{M}$ |
|  | $10 \%: \$ 1.5 \mathrm{M}$ |  |  |

To see why such behavior is a violation of (bi-)independence, let $\delta_{r}$ be the degenerate lottery that pays $\$ r$ for sure. Let $x=\delta_{1 \mathrm{M}}, y=\frac{10}{13} \delta_{1.5 \mathrm{M}}+\frac{3}{13} \delta_{0}, z=\delta_{1 \mathrm{M}}$, and $z^{\prime}=\delta_{0}$. The first pair of lotteries becomes $0.13 x z$ and $0.13 y z$. The second pair becomes $0.13 x z^{\prime}$ and $0.13 y z^{\prime}$. (Bi-)independence requires that $0.13 x z \succsim 0.13 y z$ if and only if $0.13 x z^{\prime} \succsim 0.13 x z^{\prime}$. Therefore, the Allais paradox violates (bi-)independence, and thus is inconsistent with linear utility functions.

Many nonlinear utility functions have been proposed to accommodate empirical evidence inconsistent with linearity. One of the most prominent is found in Machina (1982). It is assumed that the utility function is differentiable, which implies the existence of a unique local expected utility function in an infinitesimal neighborhood of any lottery. In other words, the decision maker's utility function exhibits a form of local linearity. It is unclear, however, what axioms a decision maker's preference should satisfy to have such a utility representation. Below, we introduce a definition of locally linear choice behavior, without assuming some form of local linearity on the utility representation directly.

Since linearity is characterized by (bi-)independence, a natural idea for formalizing local linearity is to assume that (bi-)independence holds locally, i.e., when the choice alternatives are close to each other. First, let us show that part of this idea offers a natural solution to evidence against full linearity. Take the Allais paradox as an example. If the right-hand lottery $0.13 y z$ in the first pair becomes almost degenerate, decision makers may not be much biased toward $\delta_{1 \mathrm{M}}$, and hence the certainty effect may not be strong enough to trigger violations of (bi-)independence. ${ }^{3}$ To see this, suppose we now have $0.013 x z$ and $0.013 y^{*} z$ in

[^3]the first pair and $0.013 x z^{*}$ and $0.013 y^{*} z^{*}$ in the second, in which $y^{*}=\frac{10}{13} \delta_{1.5 M}+\frac{3}{13} \delta_{0.5 M}$ and $z^{*}=\delta_{0.5 \mathrm{M}}$ :

| First pair |  | Second pair |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 100\%: \$1M | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 0.3 \%: & \$ 0.5 \mathrm{M} \\ 98.7 \%: & \$ 1 \mathrm{M} \\ 1 \%: & \$ 1.5 \mathrm{M} \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 98.7 \%: \$ 0.5 \mathrm{M} \\ & 1.3 \%: \$ 1 \mathrm{M} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 99 \%: \\ & 1 \%: \end{aligned} \$ 0.5 \mathrm{M}, 5 \mathrm{M}$ |

Can we assume that (bi-)independence holds locally around any choice alternative then? The answer is negative, because in that case (bi-)independence will hold globally. Below, we introduce two novel ways to mildly weaken (bi-)independence, and require that the weaker version of (bi-)independence hold locally everywhere. A subset of $X$ is said to be a neighborhood of an alternative $x$ if it is an open convex set that contains $x$.

Axiom 5 (Weak Local Independence) Any $z \in X$ has a neighborhood $L_{z}$ such that for any $x, y \in L_{z}$ and $\lambda \in(0,1), x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z$.

For a subset $L$ of $X$, we say that $L$ preserves independence if $x, y, z, \lambda x z, \lambda y z \in L$ with $\lambda \in(0,1)$ implies that $x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z$. In other words, any three lotteries in this subset satisfy the property required by independence. Weak local independence does not imply that $L_{z}$ preserves independence. It only requires that preferences be preserved when the alternatives in $L_{z}$ are mixed with the given $z$. In fact, if instead we require that any $z \in X$ have a neighborhood $L_{z}$ that preserves independence, independence will hold globally.

To see how weak local independence differs from preserving independence locally, consider the following example. Let $X=[0,1]$. Suppose $\succsim$ can be represented by

$$
U(x)= \begin{cases}-x+0.01, & \text { if } x<0.01  \tag{1}\\ x-0.01, & \text { if } x \geqslant 0.01\end{cases}
$$

It can be verified that no neighborhoods of $x=0.01$ preserve independence, but weak local independence holds.

Weak local independence only informs us of the decision maker's local choice behavior. It does not impose any structure on the decision maker's preference when the choice alternatives are far apart. A local and weakened version of bi-independence, by contrast, imposes structures on the choice behavior in this situation.

Axiom 6 (Weak Local Bi-independence) Any $z, z^{\prime} \in X$ with $z \sim z^{\prime}$ have neighborhoods $L_{z}$ and $L_{z^{\prime}}$, respectively, such that for any $x \in L_{z}, y \in L_{z^{\prime}}$, and $\lambda \in(0,1), x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z^{\prime}$.

For subsets $L_{1}, L_{2}$ of $X$, we say that $L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$ preserve bi-independence if $x, z, \lambda x z \in L_{i}$, $y, z^{\prime}, \lambda y z^{\prime} \in L_{3-i}$ with $i \in\{1,2\}, \lambda \in(0,1)$, and $z \sim z^{\prime}$ implies that $x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z^{\prime}$.

Weak local bi-independence does not require that $L_{z}$ and $L_{z^{\prime}}$ preserve bi-independence. It only requires that preferences be preserved when the alternatives $x$ and $y$ are mixed respectively with the given $z$ and $z^{\prime}$. Clearly, weak local bi-independence weakens bi-independence in a fashion similar to how weak local independence weakens independence.

By letting $z=z^{\prime}$ in weak local bi-independence, we obtain weak local independence. Thus, weak local bi-independence is stronger than weak local independence. In fact, weak local bi-independence is strictly stronger. Figure 1 is an example that satisfies weak local independence but does not satisfy weak local bi-independence.


Figure 1: Let $X=[0,1]$. The decision maker's utility function $U: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is shown in the figure. In this example, every alternative $\tilde{z} \in[0,1]$ has a neighborhood such that for any $x, y$ in that neighborhood and $\lambda \in(0,1), x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y \tilde{z}$. In particular, the neighborhood $L_{z}$ satisfies this requirement trivially since $U$ is monotone within $L_{z}$. However, $z$ and $z^{\prime}$ do not satisfy the requirement of weak local bi-independence, since any neighborhood of $z^{\prime}$ includes a nonlinear segment. Take any alternative $x$ from that nonlinear segment. We can find $y$ in $L_{z}$ such that $x \succ y$ but $\lambda y z \succ \lambda x z^{\prime}$.

## 3 Weak Local Independence

First, we introduce results that mainly use weak local independence. A set $Y \subseteq X$ is regular closed if $Y=\operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{int}(Y))$. We say that $\succsim$ exhibits piecewise independence if there exists a collection of regular closed subsets whose union is $X$ such that each of those subsets preserves independence. A linear utility function $U: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is said to be a local utility function of $\succsim$ if it represents $\succsim$ on a nonempty regular closed subset $Y \subseteq X$ and $U(X) \in\{\{0\},[0,1]\}$. In other words, we normalize each local utility function so that it is either a constant utility function that assigns 0 to any alternative or has range $[0,1]$.

Theorem 1 If $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local independence, then $\succsim$ exhibits piecewise independence. Furthermore, $\succsim$ has at most a finite number of local utility functions.

Assuming weak order and continuity, weak local independence implies that one can decompose the choice domain into regular closed regions such that within each region, $\succsim$ has a linear utility representation. Note that the fact that $\succsim$ has a linear utility representation within each of these regions does not imply that $\succsim$ can be represented by a CFPL function (to be formally defined in the next section). For example, the preference in Figure 1 exhibits piecewise linear independence, since it is monotone within $\left[0, z^{\prime \prime}\right]$ and within $\left[z^{\prime \prime}, 1\right]$, but it cannot be represented by a CFPL function.

One important implication of Theorem 1 is that generically, weak local independence leads to nondifferentiability of the utility representation.

Proposition 1 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local independence. If each local utility function of $\succsim$ is non-constant and $\succsim$ has a differentiable utility representation, then there exists a linear utility function $U$ such that any local utility function of $\succsim$ is either $U$ or $1-U$.

Thus, assuming weak order, continuity, and weak local independence, if $\succsim$ has nonconstant local utility functions, a necessary condition for $\succsim$ to have a differentiable utility representation is that it can have at most two local utility functions that represent opposite preferences. This means that for any regular closed regions $X, Y$ that preserve independence, each level set in $X$ must be parallel to each level set in $Y$. To see the intuition, suppose that there exists two regions in which the level sets are not parallel across regions. If this is the case, we can find some alternative at which the level set has a kink. Then any representation of $\succsim$ with non-constant local utility functions cannot be differentiable at that alternative.

Next, we present an example of $\succsim$ such that (i) $\succsim$ has a differentiable utility representation and (ii) there exists a non-constant $U$ such that $U$ and $1-U$ are the only local utility functions of $\succsim$. Let $X=[0,1]$ and suppose $\succsim$ can be represented by $V(x)=(x-0.01)^{2} .{ }^{4}$ Then the (normalized) local utility functions are $U_{1}(x)=x$ and $U_{2}(x)=1-x$, and the corresponding regular closed regions are $[0,0.01]$ and $[0.01,1]$, respectively. This example shows that it is possible for $\succsim$ to exhibit piecewise independence and have a differentiable representation even if it does not satisfy independence. However, situations in which a differentiable representation may exist-namely, when $\succsim$ has a constant local utility function or when $\succsim$ only has two opposite local utility functions - is nongeneric. Therefore, under the axioms in Proposition 1, generically, $\succsim$ will not have a differentiable utility representation.

Although $\succsim$ may not have a differentiable utility representation, it turns out that we can still perform the local utility analysis in the spirit of Machina (1982). Consider a preorder

[^4](a reflexive and transitive binary relation) $\unrhd$ defined on $X$. We say that a utility function $U$ respects $\unrhd$ if for any $x, y \in X, x \unrhd y$ implies $U(x) \geqslant U(y)$. For example, in expected utility theory, an expected utility function with a strictly increasing Bernoulli index respects first-order stochastic dominance, which is a preorder. We say that $\succsim$ respects $\unrhd$ if it has a utility representation that respects $\unrhd$. We say that $\unrhd$ satisfies betweenness if $x \unrhd y$ implies that $x \unrhd \lambda x y \unrhd y$ for any $\lambda \in[0,1]$.

Proposition 2 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local independence. For any preorder $\unrhd$ that satisfies betweenness, if each local utility function of $\succsim$ respects $\unrhd$, then $\succsim$ respects $\unrhd$.

Suppose $X$ is the set of lotteries over a (finite) set of monetary prizes. Then first-order stochastic dominance and second-order stochastic dominance can be defined in the usual way as partial orders on $X$. Since both of these partial orders satisfy betweenness, we conclude that if each local utility function of $\succsim$ respects first-order (second-order) stochastic dominance, then $\succsim$ will respect first-order (second-order) stochastic dominance. Therefore, the insights from the main results of Machina (1982) also apply in our theory.

## 4 Weak Local Bi-independence

Now, we introduce the results that make use of weak local bi-independence. Since weak local bi-independence is stronger than weak local independence, our results in the previous section continue to hold here.

As discussed above, Figure 1 shows that weak local independence is too weak to ensure that the preference can be represented by a CFPL function, and that weak local biindependence is strictly stronger than weak local independence. It turns out that weak local bi-independence exactly characterizes CFPL functions.

Definition 1 A function $f: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is CFPL if $f$ is continuous and there exist a finite collection of regular closed subsets whose union is $X$ such that $f$ is affine on each of those subsets. ${ }^{5}$

If a preference can be represented by a CFPL function, we say that the preference has a CFPL representation.

Theorem 2 The preference $\succsim$ has a CFPL representation if and only if $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local bi-independence.

[^5]Assuming weak order and continuity, (bi-)independence characterizes linear functions on $X$, whereas weak local bi-independence characterizes CFPL functions on $X$. CFPL functions have been extremely useful in many academic fields, and the behavioral characterization of CFPL functions is more challenging than it might appear (see Siniscalchi (2006) for a related example).

According to this theorem, our stronger behavioral definition of local linearity, weak local bi-independence, leads to the following local linearity property of the utility function: The utility representation is locally exactly linear almost everywhere. The measure of the set of nondifferentiable points/alternatives is zero, and every differentiable point/alternative has a neighborhood such that the utility representation is affine on that neighborhood.

The uniqueness of CFPL representations is analogous to that of linear representations.
Proposition 3 Suppose the preference $\succsim$ has a CFPL representation $W$. Then, $\succsim$ can be represented by another CFPL function $\tilde{W}$ if and only if there exists a strictly increasing CFPL function $f: W(X) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $\tilde{W}=f \circ W$.

Therefore, CFPL representations are unique up to positive CFPL transformations, just like linear representations are unique up to positive (continuous) linear transformations.

### 4.1 Sketch of the Proof of Theorem 2

We explain why the axioms imply that the preference has a CFPL representation. The proof consists of three parts. First, we identify the interior of all regions over which the preference can be represented by an affine function. By weak local independence (implied by weak local bi-independence), every alternative $z$ has a neighborhood $L_{z}$ such that for any $x, y \in L_{z}$ and $\lambda \in(0,1), x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z$. Pick any $z^{\prime} \in L_{z}$. We can find a neighborhood $L_{z^{\prime}} \subseteq L_{z}$ that has the same property with respect to $z^{\prime}$. Inductively, we can find $N$ alternatives inside $L_{z}$ and prove that the (regular closed) polytope formed by these $N$ alternatives and $z$ preserves independence. Figure 2 illustrates the construction when $N=2$.

It may appear that the fact that there is a polytope containing $z$ that preserves independence for every $z \in X$ is sufficient for us to construct a CFPL representation, but if this is true, we only need weak local independence rather than weak local bi-independence. We have seen a pathological example in Figure 1 that only satisfies the former but not the latter, and cannot be represented by a CFPL function. In the actual proof, we use weak local bi-independence instead to construct polytopes in a similar fashion. This allows us to show that every pair of such polytopes preserves bi-independence, which is the key to ensure that each of these polytopes is indeed part of a region over which the preference's CFPL


Figure 2: Let $N=2$. Without loss of generality, assume that $L_{z^{\prime \prime}} \subseteq L_{z^{\prime}} \subseteq L_{z}$. It can be shown that the triangle $\overline{z^{\prime \prime} z^{\prime} z}$ preserves independence.
representation is affine (called a region for simplicity). Let the union of the interiors of these polytopes be $X_{o}$, which is the union of the interiors of all regions.

Next, we identify each region via Zorn's lemma. First, we consider the set of all functions that map $X_{o}$ into subsets of $X$ that preserve independence individually and bi-independence pairwisely. By Zorn's lemma, we are able to find a maximal element among these functions. It will assign each $z \in X_{o}$ a maximal region that satisfies the required properties. The image of this maximal function identifies all regions.

The number of regions must be finite. Intuitively, if we do not have finitely many regions, we can select an alternative in each region and then find an accumulation point of these alternatives such that any neighborhood of that accumulation point intersects with infinitely many regions. This turns out to violate weak local independence, which means that weak local bi-independence is also violated.

Then, we construct a CFPL representation of the preference. The key step in this part is to show that if a collection of subsets of $X$ preserve independence individually and biindependence pairwisely, we can construct a CFPL representation on the union of these subsets. The proof of this step is similar to Chapter 2.4 of Schmidt (1998).

## 5 Cautiously Optimistic Linear Utility

Tarela and Martínez (1999) and Ovchinnikov (2002) show that a CFPL function has a lattice polynomial representation that maximizes over a collection of minimums of sets of affine functions. Building on their results, we define the COLU representation of the decision maker's preference as follows.

Definition 2 We say that $\succsim$ has a COLU representation if there are affine functions $U_{1}, \ldots, U_{M}$
and index sets $I_{1}, \ldots, I_{m} \subseteq\{1, \ldots, M\}$ such that

$$
x \succsim y \Longleftrightarrow \max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} U_{i}(x) \geqslant \max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} U_{i}(y) .
$$

With a COLU representation, it is as if the decision maker has two selves who are playing a sequential zero-sum game. The first self takes an action (i.e., chooses a set of utility functions indicated by an index set $I_{j}$ for further evaluations). The first self's goal is to maximize the utility of an alternative eventually. Then, the second self takes an action by choosing some $i$ from the set $I_{j}$ chosen by the first self. The second self's goal is to minimize the expected utility of the alternative. ${ }^{6}$ The second self evaluates an alternative with caution. Given what the second self will do, the first self tries to evaluate the alternative more optimistically.

Corollary 1 The preference $\succsim$ has a COLU representation if and only if $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local bi-independence.

This result directly follows from our Theorem 2 and Tarela and Martínez (1999) and Ovchinnikov (2002).

A remarkable feature of the COLU representation is its finiteness. If we allow for infinitely many affine functions under the maximum and minimum operators in the representation, the COLU representation may not be truly piecewise linear. For example, one can have a collection of affine functions whose minimum ends up being a parabola. Indeed, similar representations in the literature, such as the dual-self expected utility representation of Chandrasekher et al. (2022) and its special case, the maxmin expected utility representation of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), do not have such finiteness. In order to obtain such finiteness for a representation, usually some rather demanding axioms are needed. In our case, we do not have any axioms that directly assume finiteness. Rather, finiteness is naturally implied by weak local independence, as shown by Theorem 1.

In what sense is the COLU representation unique? A COLU representation may have many affine functions under the maximum and minimum operators. Some of the affine functions may be redundant. We might hope that by removing the redundant ones, we can obtain a minimal COLU representation that is unique. However, this is not true. Similar observations have been made in recent papers with similar representations, such as Hara et al. (2019) and Chandrasekher et al. (2022). In those papers, the uniqueness of the representation is

[^6]obtained via half-space closures. In our case, due to the finiteness of the COLU representation, we can have a much simpler and interpretable canonical COLU representation that is unique in some sense.

We already know that under weak order, continuity, and weak local bi-independence, the preference has a CFPL representation that is unique up to a positive CFPL transformation. Moreover, according to Tarela and Martínez (1999) and Ovchinnikov (2002), every CFPL function can be rewritten as a COLU representation. In general, however, a CFPL function may be equal to multiple distinct COLU representations. Therefore, below we discuss, fixing a particular CFPL representation of the preference, in what sense the COLU representation of the CFPL representation is unique. In particular, we follow the construction of Tarela and Martínez (1999) and Ovchinnikov (2002) to illustrate how distinct COLU representations that are equal to the same CFPL function can be transformed into the same unique canonical COLU representation.

Suppose a COLU representation is equal to a CFPL function $V$. According to the solution to the maxmin problem of the COLU representation, $V$ 's domain is divided into several maximal (in the sense of set inclusion) regular closed subsets, $X_{1}^{*}, \ldots, X_{j}^{*}$, such that $X=\bigcup_{i=1}^{j} X_{i}^{*}$ and $V$ is affine on each $X_{i}^{*}$. Let $X_{1}, \ldots, X_{k}$ denote the connected components of $X_{1}^{*}, \ldots, X_{j}^{*}$. Let $U_{i}$ denote the affine function that is identical to $V$ on $X_{i}, i=1, \ldots, k$. Let $\mathbb{U}=\left\{U_{1}, \ldots, U_{k}\right\}$. For each $X_{i}$, define a set of affine functions $\mathbb{U}_{i}=\left\{U \in \mathbb{U}: U_{i}(x) \leqslant\right.$ $U(x)$ for any $\left.x \in X_{i}\right\}$. Let $\mathcal{U}=\left\{\mathbb{U}_{1}, \ldots, \mathbb{U}_{k}\right\}$. For any COLU representation $V$, we call $\max _{\mathbb{U}_{i} \in \mathcal{U}} \min _{U \in \mathbb{U}_{i}} U(x)$ its canonical COLU representation.

The construction of $\mathcal{U}$ can be understood as follows. First, we remove redundant affine functions from the original COLU representation. Each nonredundant affine function solves the maxmin problem of the original COLU representation on some regular closed maximally connected subsets of $X$, which must be a polytope. For each such polytope $X_{i}$ such that the affine function $U_{i}$ solves the maxmin problem on $X_{i}$, we construct a subset $\mathbb{U}_{i}$ of $\mathbb{U}$, which consists of nonredundant affine functions from the original COLU representation that dominate $U_{i}$. Putting these subsets $\mathbb{U}_{i}$ together, we obtain $\mathcal{U}$. The next result follows from Tarela and Martínez (1999) and Ovchinnikov (2002).

Corollary 2 Every COLU representation is equal to its canonical COLU representation.
Thus, two distinct COLU representations of the preference that are equal to some CFPL function $V$ must have the same canonical COLU representation because the canonical COLU representation only depends on $V$.

### 5.1 COLU and Ambiguity

The COLU representation's functional form is similar to that of a model of ambiguity: the dual-self expected utility representation (Chandrasekher et al. (2022)). We put the COLU representation in the context of ambiguity in this subsection. Our choice domain not only nests the space of product attributes and the probability simplex as special cases, but also allows us to study subjective uncertainty. Let $X=[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]^{N} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{N}$, in which $N$ indicates the number of states. Each $x=\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{N}\right) \in X$ describes an act that assigns utility $x_{i} \in[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]$ to state $i$. Let $\mathbf{1}=(1, \ldots, 1) \in \mathbb{R}^{N}$.

Under this interpretation of $X$, an affine function $f(x)=\mu \cdot x+\alpha$ becomes the sum of a constant and the inner product between a fixed finite signed measure on the state space $\mu \in \mathbb{R}^{N}$ and any act $x$. Below we list several standard axioms in the ambiguity literature, first introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).

Axiom 7 (C-Independence) For any $x, y \in X, u \in[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]$ and $\lambda \in(0,1), x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x(u \mathbf{1}) \succsim$ $\lambda y(u \mathbf{1})$.

Axiom 8 (Monotonicity) For any $x, y \in X, x \geq y$ implies $x \succsim y$.
Axiom 9 (Uncertainty Aversion) For any $x, y \in X$ and $\lambda \in[0,1], x \sim y$ implies $\lambda x y \succsim x$.

The next result provides a new perspective on the implications of these axioms, through the lens of the COLU representation. To simplify the exposition, we impose a nondegeneracy assumption. We say that a preference is nondegenerate if there exist $u, v \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $u \mathbf{1} \succ v \mathbf{1} .^{7}$

Proposition 4 Suppose a nondegenerate $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local bi-independence. The following statements are true:

1. The preference satisfies C-independence, monotonicity, and uncertainty aversion if and only if it has a finite maxmin expected utility representation $\min _{i \in I} \mu_{i} \cdot x$, in which $\mu_{i} \in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{N}$ and $\mu_{i} \cdot \mathbf{1}=1$ for any $i$.
2. The preference satisfies C-independence and monotonicity if and only if it has a COLU representation $\max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} \mu_{i} \cdot x$, in which $\mu_{i} \in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{N}$ and $\mu_{i} \cdot \mathbf{1}=1$ for any $i$.
3. The preference satisfies monotonicity if and only if it has a COLU representation $\max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} \mu_{i} \cdot x+\alpha_{i}$, in which $\mu_{i} \in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{N}$ and $\alpha_{i} \in \mathbb{R}$ for any $i$.

[^7]4. The preference satisfies C-independence if and only if it has a COLU representation $\max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} \mu_{i} \cdot x$, in which $\mu_{i} \in \mathbb{R}^{N}$ and $\mu_{i} \cdot \mathbf{1}$ is identical for any $i$.

The first result in Proposition 4 shows that if weak local bi-independence is assumed in addition to standard axioms in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), maxmin expected utility with a finite set of priors is obtained. Siniscalchi (2006) characterizes the same class of preferences by requiring, roughly speaking, that the mixture of nearby acts do not provide an effective hedge. Siniscalchi's axiom can also be regarded as a form of local linearity similar in spirit to weak local independence. Compared with weak local (bi-)independence, the statement of Siniscalchi's axiom is more involved and harder to interpret, and the bite of the axiom relies on C-independence.

The second result shows that removing uncertainty aversion from the axiomatic system yields the finite version of the dual-self expected utility representation by Chandrasekher et al. (2022). Chandrasekher (2019) introduces a partially finite version of the dual-self expected utility representation that has a finite number of index sets for the optimistic self to choose from, but each index set may contain an infinite number of measures. Thus, his axioms do not seem to lead to a CFPL representation.

The last two results show that in our framework, (i) monotonicity's role is to ensure that all finite signed measures in the COLU representation are nonnegative measures, and (ii) C-independence ensures that those finite signed measures have the same total mass, and the constant terms of the affine functions in the COLU representation can be assumed away. It can be inferred from Chandrasekher et al. (2022) that the finite signed measures in the COLU representation are the Clark differentials of the functional that aggregates utilities across states. In particular, Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) point out that the combination of monotonicity and C-independence ensures that the Clark differentials must be a set of probability measures; that is, all finite signed measures are nonnegative and have the same total mass. When only one of the two axioms is assumed, however, the Clark differentials may not exist. In this situation, weak local bi-independence comes in handy, since it ensures the existence of a CFPL representation for which the Clark differentials must exist. Therefore, in our framework, the effects of C-independence and monotonicity can be cleanly separated. ${ }^{8}$

In summary, weak local bi-independence provides a clean framework to relate ambiguity

[^8]representations with each other. On the one hand, weak local bi-independence is weak enough to allow for a plethora of choice behaviors. On the other hand, it is also powerful enough to generate nice technical properties such as the existence of Clark differentials and Lipschitz continuity.

### 5.2 COLU and Constant Loss Aversion

One of the most important ideas in behavioral economics is that people's choice behavior is affected by their reference points, and they treat gains and losses differently (see Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). We first show how their model of reference dependence and loss aversion may be viewed as a special case of the COLU representation, then show how the COLU representation leads to natural generalizations of that model.

The well-known constant loss aversion model of Tversky and Kahneman (1991) can be easily rewritten as a special case of the COLU representation. To see this, consider a simple example in which $X$ is a space of products described by the values of their two attributes. Let $v: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ be defined as follows:

$$
v\left(x_{i}\right)= \begin{cases}x_{i}, & \text { if } x_{i} \geqslant 0 \\ 2 x_{i}, & \text { if } x_{i}<0\end{cases}
$$

The constant loss aversion model assumes that the utility of a product $\left(x_{1}, x_{2}\right)$ is equal to $v\left(x_{1}-r_{1}\right)+v\left(x_{2}-r_{2}\right)$, with $\left(r_{1}, r_{2}\right)$ being an exogenously given reference point. Let $(0,0)$ be the reference point for simplicity. We can write the constant loss aversion model as the following equivalent COLU representation, $\min \left\{x_{1}+x_{2}, 2 x_{1}+x_{2}, x_{1}+2 x_{2}, 2 x_{1}+2 x_{2}\right\}$. This COLU representation provides a new interpretation of the constant loss aversion model: The decision maker has multiple ways in mind to evaluate a product, and she adopts the most cautious way. ${ }^{9}$

Viewing the constant loss aversion model in this way, it is clear that the decision maker's caution does not need to be so extreme. For example, the decision maker may dislike losses, but she may also like specialization. ${ }^{10}$ In other words, she may appreciate a product relatively more if it excels in one attribute, rather than being mediocre in both attributes. This idea can be captured by the following modification of the previous COLU representation: $\max \left\{\min \left\{2 x_{1}+x_{2}, 2 x_{1}+2 x_{2}\right\}, \min \left\{x_{1}+2 x_{2}, 2 x_{1}+2 x_{2}\right\}\right\}$. In this example, when both $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ are positive, the decision maker uses $\max \left\{2 x_{1}+x_{2}, x_{1}+2 x_{2}\right\}$ to evaluate the product,

[^9]which reflects a preference for specialized products. Otherwise, the decision maker uses $2 x_{1}+2 x_{2}$ to evaluate the product, which, relative to $\max \left\{2 x_{1}+x_{2}, x_{1}+2 x_{2}\right\}$, implies loss aversion. ${ }^{11}$

## 6 Neural-network Utility

A recent paper by Arora et al. (2018) from the computer science literature shows that feedforward neural-network functions with rectified linear units are identical to CFPL functions. Hence, our Theorem 2 also implies that a preference has a COLU representation if and only if it has the following representation-which we will call the neural-network utility (NU) representation - that features one of the most powerful ingredients of machine learning, neural networks.

Given any vector-valued function $\tau$, we use $\tau^{(j)}$ to denote the $j$-th component of $\tau$.

Definition 3 A function $U: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is an $N U$ if there exist
(i) $h, w_{0}, \ldots, w_{h+1} \in \mathbb{N}$ with $w_{0}=n$ and $w_{h+1}=1$, and
(ii) affine functions $\tau_{i}: \mathbb{R}^{w_{i-1}} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{w_{i}}, i=1, \ldots, h+1$, such that for any $x \in X$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
U(x)=\tau_{h+1} \circ \theta \circ \tau_{h} \circ \cdots \circ \theta \circ \tau_{2} \circ \theta \circ \tau_{1}(x), \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

in which $\theta$ is an entry-wise operation such that for any $w \in \mathbb{N}$ and $b \in \mathbb{R}^{w}$, we have $\theta(b)=\left(\max \left\{b_{i}, 0\right\}, \ldots, \max \left\{b_{w}, 0\right\}\right)$.

Each function $\theta \circ \tau_{i}$ is called the $i$-th hidden layer, and $\left(\theta \circ \tau_{i}\right)^{(j)}=\max \left\{\tau_{i}^{(j)}(\cdot), 0\right\}$ is called a neuron. ${ }^{12}$ Thus, the $i$-th hidden layer has $w_{i}$ neurons, and equation (2) characterizes a network of neurons with $h$ hidden layers. Figure 3 provides an example of an NU function.

Mathematically, to evaluate an alternative $x$, each neuron in the NU function first aggregates its child neurons' values in an affine fashion. If the outcome of aggregation is above the normalized threshold, zero, this neuron is activated and its value becomes the outcome of aggregation. Otherwise, this neuron remains inactive and has a value zero. It is without loss of generality to normalize all thresholds to 0 , since we can add an arbitrary constant to each affine function $\tau_{i}^{(j)}$ and modify the threshold accordingly. The neurons in the first

[^10]

Figure 3: Consider an alternative ( $x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}$ ). This NU function has two hidden layers, and each layer has two neurons. Each affine $\tau_{1}^{(j)}$ is from the choice domain (a subset of $\mathbb{R}^{3}$ ) to $\mathbb{R}$, and each affine $\tau_{2}^{(j)}$ is from $\mathbb{R}^{2}$ to $\mathbb{R}$. Neurons in the first layer are called child neurons of neurons in the second layer. Neurons in the second layer are called parent neurons of neurons in the first layer.
hidden layer aggregate the input of the NU function, $x_{i}$ 's, directly, and the values of neurons in the last ( $h$-th) hidden layer are aggregated into the utility of $x$.

To understand the economic interpretation of the NU representation, think of $X$ as a space of products characterized by their attributes. An affine function on $X$ describes a way to evaluate the product. A decision maker whose preference has an NU representation entertains multiple such ways to evaluate a product. This is captured by the affine functions of the first-hidden-layer neurons. What the first hidden layer achieves is that the decision maker uses the primitive attributes to form multiple more advanced subjective attributes. For example, she might combine several primitive attributes of a car to form a subjective safety attribute. Some of these subjective attributes may be active and some may not be. The decision maker may continue to consider multiple ways (captured by the affine functions of the second-hidden-layer neurons) to aggregate those active subjective attributes. This allows her to form subjective attributes that are even more advanced. This process continues until she aggregates the values of last-hidden-layer neurons to obtain the evaluation of the product.

If $X$ is the probability simplex, the decision maker considers multiple expected utility functions to evaluate the uncertainty of a lottery, which corresponds to the affine functions of the first hidden layer. For instance, she may have one neuron that activates when the expected value of prizes is high, and another that activates whenever the downside risk is high. With multiple risk attitudes, the decision maker wants to aggregate them, and she may not have a unique view about how to do so. This is captured by the second hidden layer. The aggregation continues until the decision maker reaches a final evaluation of the lottery.

The next result follows from our Theorem 2 and Arora et al. (2018). ${ }^{13}$

[^11]Corollary 3 The preference $\succsim$ has an NU representation if and only if $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local bi-independence.

The NU representation has two advantages. First, we have efficient empirical methods to estimate a neural-network model, and the same applies to the NU model. This is not true for the differentiable utility function suggested by Machina (1982). In fact, given the substantial evidence of the practical success of neural-network models when paired with a large amount of data, we can expect that the NU model will offer us a superior method to model people's choice behavior as we obtain more and more choice data.

Second, it is convenient to use the NU representation to construct special cases that captures well-known behavioral effects, which is again something not easy to do with a differentiable utility function. We show this in the next subsections.

### 6.1 NU and the Certainty Effect

We can construct neurons that capture behavioral effects in an NU representation. From the Allais paradox, we know that decision makers are often biased toward certainty. Consider the following example in which $X$ is the set of lotteries over three prizes. Figure 4 presents an NU representation in which the first neuron captures standard expected utility evaluation, while the other three neurons capture the bias toward certainty for the three prizes, respectively. ${ }^{14}$ A certainty-effect neuron for a prize is activated if and only if the lottery yields that prize with high probability.


Figure 4: In the first neuron, $V$ is affine, which does not seem to satisfy the requirement of a neuron, because it does not compare an affine function with zero-but this is for simplicity and without loss of generality, since $V(x)=\max \{V(x), 0\}-\max \{-V(x), 0\}$. If the probability of the $i$ th prize is larger than 0.99 for some $i \in\{1,2,3\}$, a neuron that captures the bias toward certainty will be activated. Finally, $U(x)$ is equal to some weighted sum of all neurons' values.

[^12]
### 6.2 NU and Subjective Attributes

Consider products described by the values of their attributes. A decision maker may have her own perception of what the product's attributes are. For example, suppose $X$ is the set of all electric scooters. Each scooter is described by a speed-related attribute $x_{1}$, a steeringrelated attribute $x_{2}$, a brake-related attribute $x_{3}$, and a battery-related attribute $x_{4}$, in which $x_{i} \in[-1,1], i=1, \ldots, 4$. The following NU representation describes a decision maker who uses $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ to form a subjective attribute about the performance of the scooter and uses $x_{1}, x_{2}$, and $x_{3}$ to form a subjective attribute about the safety of the scooter. Then, she combines the performance attribute and the safety attribute, if active, to form a more advanced attribute about the overall riding experience of the scooter. Finally, this attribute is combined with $x_{4}$ to form the final evaluation of the scooter.


Figure 5: An example in which the decision maker forms hierarchical subjective attributes to evaluate an electric scooter.

## 7 Concluding Remarks

This paper introduces two notions of local linearity that are defined based on a decision maker's choice behavior, weak local independence and weak local bi-independence. Weak local independence implies that generically, the decision maker's preference does not have any differentiable representations. The stronger notion of local linearity, weak local biindependence, characterizes CFPL functions. We introduce two new representations of the decision maker's preference that are equivalent to CFPL functions, the COLU representation and the NU representation. Our approach has several advantages over Machina's (1982) approach.

## Appendix

## Proof of Theorem 1

Proof. We first establish some useful lemmas. In what follows, stating this explicitly, we assume for each lemma that $\succsim$ satisfies weak order and continuity. Since $X$ is separable and connected, by Debreu (1954) it must have a continuous utility representation $V: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.

For any $L \subseteq \mathcal{X}$, let $\operatorname{int}(L), \operatorname{cl}(L), \partial L, \operatorname{aff}(L), \operatorname{dim}(L)$ denote the interior, closure, boundary, affine hull, and the dimension of the affine hull of $L$, respectively, in $\mathbb{R}^{N}$. For $x \in X$ and $\varepsilon>0$, let $B_{\varepsilon}(x)$ denote the open ball centered at $x$ with radius $\varepsilon$. For any finite set of choice alternatives $\left\{x^{1}, \ldots, x^{m}\right\}$, let $\overline{x^{1} \ldots x^{m}}:=\operatorname{co}\left(\left\{x^{1}, \ldots, x^{m}\right\}\right)$ be the convex hull of $\left\{x^{1}, \ldots, x^{m}\right\}$.

For any $L \in X$ and $L \subseteq X$, we write $L \perp z$ if for any $x, y \in L$ and $\lambda \in(0,1)$, $x \succsim y \Leftrightarrow \lambda x z \succsim \lambda y z$. Note that in this definition, $\lambda x z$ and $\lambda y z$ do not have to be in $L$.

The first two lemmas are straightforward. We omit their proofs.
Lemma 1 For any $L \subseteq X$ such that $\operatorname{int}(L) \neq \varnothing$, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) $L$ preserves independence.
(ii) cl(L) preserves independence.
(iii) If $x, y, r, s \in L$ and $x-y=\lambda(r-s)$ for some $\lambda>0, x \succsim y \Longleftrightarrow r \succsim s$.
(iv) There exists an affine function $U: \operatorname{cl}(L) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that represents $\succsim$ on $\operatorname{cl}(L)$.

Lemma 2 For any convex $L \subseteq X$ and $x \in L$, if $L \perp x$ and $L \perp y$, then $L \perp \alpha x y$ for any $\alpha \in(0,1)$.

Now we present a lemma that is key in our construction of the regular closed pieces.
Lemma 3 For any convex $L \subseteq X$ such that $\operatorname{int}(L) \neq \varnothing$, if $L$ preserves independence and $L \perp x$, then $\operatorname{co}(L \cup\{x\})$ preserves independence.

Proof. We first prove that $\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}) \backslash\{x\}$ preserves independence. Take any $y$ in the set. There exists $y^{\prime} \in \operatorname{int}(L)$ and $\alpha \in(0,1]$ such that $y=\alpha y^{\prime} x$. Since $y^{\prime} \in \operatorname{int}(L)$, there exists some $\varepsilon>0$ such that $B_{\varepsilon}\left(y^{\prime}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{int}(L)$. For any $r, s \in B_{\alpha \varepsilon}(y)$, let $r^{\prime}=\frac{r-y}{\alpha}+y^{\prime}, s^{\prime}=\frac{s-y}{\alpha}+y^{\prime}$. Since $\|r-y\|,\|s-y\|<\alpha \varepsilon$, we have $r^{\prime}, s^{\prime} \in B_{\varepsilon}\left(y^{\prime}\right)$ and $\alpha\left(r^{\prime}-s^{\prime}\right)=r-s$. Moreover,

$$
\alpha r^{\prime} x=r-y+\alpha y^{\prime}+(1-\alpha) x=r-y+y=r .
$$

Similarly, $\alpha s^{\prime} x=s$. Because $L \perp x, r \succsim s \Longleftrightarrow r^{\prime} \succsim s^{\prime}$. The above arguments show that for any $y \in \operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}) \backslash\{x\}$, there exists $\varepsilon>0$ such that for any $r, s \in B_{\varepsilon}(y)$, we can find $r^{\prime}, s^{\prime} \in \operatorname{int}(L)$ such that $r-s=\alpha\left(r^{\prime}-s^{\prime}\right)$ for some $\alpha>0$ and $r \succsim s \Longleftrightarrow r^{\prime} \succsim s^{\prime}$.

By Lemma 1, to show that $\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}) \backslash\{x\}$ preserves independence, we only need to show that for any $r, s, r^{*}, s^{*} \in \operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}) \backslash\{x\}$ such that $r-s=\lambda\left(r^{*}-s^{*}\right)$ for some $\lambda>0, r \succsim s$ if and only if $r^{*} \succsim s^{*}$.

First, focus on $r$ and $s$. Clearly, $\overline{r s} \subseteq \operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}) \backslash\{x\}$. For any $t \in \overline{r s}$, according to the arguments above, there exists $\varepsilon_{t}>0$ such that for any $\tilde{r}_{t}, \tilde{s}_{t} \in B_{\varepsilon_{t}}(t)$, we can find $\tilde{r}_{t}^{\prime}, \tilde{s}_{t}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{int}(L)$ that satisfy $\tilde{r}_{t}-\tilde{s}_{t}=\alpha\left(\tilde{r}_{t}^{\prime}-\tilde{s}_{t}^{\prime}\right)$ for some $\alpha>0$ and $\tilde{r} \succsim \tilde{s} \Longleftrightarrow \tilde{r}^{\prime} \succsim \tilde{s}^{\prime}$.

Note that $\left\{B_{\varepsilon_{t}}(t): t \in \overline{r s}\right\}$ forms an open cover of $\overline{r s}$. Since $\overline{r s}$ is compact, let the Lebesgue number of the open cover be $\rho>0$ and define

$$
t_{k}:=r+\frac{\min \{k \rho,\|s-r\|\}}{\|s-r\|}(s-r)
$$

for $k=0,1, \ldots, \min \{j \in \mathbb{N}: \rho j \geqslant\|s-r\|\}$. Let $m:=\min \{j \in \mathbb{N}: \rho j \geqslant\|s-r\|\}-1$. By definition, $t_{0}=r, t_{m}=s$, and $\left\|t_{k}-t_{k+1}\right\|<\rho$ for any $k \in\{0, \ldots, m\}$. Since $\rho$ is the Lebesgue number of the open cover, for any $k \in\{0, \ldots, m\}$, there exists $t \in \overline{r s}$ such that $t_{k}, t_{k+1} \in B_{\varepsilon_{t}}(t)$. Therefore, there exist $r_{k}^{\prime}, s_{k}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{int}(L)$ such that $t_{k}-t_{k+1}=\beta_{k}\left(r_{k}^{\prime}-s_{k}^{\prime}\right)$ for some $\beta_{k}>0$ and $t_{k} \succsim t_{k+1} \Longleftrightarrow r_{k}^{\prime} \succsim s_{k}^{\prime}$. Note that by construction, for any $k \in\{0, \ldots, m\}$, $t_{k}-t_{k+1}=\lambda_{k}(r-s)$ for some $\lambda_{k}>0$, which implies that for any $k \in\{0, \ldots, m\}, r_{k}^{\prime}-s_{k}^{\prime}=$ $\alpha_{k}\left(r_{0}^{\prime}-s_{0}^{\prime}\right)$ for some $\alpha_{k}>0$.

Since $L$ preserves independence, by Lemma 1, for any $k \in\{0, \ldots, m\}, r_{k}^{\prime} \succsim s_{k}^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow r_{0}^{\prime} \succsim$ $s_{0}^{\prime}$. It follows that $r_{0}^{\prime} \succsim s_{0}^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow t_{k} \succsim t_{k+1}$. Then, transitivity requires that $r \succsim s \Longleftrightarrow r_{0}^{\prime} \succsim$ $s_{0}^{\prime}$. Note that $r-s=\frac{\beta_{0}}{\lambda_{0}}\left(r_{0}^{\prime}-s_{0}^{\prime}\right)$.

The same arguments apply to $r^{*}$ and $s^{*}$ : There exist some $r_{0}^{*}, s_{0}^{*} \in \operatorname{int}(L)$ such that $r^{*} \succsim s^{*} \Longleftrightarrow r_{0}^{*} \succsim s_{0}^{*}$ and $r^{*}-s^{*}=\lambda^{*}\left(r_{0}^{*}-s_{0}^{*}\right)$ for some $\lambda^{*}>0$. Since $r-s=\lambda\left(r^{*}-s^{*}\right)$, we know that $r_{0}^{\prime}-s_{0}^{\prime}=\alpha^{*}\left(r_{0}^{*}-s_{0}^{*}\right)$ for some $\alpha^{*}>0$. By Lemma $1, r_{0}^{\prime} \succsim s_{0}^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow r_{0}^{*} \succsim s_{0}^{*}$. Thus, $r \succsim s \Longleftrightarrow r^{*} \succsim s^{*}$. This completes the proof that $\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}) \backslash\{x\}$ preserves independence.

It is straightforward to verify that

$$
\operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}) \backslash\{x\})=\operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}))
$$

Hence, by Lemma $1, \operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}))$ preserves independence.
To complete the proof of this lemma, we only need to show that $\operatorname{co}(L \cup\{x\})$ is a subset of $\operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}))$. Since $L$ is convex and has nonempty interior, $\operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{int}(L))=\operatorname{cl}(L)$. To see this, take any $y \in \operatorname{cl}(L)$ and let $\left\{y_{k}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ be some sequence in $L$ that converges to $y$. Take any $r \in \operatorname{int}(L)$. Since $L$ is convex, the sequence $\left\{\left(1-\frac{1}{k}\right) y_{k} r\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ is a sequence in $\operatorname{int}(L)$ that converges to $y$ as well. Therefore, $y \in \operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{int}(L))$. Because $\operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{int}(L))=\operatorname{cl}(L)$,
for any $y \in L$, let $\left\{y_{k}\right\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ be some sequence in $\operatorname{int}(L)$ that converges to $y$. Then, for any $\alpha \in[0,1], \alpha y_{k} x$ converges to $\alpha y x$, which implies that $\alpha y x \in \operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}))$. Thus, $\operatorname{co}(L \cup\{x\}) \subseteq \operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{co}(\operatorname{int}(L) \cup\{x\}))$.

Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1. Suppose that in addition to weak order and continuity, $\succsim$ also satisfies weak local independence. Thus, for each $x \in X$, there exists $\varepsilon_{x}>0$ such that $B_{\varepsilon_{x}}(x) \perp x$. Hereafter, for any $x \in X$, let $B_{x}=B_{\varepsilon_{x}}(x)$. We proceed to construct a polytope that preserves independence for each $x \in X$.

Lemma 4 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak local independence. Then for any $x \in X$, there exist $x^{1}, \ldots, x^{N} \in X$ such that $\overline{x x^{1} \ldots x^{N}}$ preserves independence and has nonempty interior.

Proof. Let $x^{0}:=x \in X$. Then, recursively for $i=1, \ldots, N$, let $x^{i}$ be an arbitrary point in $\left(\bigcap_{j<i} B_{x^{j}}\right) \backslash \operatorname{aff}\left(\left\{x^{0}, \ldots, x^{i-1}\right\}\right)$. Since each $B_{x^{i}}$ is open and $\operatorname{aff}\left(\left\{x^{0}, \ldots, x^{i-1}\right\}\right)$ 's dimension is at most $i-1$, such $x^{i}$, s always exist. By construction, the dimension of $\Delta:=\overline{x x^{1} \ldots x^{N}}$ is equal to $N$, the dimension of $X$, and $\Delta$ has nonempty interior.

Pick some $\alpha \in(0,1)$ such that for any $j=0, \ldots, N-1, y^{j}:=\alpha x^{N} x^{j} \in \bigcap_{i=0}^{N} B_{x^{i}}$. Clearly, $\Delta^{\prime}=\overline{y^{0} \ldots y^{N-1} x^{N}}$ also has nonempty interior. In addition, by construction, $\Delta^{\prime} \perp x^{i}$ for $i=0, \ldots, N$ because $\Delta^{\prime} \subseteq \bigcap_{i=0}^{N} B_{x^{i}}$. Since $x^{N} \in \Delta^{\prime}$, it follows from Lemma 2 that $\Delta^{\prime} \perp y^{i}$ for $i=0, \ldots, N-1$. Applying Lemma 2 again, we know that $\Delta^{\prime} \perp y$ for any $y \in \Delta^{\prime}$, which implies that $\Delta^{\prime}$ preserves independence. Then, applying Lemma 3 iteratively, we know that $\operatorname{co}\left(\Delta^{\prime} \cup\left\{x^{N-1}\right\}\right)$ preserves independence, $\operatorname{co}\left(\Delta^{\prime} \cup\left\{x^{N-1}, x^{N-2}\right\}\right)$ preserves independence, and so on. Since $\Delta=\operatorname{co}\left(\Delta^{\prime} \cup\left\{x^{0}, \ldots, x^{N-1}\right\}\right), \Delta$ preserves independence.

It follows directly from Lemma 4 that $\succsim$ exhibits piecewise independence. To show the second statement of Theorem 1, the next step is to identify the "largest" pieces that induce the same local utility function using Zorn's Lemma. Let $\mathcal{D}$ be the collection of all possible polytopes constructed using the procedure in Lemma 4. Let $X_{o}:=\bigcup_{\Delta \in \mathcal{D}} \operatorname{int}(\Delta)$. It is clear that

$$
X=\bigcup_{\Delta \in \mathcal{D}} \Delta=\bigcup_{\Delta \in \mathcal{D}} \operatorname{cl}(\operatorname{int}(\Delta)) \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(\bigcup_{\Delta \in \mathcal{D}} \operatorname{int}(\Delta)\right)=\operatorname{cl}\left(X_{o}\right) \subseteq X
$$

Thus, $X_{o}$ is an open and dense subset of $X$. For any $x \in X_{o}$, pick $\Delta_{x} \in \mathcal{D}$ such that $x \in \operatorname{int}\left(\Delta_{x}\right)$.

For any nonempty open subset $Y \subseteq X$, we say that $Y$ induces local utility function $U$ if any $x \in Y$ has a neighborhood $L \subseteq Y$ such that $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $L$. Note that when $Y$ is not convex, the fact that $Y$ induces $U$ does not imply $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $Y$. By definition, if $Y_{i}$ induces local utility function $U_{i}$ for $i=1,2$ and $Y_{1} \cap Y_{2} \neq \varnothing$, then $U_{1}=U_{2}$.

Let $\mathcal{O}:=\{L \subseteq X: L$ is nonempty, connected, and open $\}$. Let $\mathcal{F}$ be the set of all functions $P: X_{o} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$ such that for any $x \in X_{o}$, (i) int $\left(\Delta_{x}\right) \subseteq P(x)$, and (ii) $P(x)$ induces
some local utility function. Clearly, $\mathcal{F}$ is nonempty, since for any $x \in X_{0}$ we can simply let $P(x)=\operatorname{int}\left(\Delta_{x}\right)$.

Define a binary relation $\Subset$ on $\mathcal{F}$ as follows: For any $x, y \in \mathcal{F}, P \Subset Q$ if for any $x \in X_{o}$, $P(x) \subseteq Q(x)$. It is straightforward to verify that $\Subset$ is a partial order on $\mathcal{F}$. Take any totally ordered subset of $\mathcal{F},\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$, in which $I$ is an index set. Let $P^{*}: X_{o} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$ be a function such that for any $p \in X_{o}, P^{*}(x):=\bigcup_{i \in I} P_{i}(x)$. We show that $P^{*} \in \mathcal{F}$. First of all, $P^{*}(x)$ is open since every $P_{i}(x)$ is open. Second, $P^{*}(x)$ is connected, since every $P_{i}(x)$ is connected and contains $\operatorname{int}\left(\Delta_{x}\right)$, which is connected. Furthermore, each $P_{i}(x)$ induces the same local utility function as $\operatorname{int}\left(\Delta_{x}\right)$ does. Thus, $P^{*}(x)$ also induces the same local utility function as $\operatorname{int}\left(\Delta_{x}\right)$ does. Hence, $P^{*}$ is an upper bound of $\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$ in terms of $\Subset$.

Now, we can apply Zorn's lemma and know that $\mathcal{F}$ contains some $\Subset$-maximal element. With a harmless abuse of notation, denote this $\Subset$-maximal element by $P^{*}$. Next we show that $\left\{x \in X_{o}: P^{*}(x)\right\}$ is finite.

For any $x \in X$ and $\varepsilon>0$, let $C_{\varepsilon}(x):=\left\{y \in X:\|x-y\|_{\infty}<\varepsilon\right\}$; that is, $C_{\varepsilon}(x)$ is the open hypercube that is centered at $x$ with edge length $2 \varepsilon$. For any $x \in X$ and nonempty $L \subseteq X$, let $\operatorname{cone}_{x}(L):=\{y \in X: y=x+\alpha(z-x)$ for some $\alpha \geqslant 0$ and $z \in L\}$; that is, cone $_{x}(L)$ is the smallest cone with vertex $x$ that contains $L$.

Lemma 5 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak local independence and $P^{*}$ is a $\Subset$-maximal element. Then $\left\{x \in X_{o}: P^{*}(x)\right\}$ is finite.

Proof. Suppose $\mathcal{P}=\left\{x \in X_{o}: P^{*}(x)\right\}$ is not finite. Let $\mathcal{P}=\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$. Suppose $I$ is not finite. Pick a countable subset of $P_{i}$ 's and form a sequence with one choice alternative in each. By the compactness of $X$, we can pick an accumulation point of the sequence, denoted as $x$. It is clear that any neighborhood of $x$ intersects $P_{i}$ for an infinite number of $i$ 's in $I$. Fix some $\varepsilon>0$ such that $C_{\varepsilon}(x) \subseteq B_{x}$, in which $B_{x}$ is where the second vertex is chosen in the procedure for constructing the polytope for $x$ in Lemma 4. Let $J:=\left\{i \in I: C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i} \neq \emptyset\right\}$ and $Q_{i}:=C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$ for each $i \in J$. It is easy to verify by the maximality of $P^{*}$ that $Q_{j} \cap P_{i}=\emptyset$ for any $i \in I, j \in J$ with $i \neq j$.

First, we show that for any $y \in C_{\varepsilon}(x)$ with $x \neq y$, there exists $i \in J$ such that $\overline{x y} \subseteq Q_{i}$. Suppose $x \neq y$. Applying the procedure in Lemma 4 , we can construct $\Delta \in \mathcal{D}$ such that $\overline{x y} \subseteq \Delta$. By the denseness of $X_{o}$, there exists $z \in X_{o}$ such that $P^{*}(z) \cap \operatorname{int}(\Delta) \neq \emptyset$. It follows that $\operatorname{int}(\Delta)$ induces the same local utility function as $P^{*}(z)$ does. Then the maximality of $P^{*}$ implies that $\operatorname{int}(\Delta) \subseteq P^{*}(z)$. It follows that $\overline{x y} \subseteq \Delta \subseteq Q_{i}$ for some $i \in J$.

Second, we show that $Q_{i}=C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(Q_{i}\right)$ for all $i \in J$. Loosely speaking, the intersection of $Q_{i}$ and the hypercube must be a cone with vertex $x$. On one hand, by definition, $Q_{i} \subseteq C_{\varepsilon}(x)$ and $Q_{i} \subseteq \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(Q_{i}\right)$, which imply $Q_{i} \subseteq C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(Q_{i}\right)$. On the
other hand, let $y \in C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i}\right)$ for some $i \in J$. Then there exists $r \in C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i}$ such that $y \in \overline{x r}$ or $r \in \overline{x y}$. Since $r \in C_{\varepsilon}(x)$, there exists $j \in J$ such that $\overline{x r} \subseteq Q_{j}$. By $r \in P_{i}$, we have $j=i$ and thus $\overline{x r} \subseteq Q_{i}$. If $y \in \overline{x r}$, then $y \in Q_{i}$. If $r \in \overline{x y}$, then since $r \in \overline{x y} \cap P_{i} \neq \emptyset$, we have $\overline{x y} \subseteq Q_{i}$. In both cases, $y \in Q_{i}$. Thus, $C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i}\right) \subseteq$ $Q_{i} \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$. It follows that $C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(Q_{i}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i}\right)\right) \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$. Hence, $C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(Q_{i}\right) \subseteq C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)=Q_{i}$.

Now let $P_{i}^{o}:=\operatorname{int}\left(\operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)\right)$ for each $i \in I$. Note that $P_{i}$ and $P_{i}^{o}$ may not be the same set. The next step is to show that $P_{i}^{o} \cap P_{j}^{o}=\emptyset$ for any $i \neq j$. Since $P_{i} \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$ and $P_{i}$ is open, $P_{i} \subseteq P_{i}^{o}$. Suppose $P_{i}^{o} \cap P_{j}^{o} \neq \emptyset$. Then there exist $r \in X$ and $\delta>0$ such that $B_{\delta}(r) \in P_{i}^{o} \cap P_{j}^{o} \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right) \cap \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{j}\right)$. Since $B_{\delta}(r) \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$ and $P_{i}$ is open, we can find an open ball $B \subseteq B_{\delta}(r)$ such that $B \subseteq P_{i}$. Again, since $B \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{j}\right)$ and $P_{j}$ is open, we can find an open ball $B^{\prime} \subseteq B$ such that $B^{\prime} \subseteq P_{j}$. This is a contradiction, since $P_{i} \cap P_{j}=\emptyset$. Note that for any $i \neq j$, since $P_{i}^{o} \cap P_{j}^{o}=\varnothing, P_{i}^{o} \cap \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{j}\right)=\varnothing$.

We are now ready to present the main induction argument. Let $\varepsilon_{1}:=\frac{\varepsilon}{2}$ and $C_{1}:=$ $\partial C_{\varepsilon_{1}}(x)$; that is, $C_{1}$ is the surface of hypercube $C_{\varepsilon_{1}}(x)$. Clearly, $C_{1} \subseteq C_{\varepsilon}(x)$. Note that $C_{1} \cap P_{i}^{o} \neq \emptyset$ for all $i \in J$. To see that, consider any $i \in J$ and $y \in C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i} \subseteq C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i}^{o}$ with $y \neq x$. We have $\operatorname{cone}_{x}(\{y\}) \cap C_{\varepsilon}(x) \subseteq Q_{i}=C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(Q_{i}\right)$. Moreover, since $y \in C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i}^{o}=\operatorname{int}\left(Q_{i}\right)$,

$$
\operatorname{cone}_{x}(\{y\}) \cap C_{1} \subseteq \operatorname{int}\left(C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(Q_{i}\right)\right)=\operatorname{int}\left(Q_{i}\right)=C_{\varepsilon}(x) \cap P_{i}^{o} .
$$

Since $\operatorname{cone}_{x}(\{y\}) \cap C_{1} \neq \varnothing$, we have $C_{1} \cap P_{i}^{o} \neq \varnothing$ for any $i \in J$.
When $N=1, C_{1}$ contains at most two points, which cannot intersect with an infinite number of disjoint open sets-a contradiction. Hereafter, we assume $N \geqslant 2$.

Let $A_{1}$ be a face of $C_{1}$ that intersects $P_{i}^{o}$ for an infinite number of $i$ 's in $J$. By the compactness of $A_{1}$, there exists $x^{1} \in A_{1}$ such that if $L$ is a neighborhood of $x^{1}$, then $L \cap A_{1}$ intersects $P_{i}^{o}$ for an infinite number of $i$ 's in $J$. Now pick $\varepsilon^{\prime}<\varepsilon_{1}$ such that $C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \subseteq B_{x^{1}}$. Let $J_{1}:=\left\{i \in J:\left(C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap A_{1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o} \neq \emptyset\right\}$ and $y_{i}^{1}:=C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$ for all $i \in J_{1}$.

Let $\varepsilon_{2}:=\frac{\varepsilon^{\prime}}{2}$ and $C_{2}:=\partial C_{\varepsilon_{2}}\left(x^{1}\right) \subseteq C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right)$. We show that $\left(C_{2} \cap A_{1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o} \neq \varnothing$ for all $i \in J_{1}$. Following the same logic as above, for any $y \in C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap A_{1}$, there exists $i \in J_{1}$ such that $\overline{x^{1} y} \subseteq y_{i}^{1}$. Furthermore, $y_{i}^{1}=C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x^{1}}\left(y_{i}^{1}\right)$. Consider any $i \in J_{1}$ and $y \in\left(C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap A_{1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o}$ with $y \neq x^{1}$. Since $y \in C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o}=\operatorname{int}\left(y_{i}^{1}\right)$,

$$
\operatorname{cone}_{x^{1}}(\{y\}) \cap C_{2} \subseteq \operatorname{int}\left(C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x}\left(y_{i}^{1}\right)\right)=\operatorname{int}\left(y_{i}^{1}\right)=C_{\varepsilon^{\prime}}\left(x^{1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o}
$$

Since $\varnothing \neq \operatorname{cone}_{x^{1}}(\{y\}) \cap C_{2} \subseteq A_{1}$, we have $\left(C_{2} \cap A_{1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o} \neq \varnothing$.
Now let $A_{2}$ be a face of $C_{2}$ such that $A_{1} \cap A_{2}$ intersects $P_{i}^{o}$ for an infinite number of
$i$ 's in $J_{1}$. By the compactness of $A_{1} \cap A_{2}$, there exists $x^{2} \in A_{1} \cap A_{2}$ such that if $L$ is a neighborhood of $x^{2}$, then $L \cap A_{1} \cap A_{2}$ intersects $P_{i}^{o}$ for an infinite number of $i$ 's in $J_{1}$. Inductively, for any $k$, there exists $x^{k} \in A_{1} \cap \cdots \cap A_{k}$ such that if $L$ is a neighborhood of $x^{k}$, then $L \cap A_{1} \cap \cdots \cap A_{k}$ intersects $P_{i}^{o}$ for an infinite number of $i$ 's in $J$. Let $k=N-1$. Then $A_{1} \cap \cdots \cap A_{N-1}$ is a line segment that intersects $P_{i}^{o}$ for $i \in J_{N-1}$ with $\left|J_{N-1}\right|=\infty$. Pick $x^{N-1}$ in a way similar to before. Note that there exists $\hat{\varepsilon}>0$ small enough such that $C_{\hat{\varepsilon}}\left(x^{N-1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o}=C_{\hat{\varepsilon}}\left(x^{N-1}\right) \cap \operatorname{cone}_{x^{N-1}}\left(C_{\hat{\varepsilon}}\left(x^{N-1}\right) \cap P_{i}^{o}\right)$ for any $i \in J_{N-1}$. Since $A_{1} \cap \cdots \cap A_{N-1}$ is a line segment, it follows that $C_{\hat{\varepsilon}}\left(x^{N-1}\right) \cap\left(A_{1} \cap \cdots \cap A_{N-1}\right)$ intersects $P_{i}^{o}$ for at most two $i$ 's, which is a contradiction.

Finally, since each $P^{*}(x)$ induces a single local utility function and any regular closed subset of $X$ must contain some $x \in X_{0}$, we establish the second statement of Theorem 1,

## Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak order, continuity, and weak local independence, and has a differentiable representation $V: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Let $P^{*}$ be the mapping identified in the proof of Theorem 4. By Lemma 5, let $\left\{x \in X_{o}: P^{*}(x)\right\}=\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{n}$ for some $n$ and $U_{i}$ be the non-constant local utility function induced by $P_{i}$ for each $i$.

When $N=1, X=[a, b]$ for real numbers $a<b$. The claim holds trivially, since the only possible non-constant local utility functions are $U(x)=0, U(x)=\frac{x-a}{b-a}$, and $U(x)=1-\frac{x-a}{b-a}$ due to the normalization. Thus, we assume $N \geqslant 2$ hereafter.

Next, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Suppose $N \geqslant 2$. Then for any open ball $B$ in $X$, if $\operatorname{dim}(Y) \leqslant N-2$, then $B \backslash \operatorname{aff}(Y)$ is connected.

Proof. We will prove that $B \backslash \operatorname{aff}(Y)$ is path-connected. Pick any distinct $x, y \in B \backslash \operatorname{aff}(Y)$. We know that $\operatorname{dim}(Y \cup\{x\}) \leqslant N-1$. Since $X$ is a convex set with nonempty interior, any open ball in $X$ is a convex set of dimension $N$. Thus there exists $z \in B \backslash \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})$. Note that $\overline{x z} \cap \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})=\{x\}$. To see that, suppose there exists $z^{\prime} \neq x$ such that $z^{\prime} \in$ $\overline{x z} \cap \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})$. Then since $z \in \operatorname{aff}\left(\overline{x z^{\prime}}\right)$, it has to be the case that $z \in \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})$, which is a contradiction. Suppose $y \in \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})$. Then similarly we have $\overline{y z} \cap \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})=\{y\}$, and $\overline{x z} \cup \overline{y z}$ forms a path from $x$ to $y$ in $B \backslash \operatorname{aff}(Y)$. Suppose $y \notin \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})$. Then we directly have $\overline{x y} \cap \operatorname{aff}(Y \cup\{x\})=\{x\}$. Thus, $\overline{x y} \subseteq B \backslash \operatorname{aff}(Y)$ and we are done.

Pick any $i$ and let $P=\bigcup\left\{P_{j}: U_{j}=U_{i}\right.$ or $\left.U_{j}=1-U_{i}\right\}$ and $Q=\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^{n} P_{i}\right) \backslash P$. By way of contradiction, assume that $Q \neq \varnothing$. By construction, $P$ and $Q$ are both open and $\operatorname{cl}(P \cup Q)=\operatorname{cl}(P) \cup \operatorname{cl}(Q)=X$. Since $X$ is connected, we must have $\operatorname{cl}(P) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q) \neq \varnothing$. Pick any $x^{1} \in \operatorname{cl}(P) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q)$ and let $B_{1}$ be the open ball centered at $x^{1}$ such that $B_{1} \perp x^{1}$,
given by weak local independence. We show that there exists $x^{2} \in B_{1}$ such that $x^{2} \neq x^{1}$ and $x^{2} \in \operatorname{cl}(P) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q)$. Suppose not. Then $B_{1} \backslash\{x\}=\left(\left(B_{1} \backslash\{x\}\right) \cap \operatorname{cl}(P)\right) \cup\left(\left(B_{1} \backslash\{x\}\right) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q)\right)$ and $\left.\left(B_{1} \backslash\{x\}\right) \cap \operatorname{cl}(P) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q)\right)=\varnothing$. This is a contradiction, since $B_{1} \backslash\{x\}$ is connected when $N \geqslant 2$. Hence, we can pick $x^{2} \in B_{1}$ such that $x^{2} \neq x^{1}$ and $x^{2} \in \operatorname{cl}(P) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q)$.

Inductively, by Lemma 6 , for $j=2, \ldots, N$, we can pick $x^{j} \in B_{j-1} \backslash \operatorname{aff}\left(\overline{x^{1} \cdots x^{j-1}}\right)$ such that $x^{j} \in \operatorname{cl}(P) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q)$ and $B_{j} \subseteq B_{j-1}$ such that $B_{i} \perp x^{i}$. By $x^{N} \in \operatorname{cl}(P) \cap \operatorname{cl}(Q)$, there exists $r \in P \cap B_{N}$ and $s \in Q \cap B_{N}$. Since $P$ and $Q$ are both open, we can assume, without loss of generality, that $r, s \notin \operatorname{aff}\left(\overline{x^{1} \cdots x^{N}}\right)$. Using the same argument in Lemma $4, \Delta_{1}=\overline{x^{1} \cdots x^{N} r}$ and $\Delta_{2}=\overline{x^{1} \cdots x^{N} s}$ both preserve independence. By $r \in P$, either $U_{i}$ or $1-U_{i}$ represents $\succsim$ on $\Delta_{1}$. We focus on the case in which $U_{i}$ represents $\succsim$ on $\Delta_{1}$, since the other case is symmetric. In addition, there exists a non-constant local utility function $U \notin\left\{U_{i}, 1-U_{i}\right\}$ that represents $\succsim$ on $\Delta_{2}$. Pick any $z$ in the relative interior of $\overline{x^{1} \cdots x^{N}}$; it is clear that

$$
\operatorname{dim}\left(\left\{\tilde{x} \in \Delta_{1}: U_{i}(\tilde{x})=U_{i}(z)\right\}=\operatorname{dim}\left(\left\{\tilde{x} \in \Delta_{2}: U(\tilde{x})=U(z)\right\}=N-1\right.\right.
$$

In addition, since $U$ is a local utility function distinct from $U_{i}$ and $1-U_{i}$, the gradient of $V$ at $z, \nabla V(z)$, which needs to be orthogonal to both $\left\{\tilde{x} \in \Delta_{1}: U_{i}(\tilde{x})=U_{i}(z)\right\}$ and $\{\tilde{x} \in$ $\left.\Delta_{2}: U(\tilde{x})=U(z)\right\}$, must be $\overrightarrow{0}$. It then follows from the continuity of $V$ that $V(x)=V(y)$ for any $x, y \in \overline{x^{1} \cdots x^{N}}$. Since both $U_{i}$ and $U$ are non-constant and represent $\succsim$ on $\overline{x^{1} \cdots x^{N}}$, which is of dimension $N-1$, it must be the case that $U=U_{i}$ or $U=1-U_{i}$, which is a contradiction.

## Proof of Proposition 2

Proof. Let $\unrhd$ be a preorder that satisfies betweenness and suppose each local utility function of $\succsim$ respects $\unrhd$. Pick $x, y \in X$ such that $x \unrhd y$. For any $z \in \overline{x y}$, let $B_{z}$ be an open ball centered at $z$ such that $B_{z} \perp z$, given by weak local independence. Thus, $\left\{B_{z}: z \in \overline{x y}\right\}$ forms an open cover of $\overline{x y}$, which is compact, and thus it has a finite subcover $\left\{B_{z^{i}}\right\}_{i=1}^{m}$. Let the Lebesgue's number of this finite subcover be $\delta>0$. Pick $x^{1}, x^{2}, \ldots, x^{k} \in \overline{x y}$ such that $x^{1}=x$, $x^{m}=y$ and $\left\|x^{j}-x^{j+1}\right\|<\delta$ for $j=1, \ldots, k-1$. By definition of the Lebesgue's number, for any $j=1, \ldots, k-1$, there exists $i(j) \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$ such that $\overline{x^{j} x^{j+1}} \subseteq B_{z_{i(j)}}$. Thus, following the same procedure as in Lemma 4, for each $j$, we can construct two polytopes $\overline{z^{i(j)} r^{1} \ldots r^{N}}$ and $\overline{z^{i(j)} s^{1} \ldots s^{N}}$ with $r^{1}=x^{j}$ and $s^{1}=x^{j+1}$, both of which preserve independence. Since each local utility function of $\succsim$ respects $\unrhd, \succsim$ restricted to $\overline{z^{i(j)} x^{j}}$ and $\succsim$ restricted to $\overline{z^{i(j)} x^{j+1}}$ both respect $\unrhd$. Since $\bigcup_{j=1}^{m}\left(\overline{z^{i(j)} x^{j}} \cup \overline{z^{i(j)} x^{j+1}}\right)=\overline{x y}$, it is easy to see that $\succsim$ restricted to $\overline{x y}$ respects $\unrhd$, and thus, $x \succsim y$.

## Proof of Theorem 2

Proof. We will only show the sufficiency of the axioms. We prove this via a sequence of lemmas. We present the proof of the necessity in the Online Appendix.

In what follows, without stating this explicitly, we assume for each lemma that $\succsim$ satisfies weak order and continuity. Since $X$ is separable and connected, by Debreu (1954) it must have a continuous utility representation $V: X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$.

The first two lemmas are about the (bi-)independence of line segments. Lemma 7 characterizes when a line segment preserves independence. The proof for Lemma 7 is standard in the literature and is thus omitted. Lemma 8 characterizes when two line segments preserve bi-independence, provided that they each preserve independence. We provide the proof in the Online Appendix.

Lemma 7 For any $x, r \in X, \overline{x r}$ preserves independence if and only if $\overline{x r} \perp x$.
Lemma 8 For any $x, y, r, s \in X$, if $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ each preserve independence, then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ preserve bi-independence.
(ii) For any $x^{\prime}, r^{\prime} \in \overline{x r}$ and $y^{\prime}, s^{\prime} \in \overline{y s}$ such that $x^{\prime} \sim y^{\prime}$ and $r^{\prime} \sim s^{\prime}, \lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime} \sim \lambda y^{\prime} s^{\prime}$ for any $\lambda \in(0,1)$.
(iii) There exists $\varepsilon>0$ such that for any $y^{\prime}, s^{\prime} \in \overline{y s}$ with $\left\|y^{\prime}-s^{\prime}\right\|<\varepsilon, \overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y^{\prime} s^{\prime}}$ preserve bi-independence.

Given $x$ and $y$ with $x \sim y$, we say that neighborhoods $L_{x}$ and $L_{y}$ preserve weak biindependence with respect to $x$ and $y$ if for any $r \in L_{x}, s \in L_{y}$, and $\lambda \in(0,1), r \succsim s \Leftrightarrow$ $\lambda x r \succsim \lambda y s$. We omit the phrase "with respect to $x$ and $y$ " from time to time when there is no risk of confusion.

We introduce one last lemma before constructing the linear regions.

Lemma 9 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak local bi-independence. Then for any $x$, there exists $\varepsilon>0$ such that for any $r \in B_{\varepsilon}(x)$ and any convex regular closed subset $L$ that preserves independence, $\overline{x r}$ and $L$ preserve bi-independence.

Proof. There is nothing to prove if $L=\emptyset$. Let $L \neq \emptyset$. By way of contradiction, suppose for any $n$ there exist $r^{n} \in B_{1 / n}(x)$ and a nonempty, convex, and regular closed $L_{n}$ that preserves independence, such that $\overline{x r^{n}}$ and $L_{n}$ do not preserve bi-independence. Thus, there exists $y^{n}, s^{n} \in L_{n}$ such that $\overline{x r^{n}}$ and $\overline{y^{n} s^{n}}$ do not preserve bi-independence. By weak local independence (implied by weak local bi-independence), for a sufficiently large $n, B_{1 / n}(x) \perp x$,
which implies that $\overline{x r^{n}}$ preserves independence by Lemma 7. Then by Lemma 8, there exist $\hat{x}^{n}, \hat{r}^{n} \in \overline{x r^{n}}$ and $\hat{y}^{n}, \hat{s}^{n} \in \overline{y^{n} s^{n}} \subseteq L_{n}$ such that $\hat{x}^{n} \sim \hat{y}^{n}$ and $\hat{r}^{n} \sim \hat{s}^{n},\left\|\hat{y}^{n}-\hat{s}^{n}\right\|<\frac{1}{n}$, and $\overline{\hat{x}^{n} \hat{r}^{n}}$ and $\hat{\hat{x}^{n} \hat{S}^{n}}$ do not preserve bi-independence.

It is clear that $\hat{x}^{n}, \hat{r}^{n}$ converges to $x$ as $n$ goes to infinity. Since $X$ is compact, the sequence $\left\{\hat{y}^{n}\right\}$ has a subsequence that converges to some $y$. We assume, without loss of generality, that the subsequence is $\left\{\hat{y}^{n}\right\}$ itself and that $\left\|\hat{y}^{n}-y\right\|$ is monotonically decreasing in $n$. By continuity, $V\left(\hat{y}^{n}\right)=V\left(\hat{x}^{n}\right)$ for all $n$ implies that $V(y)=V(x)$.

To derive the desired contradiction, we show that for any $\varepsilon, \delta>0, B_{\varepsilon}(x)$ and $B_{\delta}(y)$ cannot preserve weak bi-independence. Fix any $\varepsilon, \delta>0$. We can, without loss of generality, assume $\delta$ is small enough such that $B_{\delta}(y) \perp y$, because if $B_{\varepsilon}(x)$ and $B_{\delta}(y)$ cannot preserve weak bi-independence, $B_{\varepsilon}(x)$ and $B_{\delta^{\prime}}(y)$ cannot preserve weak bi-independence for any $\delta^{\prime}>\delta$.

Clearly, there exists $m$ such that $\left\|y-\hat{y}^{m}\right\|<\delta-\frac{1}{m}$. Then it follows that $\left\|y-\hat{s}^{m}\right\|<$ $\delta-\frac{1}{m}+\frac{1}{m}=\delta$. Hence $\hat{y}^{m}, \hat{s}^{m} \in B_{\delta}(y)$. There also exists $k$ such that $n \geqslant k$ implies $\hat{x}^{n}, \hat{r}^{n} \in B_{\varepsilon}(x)$. Let $N=\max \{m, k\}$. Then $\hat{x}^{N}, \hat{r}^{N} \in B_{\varepsilon}(x), \hat{y}^{N}, \hat{s}^{N} \in B_{\delta}(y)$. Since $L_{N}$ is regular closed, $L_{N}=\operatorname{cl}\left(\operatorname{int}\left(L_{N}\right)\right)$, which implies that $L_{N} \cap B_{\delta}(y)$ has nonempty interior. By Lemma 3, we have that $\operatorname{co}\left(\left(L_{N} \cap B_{\delta}(y)\right) \cup\{y\}\right)$ preserves independence. Thus, $\overline{\hat{y}^{N} \hat{s}^{N} y}$ preserves independence.

By construction, since $\hat{x}^{N}, \hat{r}^{N} \in \overline{x r^{N}}$, and $\overline{x r^{N}}$ preserves independence, we either have $\hat{x}^{N}, \hat{r}^{N} \succsim x$ or $x \succsim \hat{x}^{N}, \hat{r}^{N}$. The two cases are symmetric, so we will only consider the first case. Note that $\hat{x}^{N} \sim \hat{y}^{N}$ and $\hat{r}^{N} \sim \hat{s}^{N}$, and that $\overline{\hat{x}^{N} \hat{r}^{N}}$ and $\overline{\hat{y}}^{N} \hat{s}^{N}$ each preserve independence but do not preserve bi-independence. We either have $\hat{x}^{N} \succ \hat{r}^{N}$ or $\hat{r}^{N} \succ \hat{x}^{N}$. Again, the two cases are symmetric so we will only prove the first case. Hence, $\hat{x}^{N} \succ \hat{r}^{N} \succsim x$, and $\hat{r}^{N} \in \overline{\hat{x}^{N} x}$. It follows that $\hat{y}^{N} \succ \hat{s}^{N} \succsim y$. Then by continuity there exists $s \in \overline{\hat{y}^{N} y}$ such that $s \sim \hat{s}^{N}$. If $B_{\varepsilon}(x)$ and $B_{\delta}(y)$ preserve weak bi-independence, since $x \sim y$ and $\hat{x}^{N} \sim \hat{y}^{N}$, we have $\lambda \hat{x}^{N} x \sim \lambda \hat{y}^{N} y$ for all $\lambda \in[0,1]$. Since $\hat{r}^{N} \in \overline{\hat{x}^{N} x}, s \in \overline{\hat{y}^{N} y}$, and $\hat{r}^{N} \sim s$, it follows that $\lambda \hat{x}^{N} \hat{r}^{N} \sim \lambda \hat{y}^{N} s$ for all $\lambda \in[0,1]$. Note that for all $\lambda \in[0,1]$, since $\overline{\hat{y}^{N} \hat{s}^{N} y}$ preserves independence, $\lambda \hat{y}^{N} s \sim \lambda \hat{y}^{N} \hat{s}^{N}$. It then follows that $\lambda \hat{x}^{N} \hat{r}^{N} \sim \lambda \hat{y}^{N} \hat{s}^{N}$ for all $\lambda \in[0,1]$. Thus $\overline{\hat{x}^{N} \hat{r}^{N}}$ and $\overline{\hat{y}^{N} \hat{s}^{N}}$ preserve bi-independence, which is a contradiction.

Now we proceed to construct a polytope for each $x \in X$ using similar procedures as in Lemma 4.

Lemma 10 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak local bi-independence. Then for any $x^{0} \in X$, there exist $x^{1}, \ldots, x^{N} \in X$ such that $\overline{x^{0} x^{1} \ldots x^{N}}$ preserves independence and has nonempty interior, and $\overline{x^{i} x^{j}}$ and $L$ preserve bi-independence for any $i, j$ and any convex regular closed subset $L$ that preserves independence.

Proof. By Lemma 9, for each $x \in X$, there exists $\varepsilon_{x}>0$ such that $B_{\varepsilon_{x}}(x) \perp x$, and that
for any $r \in B_{\varepsilon_{x}}(x)$ and any convex regular closed subset $L$ that preserves independence, $\overline{x r}$ and $L$ preserve bi-independence. For any $x$, let $B_{x}=B_{\varepsilon_{x}}(x)$. Then construct the polytope in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 4 and we are done.

The following lemma shows that each polytope constructed in Lemma 10 can be a linear region of some CFPL representation of $\succsim$.

Lemma 11 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak local bi-independence and $\hat{\mathcal{D}}$ is the collection of all polytopes constructed in Lemma 10. Then for any $\Delta, \Delta^{\prime} \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}, \Delta$ and $\Delta^{\prime}$ preserve bi-independence.

Proof. Since $\Delta$ and $\Delta^{\prime}$ both preserve independence and have nonempty interior, Lemma 1 implies that there are affine functions $U: \Delta \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and $U^{\prime}: \Delta^{\prime} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that represent $\succsim$ on $\Delta$ and $\Delta^{\prime}$, respectively. To prove that $\Delta$ and $\Delta^{\prime}$ preserve bi-independence, pick any $x, r \in \Delta$, $y, s \in \Delta^{\prime}$, and $\lambda \in(0,1)$ such that $\lambda x r \in \Delta$, $\lambda y s \in \Delta^{\prime}$, and $x \sim y$. We want to show that $r \succsim s \Leftrightarrow \lambda x r \succsim \lambda y s$.

Since $\Delta=\overline{x^{0} \ldots x^{N}}$ and $\Delta^{\prime}:=\overline{y^{0} \ldots y^{N}}$ for some $x^{0}, \ldots, x^{N} \in X$ and $y^{0}, \ldots, y^{N} \in X$, without loss of generality, let $U\left(x^{0}\right)=\min _{i} U\left(x^{i}\right), U\left(x^{N}\right)=\max _{i} U\left(x^{i}\right), U^{\prime}\left(y^{0}\right)=\min _{i} U^{\prime}\left(y^{i}\right)$, and $U^{\prime}\left(y^{N}\right)=\max _{i} U^{\prime}\left(y^{i}\right)$. Clearly, $U(\lambda x r) \in\left[U\left(x^{0}\right), U\left(x^{N}\right)\right]$ and $U^{\prime}(\lambda y s) \in\left[U^{\prime}\left(y^{0}\right), U^{\prime}\left(y^{N}\right)\right]$. The cases with $x^{0} \sim x^{N}$ or $y^{0} \sim y^{N}$ are straightforward. Therefore, assume that $x^{N} \succ x^{0}$ and $y^{N} \succ y^{1}$. Without loss of generality, let $U\left(x^{N}\right)=U^{\prime}\left(y^{N}\right)=1$ and $U\left(x^{0}\right)=U^{\prime}\left(y^{0}\right)=$ 0. Standard arguments imply that there exist unique $\alpha, \alpha^{\prime}, \alpha^{\prime \prime}, \beta, \beta^{\prime}, \beta^{\prime \prime} \in[0,1]$ such that $\alpha x^{0} x^{N} \sim x, \alpha^{\prime} x^{0} x^{N} \sim r, \alpha^{\prime \prime} x^{0} x^{N} \sim \lambda x r, \beta y^{0} y^{N} \sim y, \beta^{\prime} y^{0} y^{N} \sim s$, and $\beta^{\prime \prime} y^{0} y^{N} \sim \lambda y s$. Then,

$$
U(\lambda p r)=\alpha^{\prime \prime}=\lambda U(p)+(1-\lambda) U(r)=\lambda \alpha+(1-\lambda) \alpha^{\prime}
$$

Similarly,

$$
U^{\prime}(\lambda q s)=\beta^{\prime \prime}=\lambda U^{\prime}(q)+(1-\lambda) U^{\prime}(s)=\lambda \beta+(1-\lambda) \beta^{\prime} .
$$

By the construction in Lemma 10 , since each $\Delta \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}$ is regular closed and convex and preserves independence, $\overline{x^{0} x^{N}}$ and $\Delta^{\prime}$ preserve bi-independence, which implies that $\overline{x^{0} x^{N}}$ and $\overline{y^{0} y^{N}}$ preserve bi-independence. Therefore, since $\alpha x^{0} x^{N} \sim x \sim y \sim \beta y^{0} y^{N}$, we have $\alpha^{\prime} x^{0} x^{N} \succsim \beta^{\prime} y^{0} y^{N} \Rightarrow\left(\lambda \alpha+(1-\lambda) \alpha^{\prime}\right) x^{0} x^{N} \succsim\left(\lambda \beta+(1-\lambda) \beta^{\prime}\right) y^{0} y^{N}$ and $\alpha^{\prime} x^{0} x^{N} \succ \beta^{\prime} y^{0} y^{N} \Rightarrow$ $\left(\lambda \alpha+(1-\lambda) \alpha^{\prime}\right) x^{0} x^{N} \succ\left(\lambda \beta+(1-\lambda) \beta^{\prime}\right) y^{0} y^{N}$, which establishes the lemma.

Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we identify the "largest" linear regions using Zorn's Lemma. Let $\hat{X}_{o}:=\bigcup_{\Delta \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}} \operatorname{int}(\Delta)$. It is clear that $\hat{X}_{o}$ is an open and dense subset of $X$. For any $x \in \hat{X}_{o}$, pick $\hat{\Delta}_{x} \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}$ such that $x \in \operatorname{int}\left(\hat{\Delta}_{x}\right)$. Recall that $\mathcal{O}=\{L \subseteq X$ : $L$ is nonempty, connected, and open $\}$. Let $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$ be the set of all functions $P: \hat{X}_{o} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$ such that for any $x, y \in \hat{X}_{o}$, (i) $\operatorname{int}\left(\hat{\Delta}_{x}\right) \subseteq P(x)$, (ii) $P(x)$ and $P(y)$ preserve bi-independence,
and (iii) $P(x)$ and $\Delta$ preserve bi-independence for any $\Delta \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}$. Clearly, $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$ is nonempty since it contains $x \mapsto \hat{\Delta}_{x}$.

Define a binary relation $\hat{\Subset}$ on $\mathcal{F}$ as follows: For any $x, y \in \mathcal{F}, P \hat{\Subset} Q$ if for any $x \in \hat{X}_{o}$, $P(x) \subseteq Q(x)$. It is straightforward to verify that $\hat{\subseteq}$ is a partial order on $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$. Take any totally ordered subset of $\hat{\mathcal{F}},\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$, in which $I$ is an index set. Let $P^{*}: X_{o} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$ be a function such that for any $x \in \hat{X}_{o}, P^{*}(x):=\bigcup_{i \in I} P_{i}(x)$. It must be true that $P^{*} \in \mathcal{P}$. First of all, $P^{*}(x)$ is open since every $P_{i}(x)$ is open. Second, $P^{*}(x)$ is connected, since every $P_{i}(x)$ is connected and contains $\operatorname{int}\left(\hat{\Delta}_{x}\right)$, which is connected. Now we show that $P^{*}(x)$ and $P^{*}(y)$ preserve bi-independence for all $x, y \in \hat{X}_{o}$. To see this, for any $\lambda \in(0,1)$, if $x^{\prime}, r^{\prime}, \lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime} \in P^{*}(x)$ and $y^{\prime}, s^{\prime}, \lambda y^{\prime} s^{\prime} \in P^{*}(y)$, by $\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$ is totally ordered by $\hat{\Subset}$, there must exist some index $j \in I$ such that $x^{\prime}, r^{\prime}, \lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime} \in P_{j}(x)$ and $y^{\prime}, s^{\prime}, \lambda y^{\prime} s^{\prime} \in P_{j}(y)$. Then, the property that we want $x^{\prime}, r^{\prime}, \lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime}, y^{\prime}, s^{\prime}, \lambda y^{\prime} s^{\prime}$ to satisfy to ensure that $P^{*}(x)$ and $P^{*}(y)$ preserve bi-independence follows from the fact that $P_{j}(x)$ and $P_{j}(y)$ preserve bi-independence. Similarly, it is easy to show that $P^{*}(x)$ and $\Delta$ preserve bi-independence for any $\Delta \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}$. Hence, $P^{*}$ is an upper bound of $\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$ in terms of $\hat{\Subset}$.

We can apply now Zorn's lemma and know that $\hat{\mathcal{F}}$ contains some $\hat{\Subset}$-maximal element. Denote this $\hat{\Subset}$-maximal element by $\hat{P}^{*}$. Clearly, $\bigcup_{x \in \hat{X}_{o}} \hat{P}^{*}(p)$ is an open and dense subset of $X$. The next step is to prove that $\hat{P}^{*}$ has some nice properties. To do that, we will need the following two lemmas.

For any two subsets $L_{1}, L_{2}$ of $X$, we write $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2}$ if there exist $x_{h}, x_{l} \in L_{1}$ and $y_{h}, y_{l} \in L_{2}$ such that $x_{h} \succ x_{l}, y_{h} \succ y_{l}, x_{h} \succ y_{l}$, and $y_{h} \succ x_{l}$. For a finite sequence of subsets $L_{1}, \ldots, L_{m}$ of $X$, we write $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$ if $L_{i} \rightleftarrows L_{i+1}$ for any $i \in\{1, \ldots, m-1\}$. Note that $\rightleftarrows$ is not a transitive binary relation; that is, $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2} \rightleftarrows L_{3}$ does not imply $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{3}$.

The proof of Lemma 12 is similar to Chapter 2.4 of Schmidt (1998), which we present in the Online Appendix.

Lemma 12 Suppose $L_{1}, \ldots, L_{m} \subseteq X$ are nonempty, connected, and open subsets such that $L_{i}$ and $L_{j}$ preserve bi-independence for any $i, j \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$. If $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$, there exist affine functions $U_{i}: L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, i=1, \ldots, m$, such that the function $U: \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies $p \in L_{i} \Rightarrow U(p)=U_{i}(p), i=1, \ldots, m$, represents $\succsim$ on $\bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i}$.

To show that different linear regions must have empty intersections, we need one more lemma, whose proof can be found in the Online Appendix.

Lemma 13 Suppose $L_{1}, L_{2}, L_{3} \subseteq X$ are nonempty, connected, open subsets such that $L_{i}$ and $L_{j}$ preserve bi-independence for any $i, j \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$. If $L_{1} \cap L_{2} \neq \emptyset$, then
(i) $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ preserves independence;
(ii) $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$ preserve bi-independence.

Now we proceed to show that the maximal linear regions cannot overlap.
Lemma 14 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak local bi-independence and $\hat{P}^{*}$ is a $\hat{\Subset}$-maximal element. Then for any $x, y \in \hat{X}_{o}$, if $\hat{P}^{*}(x) \cap \hat{P}^{*}(y) \neq \varnothing$, then $\hat{P}^{*}(x)=\hat{P}^{*}(y)$.

Proof. Suppose $\hat{P}^{*}(x) \cap \hat{P}^{*}(y) \neq \varnothing$. By Lemma 13, we have (i) $\hat{P}^{*}(x) \cup \hat{P}^{*}(y)$ preserves independence, (ii) $\hat{P}^{*}(x) \cup \hat{P}^{*}(y)$ and $\hat{P}^{*}(r)$ preserve bi-independence for all $r \in \hat{X}_{o}$, and (iii) $\hat{P}^{*}(x) \cup \hat{P}^{*}(y)$ and $\Delta$ preserve bi-independence for any $\Delta \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}$. Thus, if $\hat{P}^{*}(x) \cap \hat{P}^{*}(y) \neq \varnothing$, then $\hat{P}^{*}$ is not $\hat{\Subset}$-maximal unless $\hat{P}^{*}(x)=\hat{P}^{*}(y)$. To see this, if $\hat{P}^{*}(x) \neq \hat{P}^{*}(y)$, we can define a new function $\hat{P}: \hat{X}_{o} \rightarrow \mathcal{O}$ that agrees with $\hat{P}^{*}$ except at $x$ and $y$. Let $\hat{P}(x)=$ $\hat{P}(y)=\hat{P}^{*}(x) \cup \hat{P}^{*}(y)$. Then, we have $\hat{P} \neq P^{*}, \hat{P} \in \hat{\mathcal{F}}$, and $\hat{P}^{*} \hat{\Subset} \hat{P}$.

Lemma 15 Suppose $\succsim$ satisfies weak local bi-independence and $\hat{P}^{*}$ is a $\hat{\Subset}$-maximal element. Then $\left\{\hat{P}^{*}(x): x \in \hat{X}_{o}\right\}$ is finite.

Proof. Suppose $\left\{\hat{P}^{*}(x): x \in \hat{X}_{o}\right\}=\left\{P_{i}\right\}_{i \in I}$ for some infinite index set $I$. Let $B_{x}$ be where the second vertex is chosen in the procedure for constructing $\Delta \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}$ in Lemma 10. We show that for any $y \in B_{x}$, there exists $i \in I$ such that $\overline{x y} \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$. Without loss of generality, assume $x \neq y$. Applying the procedure in Lemma 10 , we can construct $\Delta \in \hat{\mathcal{D}}$ such that $\overline{x y} \subseteq \Delta$. By the denseness of $\hat{X}_{o}$, there exists $i \in I$ such that $P_{i} \cap \operatorname{int}(\Delta) \neq \emptyset$. Then by Lemma 14, it must be the case that $\operatorname{int}(\Delta) \subseteq P_{i}$, which implies $\overline{x y} \subseteq \Delta \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(P_{i}\right)$. The rest is similar to the proof of Lemma 5 .

Now we start to construct the CFPL representation. The idea is to separate the linear regions into groups according to their utility range and perform positive affine transformations group by group.

For any $P, P^{\prime} \in \mathcal{P}:=\left\{\hat{P}^{*}(x): x \in \hat{X}_{o}\right\}$, we write $P^{\prime} \leadsto P P$ if $V(P)=V\left(P^{\prime}\right)$ or there is a finite sequence of subsets $P_{1}, \ldots, P_{m} \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $P_{1}=P, P_{m}=P^{\prime}$, and $P_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows P_{m}$. By definition, $\longleftrightarrow$ is reflexive and transitive, and hence an equivalence relation defined on $\mathcal{P}$. Let $\mathcal{Q}_{1}, \ldots, \mathcal{Q}_{K}$ be the equivalence classes induced by $\rightsquigarrow \rightsquigarrow$. Since $\mathcal{P}$ is finite, it is clear that there are only a finite number of equivalent classes. Let $Q_{i}^{*}=\bigcup_{P \in \mathcal{Q}_{i}} P$ for each $i \in\{1, \ldots, K\}$. It is easy to see that (i) $V\left(Q_{i}^{*}\right)$ is a (possibly degenerate) interval for any $i$, (ii) $V\left(Q_{i}^{*}\right) \cap V\left(Q_{j}^{*}\right)$ has empty interior if $i \neq j$, and (iii) $V\left(X_{o}\right)=\bigcup_{i=1}^{K} V\left(Q_{i}^{*}\right)$.

For each $i$, let $V_{i}^{h}:=\sup V\left(Q_{i}^{*}\right)$ and $V_{i}^{l}:=\inf V\left(Q_{i}^{*}\right)$. If $V\left(X_{o}\right)$ is a singleton, then the whole theorem is trivially true. Without loss of generality, let $V\left(Q_{i}^{*}\right)$ be a nondegenerate interval if and only if $i \in\{1, \ldots, k\}$, and assume $V_{i}^{h} \leqslant V_{i+1}^{l}$ for each $i \in\{1, \ldots, k-1\}$.

Consider $V_{1}$ first. By Lemma 12, there exists a CFPL function $U_{1}: Q_{1}^{*} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that represents $\succsim$ on $Q_{1}^{*}$. We can a perform positive affine transformation to $U_{1}$ such that $\inf U^{1}=$ $V_{1}^{l}$ and $\sup U^{1}=V_{1}^{h}$. Since $V$ also represents $\succsim$ on $Q_{1}^{*}$, there exists a strictly increasing
function $f_{1}: V\left(Q_{1}^{*}\right) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $f_{1}(V(p))=U_{1}(p)$ for any $p \in Q_{1}^{*}$. Extend $f_{1}$ 's domain to $V(X)$ by letting $f_{1}(v)=v$ for any $v \in V(X) \backslash V\left(Q_{1}^{*}\right)$.

The proof of the next lemma can be found in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 16 The function $f_{1}$ is strictly increasing and continuous.

Thus, $f_{1} \circ V$ is continuous on $X$ and CFPL on $Q_{1}^{*}$. Recursively, for each $2 \leqslant i \leqslant k$, repeat the exercise above to construct continuous and strictly increasing function $f_{i}: V(X) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $f_{i} \circ f_{i-1} \circ \cdots f_{1} \circ V$ represents $\succsim$, and is CFPL on $Q_{i}^{*}$. In the end, we have $U=f_{k} \circ \cdots \circ f_{1} \circ V$ represents $\succsim$, and is CFPL on $\bigcup_{i=1}^{k} Q_{i}^{*}$. Since each $V\left(Q_{i}^{*}\right)$ is a constant for $i>k, U$ is CFPL on $X_{o}$. By Lemma 1, it is clear that $U$ is affine on $\operatorname{cl}(P)$ for any $P \in \mathcal{P}$, and $\bigcup_{P \in \mathcal{P}} \operatorname{cl}(P)=X$. Since each $P \in \mathcal{P}$ is open, $\operatorname{cl}(P)$ is regular closed and we are done with the sufficiency of the axioms.

## Proof of Proposition 3

Proof. Suppose $W$ is a CFPL representation of $\succsim$ and for some strictly increasing CFPL function $f: W(X) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, \tilde{W}=f \circ W$. Since $f$ is strictly increasing, $\tilde{W}$ must represent $\succsim$. Since $f$ is CFPL, $\tilde{W}$ is also CFPL. Hence, $\tilde{W}$ is a CFPL representation of $\succsim$.

Next, suppose $W, \tilde{W}$ are CFPL representations of $\succsim$. For the regular closed subsets in $X$ such that their union is $X$ and $W$ is affine on each of them, suppose $X_{1}, \ldots, X_{m_{1}}$ are the connected components of those subsets. For the regular closed subsets in $X$ such that their union is $X$ and $\tilde{W}$ is affine on each of them, suppose $Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{m_{2}}$ are the connected components of those subsets. Consider the collection of intersections between any $X_{i}$ and $Y_{j}$, denoted by $\left\{Z_{1}, \ldots, Z_{m}\right\}$. Clearly, $m$ is finite, both $W$ and $\tilde{W}$ must be affine on each $Z_{k}$, and the union of all $Z_{k}$ 's is $X$. Let $W\left(Z_{k}\right)=\left[W_{k}^{l}, W_{k}^{h}\right]$ and $\tilde{W}\left(Z_{k}\right)=\left[\tilde{W}_{k}^{l}, \tilde{W}_{k}^{h}\right]$. Then, $W_{1}^{l}, W_{1}^{h}, W_{2}^{l}, W_{2}^{h}, \ldots, W_{m}^{l}, W_{m}^{h}$ are elements of $W(X)$. Rearrange these numbers in an ascending order and denote them by $W_{1}=\min _{X} W(x) \leqslant W_{2} \leqslant \cdots \leqslant W_{2 m}=\max _{X} W(x)$. Similarly, $\tilde{W}_{1}^{l}, \tilde{W}_{1}^{h}, \tilde{W}_{2}^{l}, \tilde{W}_{2}^{h}, \ldots, \tilde{W}_{m}^{l}, \tilde{W}_{m}^{h}$ are elements of $\tilde{W}(X)$. Rearrange them in an ascending order and denote them by $\tilde{W}_{1}=\min _{X} \tilde{W}(x) \leqslant \tilde{W}_{2} \leqslant \cdots \leqslant \tilde{W}_{2 m}=\max _{X} \tilde{W}(x)$. We know that each $W^{-1}\left(\left[W_{i}, W_{i+1}\right]\right)=\tilde{W}^{-1}\left(\left[\tilde{W}_{i}, \tilde{W}_{i+1}\right]\right)$ must be the union of some subsets of of $Z_{1}, \ldots, Z_{m}$. Hence, $W$ and $\tilde{W}$ are affine on each connected component of $W^{-1}\left(\left[W_{i}, W_{i+1}\right]\right)=$ $\tilde{W}^{-1}\left(\left[\tilde{W}_{i}, \tilde{W}_{i+1}\right]\right)$.

Construct a function $f: W(X) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ as follows. Let $f\left(W_{i}\right)=\tilde{W}_{i}$. Between $W_{i}$ and $W_{i+1}$, make $f$ an affine function. It is easy to see that $\tilde{W}=f \circ W$. By construction, $f$ is CFPL. Finally, since both $W$ and $\tilde{W}$ represent the same preference, $f$ is strictly increasing.

## Proof of Proposition 4

Proof. The first and second statements are straightforward. We only prove the only-if part of the third and fourth statements. For the former, take a canonical COLU representation of $\succsim, V(x)=\max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} \mu_{i} \cdot x+\alpha_{i}$. Since each $\mu_{i} \cdot x+\alpha_{i}$ is equal to $V$ in some regular closed subset of $X$, applying monotonicity in that subset immediately implies that $\mu_{i} \in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{N}$ for any $i$.

For the only-if part of the last statement, take a CFPL representation of $\succsim, V$. Let $X_{1}, \ldots, X_{k}$ be the connected components of the regular closed subsets in the definition of the representation. Each $X_{i}$ is a regular closed connected subset of $X$ such that $V$ is affine on $X_{i}$. First, $V$ is not constant on any of these $X_{i}$ 's. To see this, suppose $V$ is constant on $X_{i}$. By Lemma 3 and C-independence, $\operatorname{co}\left(X_{i} \cup\{\underline{u} \mathbf{1}\}\right)$ must preserve independence, and hence $\operatorname{co}\left(X_{i} \cup\{\underline{u} \mathbf{1}, \bar{u} \mathbf{1}\}\right)$ must preserve independence. This implies that $V$ is constant on $\{u \mathbf{1}: u \in[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]\}$, which violates the assumption that the preference is nondegenerate.

Next, without loss of generality, suppose $X_{1}$ contains an alternative that maximizes $V$. By Lemma 3 and C-independence, $Y_{1}=\operatorname{co}\left(X_{1} \cup\{\underline{u} \mathbf{1}, \bar{u} \mathbf{1}\}\right)$ preserves independence. On the restricted domain $Y_{1}, V$ is CFPL. We can find a strictly increasing CFPL function to transform $V$ into $W$ such that $W$ is equal to $\mu_{1} \cdot x$ on $Y_{1}$, in which $\mu_{1} \cdot \mathbf{1}$ is normalized to either 1 or -1 . Without loss of generality, assume that $\mu_{1} \cdot \mathbf{1}=1$. Note that by Proposition 3, $W$ also represents $\succsim$ and is CFPL. Let $Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{l}$ be the connected components of the regular closed subsets in the definition of a CFPL function for $W$. Clearly, $Y_{1}$ contains an alternative that maximizes $W$.

Similar to the binary relations $\rightleftarrows$ and $\rightsquigarrow \nrightarrow$ defined in the proof of Theorem 2, let $Y_{i} \rightleftarrows Y_{j}$ if $W\left(Y_{i}\right) \cap W\left(Y_{j}\right)$ has nonempty interior. Let $Y_{i} \leadsto Y_{j}$ if there exist $i_{1}, \ldots, i_{m} \in\{1, \ldots, l\}$ such that $i_{1}=i, i_{m}=j$, and $Y_{i_{1}} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows Y_{i_{m}}$. By definition and because $W$ is not constant on any $Y_{i}$, $\leadsto$ is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Different equivalent classes induced by $u$ have at most one point in common in terms of their utility ranges.

Take the equivalent class of $Y_{1}$ induced by $\mathrm{m} \boldsymbol{\prime} \boldsymbol{*}$. On an arbitrary set in that equivalent class, suppose $W$ 's local utility function is $\mu \cdot x+\alpha$. We want to prove that $\mu \cdot \mathbf{1}=1$ and $\alpha=0$. If $Y_{1}$ is the only element of that equivalent class, we are done. Suppose this is not true. Let $Y_{i}$ be an element of that equivalent class. There must be some $Y_{j}$ in that class such that $Y_{i} \rightleftarrows Y_{j}$. Since $W\left(Y_{i}\right) \cap W\left(Y_{j}\right)$ has nonempty interior, there must exist $x_{i} \in \operatorname{int}\left(Y_{i}\right)$ and $x_{j} \in \operatorname{int}\left(Y_{j}\right)$ such that $W\left(x_{i}\right)=W\left(x_{j}\right)$. Fixing two arbitrary distinct constant $u$ 's in $[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]$, by C -independence, for a sufficiently small $\lambda \in(0,1)$ such that $\lambda x_{i}(u \mathbf{1}) \in \operatorname{int}\left(Y_{i}\right)$ and $\lambda x_{j}(u \mathbf{1}) \in \operatorname{int}\left(Y_{j}\right)$, it must be true that $W\left(\lambda x_{i}(u \mathbf{1})\right)=W\left(\lambda x_{j}(u \mathbf{1})\right)$. Suppose $W$ 's local utility functions on $Y_{i}$ and $Y_{j}$ are $\mu_{i} \cdot x+\alpha_{i}$ and $\mu_{j} \cdot x+\alpha_{j}$ respectively. Then, we have $\lambda W\left(x_{i}\right)+(1-\lambda)\left(\mu_{i} \cdot(u \mathbf{1})+\alpha_{i}\right)=\lambda W\left(x_{j}\right)+(1-\lambda)\left(\mu_{j} \cdot(u \mathbf{1})+\alpha_{j}\right)$ for two distinct $u$ 's,
which implies that $\mu_{i} \cdot \mathbf{1}=\mu_{j} \cdot \mathbf{1}$ and $\alpha_{i}=\alpha_{j}$. Following the same argument, we know that for all $Y_{i}$ 's in this equivalent class with $W$ on each $Y_{i}$ written as $\mu_{i} \cdot x+\alpha_{i}, \mu_{i}$ 's must have the same total mass and $\alpha_{i}$ 's must be identical. Since $Y_{1}$ is in this equivalent class, we know that $\mu_{i}$ 's in this equivalent class must have the same total mass 1 and $\alpha_{i}$ 's in this equivalent class must be 0 .

If $Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{l}$ are all in the same equivalent class, we are done. Suppose this is not true. Then, at least one of $Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{l}$ must contain an alternative that minimizes $W$ and does not belong to the equivalent class of $Y_{1}$. Without loss of generality, suppose it is $Y_{l}$. Consider $Y_{L}=\operatorname{co}\left(Y_{l} \cup\{\underline{u} \mathbf{1}, \bar{u} \mathbf{1}\}\right)$. First, observe that by Lemma 3 and C-independence, $Y_{L}$ preserves independence. Also observe that the utility range of $Y_{L}$ must overlap with that of the equivalent class of $Y_{1}$, because they both contain $\{u \mathbf{1}: u \in[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]\}$ and $W(\{u \mathbf{1}: u \in[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]\})$ is not a singleton.

Next, denote the subset of $Y_{L}$ whose utility range does not overlap with that of the equivalent class of $Y_{1}$ by $Y_{L}^{*}$. We can find a strictly increasing CFPL transformation that is equal to the identity function on $W(X) \backslash W\left(Y_{L}^{*}\right)$ to transform $W$ into $W^{*}$ such that at any point in $Y_{L}^{*}, W^{*}$ 's local utility function $\mu^{*} \cdot x+\alpha^{*}$ satisfies $\mu^{*} \cdot \mathbf{1}=1$. We can normalize $\mu^{*} \cdot \mathbf{1}$ to 1 rather than -1 because of the following reason. Note that $Y_{L}$ has a subset whose utility range overlaps with that of the equivalent class of $Y_{1}$ but does not overlap with that of $Y_{L}^{*}$. Therefore, at any point of that subset, either $W^{\prime}$ 's or $W^{*}$ s local utility function, $\mu \cdot x+\alpha$, must satisfy $\mu \cdot \mathbf{1}=1$ and $\alpha=0$, as we have established previously. Then, since $Y_{L}$ preserves independence, it cannot be the case that $\mu^{*} \cdot \mathbf{1}=-1$.

Finally, we prove that $\alpha^{*}$ must also be zero. If $\alpha^{*}$ is not zero, $W^{*}$ must be discontinuous at the boundary between $\mathrm{cl}\left(Y_{L} \backslash Y_{L}^{*}\right)$ and $Y_{L}$, because on either of these two sets, the total mass of the finite signed measure of the local utility function of $W^{*}$ is 1 , but the constant term of the local utility function is different, which makes $W^{*}$ discontinuous and hence we reach a contradiction. Then, note that any point in $X$, whose local utility function of $W^{*}$ is $\mu \cdot x+\alpha$, must belong to an element of either the equivalent class of $Y_{1}$ or the equivalent class of $Y_{L}^{*}$. Then, we know that $\mu \cdot \mathbf{1}=1$ and $\alpha=0$, which follows from the argument that we use to show that any two $Y_{i}, Y_{j}$ that overlap with each other in terms of the utility range must satisfy $\mu_{i} \cdot \mathbf{1}=\mu_{j} \cdot \mathbf{1}$ and $\alpha_{i}=\alpha_{j}$.

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## Online Appendix

## Proof of Lemma 8

Lemma 8 For any $x, y, r, s \in X$, if $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ each preserve independence, then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ preserve bi-independence.
(ii) For any $x^{\prime}, r^{\prime} \in \overline{x r}$ and $y^{\prime}, s^{\prime} \in \overline{y s}$ such that $x^{\prime} \sim y^{\prime}$ and $r^{\prime} \sim s^{\prime}, \lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime} \sim \lambda y^{\prime} s^{\prime}$ for any $\lambda \in(0,1)$.
(iii) There exists $\varepsilon>0$ such that for any $y^{\prime}, s^{\prime} \in \overline{y s}$ with $\left\|y^{\prime}-s^{\prime}\right\|<\varepsilon$, $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y^{\prime} s^{\prime}}$ preserve bi-independence.

Proof. (i) $\Rightarrow$ (iii) is trivial. We will show $(\mathrm{ii}) \Rightarrow(\mathrm{i})$ and $(\mathrm{iii}) \Rightarrow(\mathrm{ii})$.
To show (ii) $\Rightarrow$ (i), suppose (ii) holds but $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ do not preserve bi-independence. Without loss of generality, assume that $x \sim y$ and $r \succ s$ but $\lambda y s \succsim \lambda x r$ for some $\lambda \in(0,1)$. Now we show that there must exist $r^{\prime} \in \overline{x r}$ and $s^{\prime} \in \overline{y s}$ such that $r^{\prime} \sim s^{\prime}$, and $\lambda x r^{\prime} \nsim \lambda y s^{\prime}$, which is a contradiction.

Case 1: $x \sim y \succsim r \succ s$. Since $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ each preserve independence, we have $y \succsim \lambda y s \succsim$ $\lambda x r \succsim r$. By $x \sim y \succsim r \succ s$ and continuity, there exist $s^{\prime} \in \overline{y s}$ such that $r \sim s^{\prime}$. Then, since $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ each preserve independence, we have $\lambda y s^{\prime} \succ \lambda y s \succsim \lambda x r$ and we are done.

Case 2: $r \succ s \succsim x \sim y$. Similar to case 1, we have $s \succsim \lambda y s \succsim \lambda x r \succsim x$. By $r \succ s \succsim x \sim y$ and continuity, there exist $r^{\prime} \in \overline{x r}$ such that $r^{\prime} \sim s$. Then, since $\overline{x r}$ and $\overline{y s}$ each preserve independence, we have $\lambda y s \succsim \lambda x r \succ \lambda x r^{\prime}$, and we are done.

The case in which $r \succ x \sim y \succ s$ is impossible, since it implies $\lambda x r \succ x \sim y \succ \lambda y s$. Hence, we have established (ii) $\Rightarrow$ (i).

Now we show (iii) $\Rightarrow$ (ii). Suppose (iii) holds. Consider $x^{\prime}, r^{\prime} \in \overline{x r}$ and $y^{\prime}, s^{\prime} \in \overline{y s}$ such that $x^{\prime} \sim y^{\prime}$ and $r^{\prime} \sim s^{\prime}$. We want to show that $\lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime} \sim \lambda y^{\prime} s^{\prime}$ for any $\lambda \in(0,1)$. Since $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$ and $\overline{y^{\prime} s^{\prime}}$ each preserve independence, it is without loss of generality to assume that $x^{\prime} \sim y^{\prime} \succ r^{\prime} \sim s^{\prime}$.

Pick $m \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\left\|y^{\prime}-s^{\prime}\right\|<m \varepsilon$, in which $\varepsilon$ is given in (iii). For $k \in\{0,1, \ldots, m\}$, let $t^{k}=y^{\prime}+\left(s^{\prime}-y^{\prime}\right) k / m$. It is clear that $\left\|t^{k}-t^{k+1}\right\|<\varepsilon$. By (iii), $\overline{t^{k} t^{k+1}}$ and $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$ preserve bi-independence for any $k \in\{0,1, \ldots, m\}$.

Suppose $\overline{t^{0} t^{k}}$ and $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$ preserve bi-independence. Since $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$ preserves independence, there exists a monotone transformation $f$ such that $U\left(\lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)=f \circ V\left(\lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)=\lambda$ for any $\lambda \in[0,1]$. Note that since $V$ represents $\succsim, U=f \circ V$ also represents $\succsim$. Let $\alpha, \beta \in(0,1)$ be such that $\alpha x^{\prime} r^{\prime} \sim t^{k}$ and $\beta x^{\prime} r^{\prime} \sim t^{k+1}$. Since $\overline{x^{\prime}\left(\alpha x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)}$ and $\overline{t^{0} t^{k}}$ preserve bi-independence, we have $U\left(\lambda x^{\prime}\left(\alpha x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)\right)=U\left(\lambda t^{0} t^{k}\right)$ for any $\lambda \in[0,1]$. Thus,

$$
\left.U\left(\lambda t^{0} t^{k}\right)=U\left((\lambda+(1-\lambda) \alpha) x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)\right)=\lambda+(1-\lambda) \alpha
$$

Since $\overline{\left(\alpha x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)\left(\beta x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)}$ and $\overline{t^{k} t^{k+1}}$ preserve bi-independence, $U\left(\lambda\left(\alpha x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)\left(\beta x^{\prime} r^{\prime}\right)\right)=U\left(\lambda t^{k} t^{k+1}\right)$ for any $\lambda \in[0,1]$. Thus,

$$
U\left(\lambda t^{k} t^{k+1}\right)=\lambda \alpha+(1-\lambda) \beta
$$

Thus, $U$ is continuous on $\overline{t^{0} t^{k+1}}$ and linear on $\overline{t^{0} t^{k}}, \overline{t^{k} t^{k+1}}$, and $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$. If $U$ restricted to $\overline{t^{0} t^{k+1}}$ has a kink at $t^{k}$, it is easy to see that $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$ and $\overline{t^{0} t^{k+1}} \cap B_{\varepsilon}\left(t^{k}\right)$ cannot preserve bi-independence, which contradicts (iii). Hence, $U$ is linear on both $\overline{t^{0} t^{k+1}}$ and $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$, which implies that $\overline{t^{0} t^{k+1}}$ and $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$ preserve bi-independence. Inductively, we establish that $\overline{t^{0} t^{m}}=\overline{y^{\prime} s^{\prime}}$ and $\overline{x^{\prime} r^{\prime}}$ preserve bi-independence, and thus $\lambda y^{\prime} s^{\prime} \sim \lambda x^{\prime} r^{\prime}$ for any $\lambda \in(0,1)$.

## Proof of Lemma 12

Lemma 12 Suppose $L_{1}, \ldots, L_{m} \subseteq X$ are nonempty, connected, and open subsets such that $L_{i}$ and $L_{j}$ preserve bi-independence for any $i, j \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$. If $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$, there exist affine functions $U_{i}: L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, i=1, \ldots, m$, such that the function $U: \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies $x \in L_{i} \Rightarrow U(x)=U_{i}(x), i=1, \ldots, m$, represents $\succsim$ on $\bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i}$.

Proof. We say that $U: \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ weakly represents $\succsim$ for $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$ if $U$ represents $\succsim$ on each $L_{j} \cup L_{j+1}, j=1, \ldots, m-1$.

We first consider the case in which $m=2$. Since $L_{i}$ and $L_{i}$ preserve bi-independence, $L_{i}$ preserves independence. By Lemma 1, we can find an affine function $U_{i}: L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that represents $\succsim$ on $L_{i}, i=1,2$, respectively. Since $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2}$, we can find $x_{h}, x_{l} \in L_{1}$ and $y_{h}, y_{l} \in L_{2}$ such that both $x_{h}$ and $y_{h}$ are strictly preferred to both $x_{l}$ and $y_{l}$. Since $\succsim$ on $L_{i}$ can be represented by a continuous affine function and $L_{i}$ is connected, $i=1,2$, there must exist $x \in L_{1}$ and $y \in L_{2}$ such that $x \sim y$. Since $L_{1}$ is open and there exists $x_{h}, x_{l} \in L_{1}$ such that $x_{h} \succ x_{l}$, we can always find $x^{*}, x_{*}$ in a small $\varepsilon$-ball centered at $x$ such that $\overline{x^{*} x_{*}} \subseteq L_{1}$ and $x^{*} \succ x \sim y \succ x_{*}$. Without loss of generality, let $U_{1}(x)=0$. Since $L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$ are open, by continuity, there exists some small enough $\alpha \in(0,1)$ such that $r \in L_{1}$ implies $\alpha r x \in L_{1}$ and $x^{*} \succ \alpha r x \succ x_{*}$, and $s \in L_{2}$ implies $\alpha s y \in L_{2}$ and $x^{*} \succ \alpha s y \succ x_{*}$. Then, standard arguments imply that for each $s \in L_{2}$ there exists a unique $\lambda_{s} \in(0,1)$ such that $\alpha s y \sim \lambda_{s} x^{*} x_{*}$. Define for each $s \in L_{2}$

$$
\hat{U}_{2}(s)=\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}\left(\lambda_{s} x^{*} x_{*}\right) .
$$

Take any $s, s^{\prime} \in L_{2}$. Since $L_{2}$ preserves independence, we have $s \succsim s^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow \alpha s y \succsim$ $\alpha s^{\prime} y \Longleftrightarrow \hat{U}_{2}(s) \geqslant \hat{U}_{2}\left(s^{\prime}\right)$. Hence, $\hat{U}_{2}$ represents $\succsim$ on $L_{2}$. For any $\lambda \in(0,1)$ such that $\lambda s s^{\prime} \in L_{2}$, since $L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$ preserve bi-independence,

$$
\alpha\left(\lambda s s^{\prime}\right) y=\lambda(\alpha s y)\left(\alpha s^{\prime} y\right) \sim \lambda\left(\lambda_{s} x^{*} x_{*}\right)\left(\lambda_{s^{\prime}} x^{*} x_{*}\right)
$$

which implies that

$$
\begin{aligned}
\hat{U}_{2}\left(\lambda s s^{\prime}\right) & =\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}\left(\left(\lambda \lambda_{s}+(1-\lambda) \lambda_{s^{\prime}}\right) x^{*} x_{*}\right) \\
& =\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}\left(\lambda\left(\lambda_{s} x^{*} x_{*}\right)\left(\lambda_{s^{\prime}} x^{*} x_{*}\right)\right) \\
& =\frac{1}{\alpha}\left[\lambda U_{1}\left(\lambda_{s} x^{*} x_{*}\right)+(1-\lambda) U_{1}\left(\lambda_{s^{\prime}} x^{*} x_{*}\right)\right] \\
& =\lambda \hat{U}_{2}(s)+(1-\lambda) \hat{U}_{2}\left(s^{\prime}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus, $\hat{U}_{2}$ is affine and we can find some positive affine transformation to convert $U_{2}$ into $\hat{U}_{2}$. Without loss of generality, let $U_{2}=\hat{U}_{2}$. Note that since $x \sim y$,

$$
U_{2}(y)=\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}\left(\lambda_{y} x^{*} x_{*}\right)=\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}(x)=0=U_{1}(x) .
$$

Take any $x^{\prime} \in L_{1}$ and $y^{\prime} \in L_{2}$. We want to verify that $x^{\prime} \succsim y^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow U_{1}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \geqslant U_{2}\left(q^{\prime}\right)$. Because $L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$ preserve bi-independence and $x \sim y, x^{\prime} \succsim y^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow \alpha x^{\prime} x \succsim \alpha y^{\prime} y$. According to the definition of $\alpha$, we can let $\gamma \in(0,1)$ be the unique number such that $\gamma x^{*} x_{*} \sim \alpha x^{\prime} x$. Since $U_{1}(x)=U_{2}(y)=0$,

$$
U_{1}\left(x^{\prime}\right)=\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}\left(\alpha x^{\prime} x\right)=\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}\left(\gamma x^{*} x_{*}\right),
$$

and

$$
U_{2}\left(y^{\prime}\right)=\frac{1}{\alpha} U_{1}\left(\lambda_{y^{\prime}} x^{*} x_{*}\right)
$$

where $\lambda_{y^{\prime}} x^{*} x_{*} \sim \alpha y^{\prime} y$. Then,

$$
x^{\prime} \succsim y^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow \alpha x^{\prime} x \succsim \alpha y^{\prime} y \Longleftrightarrow \gamma \geqslant \lambda_{y^{\prime}} \Longleftrightarrow U_{1}\left(x^{\prime}\right) \geqslant U_{2}\left(y^{\prime}\right) .
$$

These observations also imply that if $x \in L_{1} \cap L_{2}, U_{1}(x)=U_{2}(x)$. Then, we can define a function $U: L_{1} \cup L_{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $x \in L_{i} \Rightarrow U(x)=U_{i}(x), i=1,2$. The above arguments show that $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$. Clearly, any positive affine transformations of $U$ also represent $\succsim$ on $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$.

Now we proceed to prove the lemma for any $m>2$. By applying the procedure above and performing positive affine transformations inductively, we can find affine functions $U_{1}, \ldots, U_{m}$ such that $U: \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ weakly represents $\succsim$ for $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$. We want to prove that $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $\bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i}$. Recall $\succsim$ has a continuous representation $V$.

Step 1: We prove that if for some $i \in\{2, \ldots, m-1\}, L_{i-1} \rightleftarrows L_{i+1}, U$ must weakly represent $\succsim$ for $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{i-1} \rightleftarrows L_{i+1} \rightleftarrows L_{i+2} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$. To prove this, we
only need to verify that $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $L_{i-1} \cup L_{i+1}$. Because $L_{i-1}, L_{i}$, and $L_{i+1}$ are connected, $V\left(L_{i-1}\right), V\left(L_{i}\right)$ and $V\left(L_{i+1}\right)$ are all intervals. By $L_{i-1} \rightleftarrows L_{i} \rightleftarrows L_{i+1} \rightleftarrows L_{i-1}$, $V\left(L_{i-1}\right) \cap V\left(L_{i}\right) \cap V\left(L_{i+1}\right)$ contains some nonempty open interval of $\mathbb{R}$. In other words, we can find some $x \in L_{i-1}, y \in L_{i}, r \in L_{i+1}, \alpha \in(0,1)$, and $B_{\varepsilon}(y) \subseteq L_{i}$ such that $V(x)=V(y)=V(r)$ and $V\left(\alpha x^{\prime} x\right), V\left(\alpha r^{\prime} r\right) \in V\left(B_{\varepsilon}(y)\right)$ for any $x^{\prime} \in L_{i-1}$ and $r^{\prime} \in L_{i+1}$.

Take any $x^{\prime} \in L_{i-1}$ and $r^{\prime} \in L_{i+1}$. Since $L_{i-1}$ and $L_{i+1}$ preserve bi-independence and $x \sim r$,

$$
x^{\prime} \succsim r^{\prime} \Longleftrightarrow \alpha x^{\prime} x \succsim \alpha r^{\prime} r \Longleftrightarrow V\left(\alpha x^{\prime} x\right) \geqslant V\left(\alpha r^{\prime} r\right)
$$

Recall that $V\left(\alpha x^{\prime} x\right), V\left(\alpha r^{\prime} r\right) \in V\left(B_{\varepsilon}(y)\right)$, which means that we can find some $y_{x}, y_{r} \in B_{\varepsilon}(y)$ such that $y_{x} \sim \alpha x^{\prime} x$ and $y_{r} \sim \alpha r^{\prime} r$. Since $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $L_{i-1} \cup L_{i}$ and $L_{i} \cup L_{i+1}$, respectively, $U\left(y_{x}\right)=U\left(\alpha x^{\prime} x\right)$ and $U\left(y_{r}\right)=U\left(\alpha r^{\prime} r\right)$. Then,

$$
\alpha x^{\prime} x \succsim \alpha r^{\prime} r \Longleftrightarrow U\left(y_{x}\right) \geqslant U\left(y_{r}\right) \Longleftrightarrow U\left(\alpha x^{\prime} x\right) \geqslant U\left(\alpha r^{\prime} r\right) \Longleftrightarrow U\left(x^{\prime}\right) \geqslant U\left(r^{\prime}\right)
$$

where the last equivalence follows from $U(x)=U(y)$ and $U(y)=U(r)$.
Step 2: We prove that if $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{m}$, there must exist some $i \in\{2, \ldots, m-1\}$ such that $L_{i-1} \rightleftarrows L_{i+1}$. If $m=3$ there is nothing to prove. Suppose $m \geqslant 4$. Let $v_{i}^{h}:=\sup _{x \in L_{i}} V(x)$ and $v_{i}^{l}:=\inf _{x \in L_{i}} V(x)$ for any $i \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$. By definition, $v_{i}^{h}>v_{i}^{l}$ for any $i \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$, and whenever $L_{j} \rightleftarrows L_{k}$ for some $j, k \in\{1, \ldots, m\},\left(v_{j}^{l}, v_{j}^{h}\right) \cap\left(v_{k}^{l}, v_{k}^{h}\right) \neq \varnothing$.

Suppose for any $i \in\{2, \ldots, m-1\}, L_{i-1} \nRightarrow L_{i+1}$; that is, either $v_{i-1}^{h} \leqslant v_{i+1}^{l}$ or $v_{i+1}^{h} \leqslant v_{i-1}^{l}$. If $v_{i-1}^{h} \leqslant v_{i+1}^{l}$ holds for every $i \in\{2, \ldots, m-1\}$, we must have $L_{1} \nRightarrow L_{m}$. This is clear if $m$ is odd. Suppose $m$ is even. Since $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2} \rightleftarrows L_{3}$, it must be the case that $v_{2}^{h}>v_{3}^{l}>v_{1}^{h}$. Hence, for any even $m>2, v_{m}^{l} \geqslant v_{2}^{h}>v_{1}^{h}$, which implies that $L_{1} \nRightarrow L_{m}$. Similarly, it cannot be the case that $v_{i+1}^{h} \leqslant v_{i-1}^{l}$ holds for every $i \in\{2, \ldots, m-1\}$.

For $m=4$, the arguments above implies that if $L_{i-1} \not \ddagger L_{i+1}$ for all $i$, then either (i) $v_{1}^{h} \leqslant v_{3}^{l}$ and $v_{4}^{h} \leqslant v_{2}^{l}$, or (ii) $v_{3}^{h} \leqslant v_{1}^{l}$ and $v_{2}^{h} \leqslant v_{4}^{l}$. The two cases are symmetric, so we will focus on the former. Since $L_{3} \rightleftarrows L_{4}$, it is clear that $v_{3}^{l}<v_{4}^{h}$, which implies that $v_{1}^{h}<v_{2}^{l}$. This contradicts the fact that $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2}$.

Now let $m \geqslant 5$. Then by $L_{i-1} \nRightarrow L_{i+1}$ for all $i$, there must be some $j \in\{3, \ldots, m-2\}$ such that $\max \left\{v_{j+2}^{h}, v_{j-2}^{h}\right\} \leqslant v_{j}^{l}$ or $v_{j}^{h} \leqslant \min \left\{v_{j-2}^{l}, v_{j+2}^{l}\right\}$. We focus on the former case, since the latter is similar. Because $L_{i-2} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{j+2}$, it must be the case that $v_{j-1}^{l}<v_{j-2}^{h} \leqslant$ $v_{j}^{l}<v_{j-1}^{h}$ and $v_{j+1}^{l}<v_{j+2}^{h} \leqslant v_{j}^{l}<v_{j+1}^{h}$. Then, $\left(v_{j-1}^{l}, v_{j-1}^{h}\right) \cap\left(v_{j+1}^{l}, v_{j+1}^{h}\right) \neq \varnothing$, and thus, $L_{j-1} \rightleftarrows L_{j+1}$.

Step 3: We prove that if there exist affine functions $U_{i}: L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, i=1, \ldots, m$, such that the function $U: \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies $x \in L_{i} \Rightarrow U(x)=U_{i}(x), i=1, \ldots, m$, weakly represents $\succsim$ for $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$, then $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $\bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i}$. The claim is
trivial if $m=1,2$. Next, suppose for some $\bar{m} \geqslant 2$, the claim is true for any $m \leqslant \bar{m}$. Assume that now $m=\bar{m}+1$. Take any $x, y \in \bigcup_{i=1}^{m} L_{i}$. If $x, y \in L_{i}$ for some $i \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$, $x \succsim y \Longleftrightarrow U(x) \geqslant U(y)$. Therefore, for the rest of the proof of this lemma, let $x \in L_{i}$ and $y \in L_{j} / L_{i}$ for some distinct $i, j \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$.

First, suppose $\{x, y\} \nsubseteq L_{1} \cup L_{m}$. Then, either $\{x, y\} \subseteq \bigcup_{i=2}^{m} L_{i}$ or $\{x, y\} \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^{m-1} L_{i}$. Since $U$ weakly represents $\succsim$ for $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$, it also weakly represents $\succsim$ for $L_{2} \rightleftarrows$ $\cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$ and for $L_{1} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m-1}$, respectively. By the induction hypothesis, we have $x \succsim y \Longleftrightarrow U(x) \geqslant U(y)$.

Second, consider the case in which $\{x, y\} \subseteq L_{1} \cup L_{m}$. Without loss of generality, let $x \in L_{1}$ and $y \in L_{m} \backslash L_{1}$. If $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{m}$, from Steps 1 and 2 , we know that there must exist some $i \in\{2, \ldots, m-1\}$ such that $L_{i-1} \rightleftarrows L_{i+1}$, and hence $U$ weakly represents $\succsim$ for $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{i-1} \rightleftarrows L_{i+1} \rightleftarrows L_{i+2} \rightleftarrows \cdots \rightleftarrows L_{m}$. Then, we know that $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $L_{1} \cup L_{2} \cup \cdots \cup L_{i-1} \cup L_{i+1} \cup L_{i+2} \cup \cdots \cup L_{m}$, and hence that $x \succsim y \Longleftrightarrow U(x) \geqslant U(y)$.

Hence, suppose $L_{1} \nRightarrow L_{m}$. Without loss of generality, let $v_{1}^{l} \geqslant v_{m}^{h}$. (If it is the other case, we reverse the indices of $L_{1}, \ldots, L_{m}$.) It must be the case that $x \succsim y$. Then, we only need to prove that $x \sim y \Rightarrow U(x)=U(y)$ and $x \succ y \Rightarrow U(x)>U(y)$. For any $i \in\{1, \ldots, m-1\}$, since $\left(v_{i}^{l}, v_{i}^{h}\right) \cap\left(v_{i+1}^{l}, v_{i+1}^{h}\right)$ is nonempty, $\left(v_{i}^{l}, v_{i}^{h}\right) \cup\left(v_{i+1}^{l}, v_{i+1}^{h}\right)$ is an open interval. Therefore, $\bigcup_{i=1}^{m-1}\left(v_{i}^{l}, v_{i}^{h}\right)$ is an open interval that contains $\frac{v_{1}^{l}+v_{1}^{h}}{2}$ and $\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^{m-1}\left(v_{i}^{l}, v_{i}^{h}\right)\right) \cap\left(v_{m}^{l}, v_{m}^{h}\right) \neq \varnothing$. Notice that since $\frac{v_{1}^{l}+v_{1}^{h}}{2}>v_{1}^{l} \geqslant v_{m}^{h}$, we must have $v_{m}^{h} \in \bigcup_{i=2}^{m-1}\left(v_{i}^{l}, v_{i}^{h}\right)$; that is, there exists some $r \in L_{i}, i \in\{2, \ldots, m-1\}$ such that $V(r)=v_{m}^{h}$. Note that by the induction hypothesis $U$ represents $\succsim$ on $\bigcup_{i=1}^{m-1} L_{i}$ and $\bigcup_{i=2}^{m} L_{i}$, respectively. Since $x \in L_{1}, y \in L_{m}$ with $v_{1}^{l} \geqslant v_{m}^{h}$, if $x \sim y$, the only possibility is that $V(x)=V(y)=v_{1}^{l}=v_{m}^{h}=V(r)$. Then it follows that $U(x)=U(r)=U(y)$ and we are done. If $x \succ y$, then $V(x) \geqslant V(r) \geqslant V(y)$ and at least one of the inqualities is strict. It follows that $U(x) \geqslant U(r) \geqslant U(y)$ and at least one of the inqualities is strict. Thus, $x \succ y \Rightarrow U(x)>U(y)$.

## Proof of Lemma 13

Lemma 13 Suppose $L_{1}, L_{2}, L_{3} \subseteq X$ are nonempty, connected, open subsets such that $L_{i}$ and $L_{j}$ preserve bi-independence for any $i, j \in\{1, \ldots, m\}$. If $L_{1} \cap L_{2} \neq \emptyset$, then
(i) $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ preserves independence;
(ii) $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$ preserve bi-independence.

Proof. We first show (i). Let $L_{0}$ be an open ball such that $L_{0} \subseteq L_{1} \cap L_{2}$. Suppose $x \sim y$ for any $x, y \in L_{0}$. Then since $L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$ each preserve independence, by Lemma 1 , we have $x \sim y$ for any $x, y \in L_{1} \cup L_{2}$. Clearly, in this case, $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ preserves independence. Suppose there exists $x, y \in L_{0}$ such that $x \succ y$. Then by definition, $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{0} \rightleftarrows L_{2}$. Since
$L_{1}$ and $L_{2}$ each preserve independence, it is clear that $L_{i}$ and $L_{j}$ preserve bi-independence for any $i, j \in\{0,1,2\}$. By Lemma 12, there exist affine functions $U_{i}: L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, i=0,1,2$, such that the function $U: \bigcup_{i=0}^{2} L_{i} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that satisfies $x \in L_{i} \Rightarrow U(x)=U_{i}(x), i=0,1,2$, represents $\succsim$ on $\bigcup_{i=0}^{2} L_{i}$. Note that $U$ is well-defined only if $U_{0}(x)=U_{1}(x)=U_{2}(x)$ for any $x \in L_{0} \subseteq L_{1} \cap L_{2}$. Since $L_{0}$ is an open ball and $U_{i}$ is affine, $i=0,1,2$, it follows that $U$ must be affine on $\bigcup_{i=0}^{2} L_{i}=L_{1} \cup L_{2}$. Thus, $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ preserve independence.

To show (ii), we first show that if $L_{1} \cup L_{2} \nRightarrow L_{3}$, then $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$ preserve biindependence. Since $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$ are both connected, $V\left(L_{1} \cup L_{2}\right)$ and $V\left(L_{3}\right)$ are two (potentially degenerate) intervals, which implies that $V\left(L_{1} \cup L_{2}\right) \cap V\left(L_{3}\right)$ is an interval. If $V\left(L_{1} \cup L_{2}\right) \cap V\left(L_{3}\right)=\varnothing$ it is straightforward to verify that $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$ preserve biindependence. By $L_{1} \cup L_{2} \nRightarrow L_{3}$, the only remaining case is when $V\left(L_{1} \cup L_{2}\right) \cap V\left(L_{3}\right)=\{v\}$ for some $v \in \mathbb{R}$. Pick $x \in L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $y \in L_{3}$ such that $V(x)=V(y)=v$. Let $U_{0}$ be an affine function that represents $\succsim$ on $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $U_{3}$ be an affine function that represents $\succsim$ on $L_{3}$. In addition, we require $U_{0}(x)=U_{3}(x)$. Then, standard arguments imply that $U$ defined on $L_{1} \cup L_{2} \cup L_{3}$, which agrees with $U_{0}$ on $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and agrees with $U_{3}$ on $L_{3}$, represents $\succsim$ on $L_{1} \cup L_{2} \cup L_{3}$. Note that $U$ is affine on both $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$. Then, it is straightforward to verify that $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$ preserve bi-independence.

Now suppose $L_{3} \rightleftarrows L_{1} \cup L_{2}$. Let $v_{i}^{h}=\sup _{x \in L_{i}} V(x)$ and $v_{i}^{l}=\inf _{x \in L_{i}} V(x)$ for $i=1,2,3$. Since both $L_{3}$ and $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ are nonempty, open, and connected, $L_{3} \rightleftarrows L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ implies $\left(v_{3}^{l}, v_{3}^{h}\right) \cap\left(\min \left\{v_{1}^{l}, v_{2}^{l}\right\}, \max \left\{v_{1}^{h}, v_{2}^{h}\right\}\right) \neq \varnothing$. Since $L_{1} \cap L_{2} \neq \varnothing,\left(\min \left\{v_{1}^{l}, v_{2}^{l}\right\}, \max \left\{v_{1}^{h}, v_{2}^{h}\right\}\right)=$ $\left(v_{1}^{l}, v_{1}^{h}\right) \cup\left(v_{2}^{l}, v_{2}^{h}\right)$. It follows that $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{3}$ or $L_{2} \rightleftarrows L_{3}$. Furthermore, since $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ preserves independence and $\left(\min \left\{v_{1}^{l}, v_{2}^{l}\right\}, \max \left\{v_{1}^{h}, v_{2}^{h}\right\}\right) \subseteq V\left(L_{1} \cup L_{2}\right), L_{1} \cap L_{2} \neq \varnothing$ implies $L_{1} \rightleftarrows L_{2}$. Hence, we can apply Lemma 12 and find affine functions $U_{1}: L_{1} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}, U_{2}: L_{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, and $U_{3}: L_{3} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $U: L_{1} \cup L_{2} \cup L_{3} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that agrees with $U_{i}$ on $L_{i}, i=1,2,3$, represents $\succsim$ on $L_{1} \cup L_{2} \cup L_{3}$. Since $L_{1} \cap L_{2}$ is nonempty and open, $\hat{U}: L_{1} \cup L_{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that agrees with $U_{1}$ on $L_{1}$ and with $U_{2}$ on $L_{2}$ must be affine on $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$. Thus, $U$ is affine on $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$, respectively. Then, it is straightforward to verify that $L_{1} \cup L_{2}$ and $L_{3}$ preserve bi-independence.

## Proof of Lemma 16

Lemma 16 The function $f_{1}$ is strictly increasing and continuous.

Proof. First, we show that $f_{1}$ is strictly increasing. Take $v \in V\left(Q_{1}^{*}\right)$ and $u, u^{\prime} \in V(X) \backslash V\left(Q_{1}^{*}\right)$ such that $u>v>u^{\prime}$. Pick $x \in Q_{1}^{*}$ and $y, y^{\prime} \in X \backslash Q_{1}^{*}$ such that $V(x)=v, V(y)=u$, and $V\left(y^{\prime}\right)=u^{\prime}$. Since $Q_{1}^{*}$ is nondegenerate, it follows that $P \rightleftarrows P^{\prime}$ for any $P, P^{\prime} \in \mathcal{Q}_{1}$. Thus, for any $P \in \mathcal{Q}_{1}, V(P)$ is a nondegenerate interval. Since each $P \in \mathcal{Q}_{1}$ is open, for any $x \in Q_{1}^{*}$,
there exist $x^{\prime}, x^{\prime \prime} \in Q_{1}^{*}$ such that $x^{\prime} \succ x \succ x^{\prime \prime}$. Hence

$$
u>v>u^{\prime} \Rightarrow V(y) \geqslant \sup U_{1}>U_{1}(x)>\inf U_{1} \geqslant V\left(y^{\prime}\right)
$$

which implies that $f_{1}(u)>f_{1}(v)>f_{1}\left(u^{\prime}\right)$. Thus, $f_{1}$ is strictly increasing on $V(X)$, and thus $f_{1}(V)$ represents $\succsim$ on $X$.

Second, we show that $f_{1}$ is continuous. Let $\left\{v_{j}\right\} \subseteq\left(V_{1}^{l}, V_{1}^{h}\right)$ be a sequence that converges to $v$. We want to show that $f_{1}\left(v_{j}\right)$ converges to $f_{1}(v)$. For each $j$, pick $y^{j} \in Q_{1}^{*}$ such that $V\left(y^{j}\right)=v_{j}$. If $v \in\left(V_{1}^{l}, V_{1}^{h}\right)$, then pick $y \in Q_{1}^{*}$ such that $V(y)=v$. It suffices to show that $U_{1}\left(y^{j}\right)$ converges to $U_{1}(y)$. This is clear, since there exists $P \in \mathcal{P}$ such that $y \in P$, and $U_{1}$ is affine on $P$, an open set. Now suppose $v=V_{1}^{h}$. Pick $y \in X$ such that $V(y)=v$. Without loss of generality, assume that $\left\{v_{j}\right\}$ is increasing. We want to show that $U_{1}\left(y_{j}\right)$ converges to $v=V_{1}^{h}=\sup U_{1}$. Suppose not. Then, there exists $r \in Q_{1}^{*}$ such that $r \succ y^{j}$ for all $j$. Then continuity implies that $r \succsim y$ and thus $V(r) \geqslant V(y)=V_{1}^{h}$, which is a contradiction of the fact that $Q_{1}^{*}$ is the union of some open subsets, each of which has a nondegenerate affine representation. Hence, $\lim _{v \uparrow V_{1}^{h}} f_{1}(v)=V_{1}^{h}$. Similarly, if $v=V_{1}^{l}$, we have $\lim _{v \downarrow V_{1}^{l}} f_{1}(v)=V_{1}^{l}$. The rest is straightforward, since $f_{1}$ is simply the identity mapping outside $\left(V_{1}^{l}, V_{1}^{h}\right)$.

## Necessity of the Axioms in Theorem 2

Proof. Suppose the preference $\succsim$ has a CFPL representation. The fact that weak order and continuity hold is clear. Now we show that $\succsim$ satisfies weak local bi-independence. By Theorem 2.1 in Ovchinnikov (2002), there exists distinct affine functions $U_{1}, \ldots, U_{n}$ and index sets $I_{1}, \ldots, I_{m}$ such that

$$
x \succsim y \Longleftrightarrow \max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} U_{i}(x) \geqslant \max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} U_{i}(y)
$$

Since $U_{1}, \ldots, U_{n}$ are distinct, for each $i \neq j$, aff $\left(\left\{x \in X: U_{i}(x)=U_{j}(x)\right\}\right)$ is either empty or defines an affine hyperplane in $\mathbb{R}^{N}$. We denote the collection of these affine hyperplanes as $\mathcal{A}$. Thus, $\mathcal{A}$ is an arrangement of hyperplanes in $\mathbb{R}^{N}$. A region of $\mathcal{A}$ in $X$ is a connected component of $X \backslash\left(\bigcup_{H \in \mathcal{A}} H\right)$. Let $\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})$ be the collection of regions of $\mathcal{A}$ in $X$. For each $L \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})$, it is easy to see that $L$ is nonempty, open, and $\operatorname{cl}(L)$ is a polytope. ${ }^{15}$ Let $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}):=\{\operatorname{cl}(L): L \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A})\}$. Since $\mathcal{A}$ is finite, $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$ must be finite. Clearly $\bigcup_{P \in \mathcal{P}(A)} P=X$, and for any $P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$ there exists $k$ such that $\max _{1 \leqslant j \leqslant m} \min _{i \in I_{j}} U_{i}(x)=U_{k}(x)$ for any $x \in P$.

For any $x \in X$, let $\mathcal{A}(x):=\{H \in \mathcal{A}: x \in H\}$ and consider $\mathcal{A}^{\prime}=\mathcal{A} \backslash \mathcal{A}(x)$. Clearly, there exists $L_{x} \in \mathcal{R}\left(\mathcal{A}^{\prime}\right)$ such that $x \in L_{x}$. It is clear that $x \in \bigcap\{P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}): x \in P\}$.

[^13]Next, we show that

$$
L_{x}=\operatorname{int}(\bigcup\{P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}): x \in P\})
$$

The claim is trivially true if $\mathcal{A}(x)=\varnothing$. If $\mathcal{A}(x) \neq \varnothing$, then by construction $\mathcal{A}(x)$ is an arrangement of hyperplanes in $\mathbb{R}^{N}$. Moreover, $x \in \bigcap_{H \in \mathcal{A}(x)} H$. It follows that $x$ is in any closed half-spaces defined by hyperplanes in $\mathcal{A}(x)$. Thus, $x \in P^{\prime}$ for any $P^{\prime} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}(x))$. Since $x \in L_{x}$, we have that $x \in P^{\prime} \cap L_{x}$ for any $P^{\prime} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}(x))$. It is clear that

$$
\left\{L^{\prime} \cap L_{x}: L^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}(x))\right\}=\left\{L \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}): L \subseteq L_{x}\right\} .
$$

It follows that $x \in P$ for any $P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$ such that $P \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(L_{x}\right)$. Since $x \in L_{x}$, we have $x \notin P$ if $P \nsubseteq \mathrm{cl}\left(L_{x}\right)$. Hence,

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{cl}\left(L_{x}\right) & =\operatorname{cl}\left(\bigcup\left\{L^{\prime} \cap L_{x}: L^{\prime} \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}(x))\right\}\right) \\
& =\operatorname{cl}\left(\bigcup\left\{L \in \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{A}): L \subseteq L_{x}\right\}\right) \\
& =\bigcup\left\{P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}): P \subseteq \operatorname{cl}\left(L_{x}\right)\right\} \\
& =\bigcup\{P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A}): x \in P\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that since $L_{x}$ is the interior of a polytope, it is regular open. Thus, $L_{x}=\operatorname{int}\left(\operatorname{cl}\left(L_{x}\right)\right)$ and we are done with this step.

The last step is to show that this $L_{x}$ construction is exactly what we want for weak local bi-independence. Given $x, y \in X$ with $x \sim y$, by the convexity of each $P \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$, it is clear that for any $r \in L_{x}$ and $s \in L_{y}, \overline{x r} \subseteq P$ and $\overline{y s} \subseteq P^{\prime}$ for some $P, P^{\prime} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$. Since $U$ coincides with an affine function within $P$ and $P^{\prime}$, we are done.


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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ Although the analysis is done in the space of risky prospects, it is clear that the same insights also hold, for example, in the space of product attributes.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ The COLU representation and its interpretation are similar to the dual-self expected utility representation and its interpretation in a recent paper by Chandrasekher, Frick, Iijima, and Le Yaouanq (2022), but the motivations, choice domain, characterizations, and classes of functions characterized are different.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ This idea is different from that of Harless (1992), who turns the risk-free lottery in the Allais paradox into a slightly risky one. The four lotteries in Harless's experiment are still far apart.

[^4]:    ${ }^{4}$ Note that this $\succsim$ can also be represented by the utility function defined in (1). Thus, the fact that a binary relation has a nondifferentiable representation does not imply that it does not have a differentiable representation.

[^5]:    ${ }^{5}$ In this definition, $X$ may be replaced by a closed subset of $X$.

[^6]:    ${ }^{6}$ Similar to the dual-self expected utility representation of Chandrasekher et al. (2022), the format of the set of actions is not important. We can write the COLU representation equivalently as $\max _{a_{1} \in A_{1}} \min _{a_{2} \in A_{2}} U\left(x, a_{1}, a_{2}\right)$, in which $A_{1}, A_{2}$ are arbitrary action sets and there is only one utility function whose value depends on the actions taken by the two selves and the alternative that is being evaluated.

[^7]:    ${ }^{7}$ Without nondegeneracy, the first two statements in Proposition 4 need to allow for the case in which all finite signed measures are zero measures.

[^8]:    ${ }^{8}$ Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) propose a maxmin representation with a confidence function over the probability measures. The confidence function scales the probability measures, essentially making them nonnegative measures with potentially different total masses, which is similar to our third result. However, to achieve this, Chateauneuf and Faro posit a set of weakenings of C-independence to obtain a homothetic aggregator. By contrast, with weak local bi-independence, the COLU representation is not necessarily homothetic.

[^9]:    ${ }^{9}$ Similar observations have also been made by Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger, and Ortoleva (2022).
    ${ }^{10}$ There is abundant evidence for product specialization; one obvious reason is that consumers like products with salient good attributes. See, among others, Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001).

[^10]:    ${ }^{11}$ For example, when $x_{1}$ is in the gain region but $x_{2}$ is in the loss region, $\max \left\{2 x_{1}+x_{2}, x_{1}+2 x_{2}\right\}=2 x_{1}+x_{2}$. Therefore, $2 x_{1}+2 x_{2}$ puts more weight on the loss, $x_{2}$, in this case.
    ${ }^{12}$ The entry-wise operation $\theta$, called the activation function, may take other functional forms in general. However, the form we assume in Definition 3, also known as the rectified linear unit, is considered to be the most popular activation function and to have strong biological motivations (see Hahnloser, Sarpeshkar, Mahowald, Douglas, and Seung (2000); and LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton (2015), among others).

[^11]:    ${ }^{13}$ Arora et al. (2018) adopt a slightly different definition of CFPL functions. In particular, each linear region is assumed to be a polyhedron, i.e., the intersection of finitely many closed half-spaces. This definition is equivalent to our definition since every CFPL function, according to our definition, can be written in the COLU form.

[^12]:    ${ }^{14}$ This function appears in Chapter 2.4.4.2 of Schmidt (1998), although its connection to neural-network models is not explored. We thank David Dillenberger for pointing this out.

[^13]:    ${ }^{15}$ A polytope is the bounded intersection of finitely many closed half-spaces in $\mathbb{R}^{n}$.

