

Curriculum Vitae

YVES SPRUMONT

Department of Economics
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Education

Ph.D. in Economics, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, USA (1986–1990), dissertation: “Three essays in collective choice theory”, advisor: H. Moulin.

B.Sc. in Economics, Facultés N-D de la Paix, Namur, Belgium (1978–1983), thesis: “Modèles sectoriels d'équilibre à prix fixes”, advisors: R. Deschamps and L. Gevers.

Employment and visiting positions

Professor (since 2020), Department of Economics, Deakin University.

Professor (2002–2020), associate professor (1996–2002), and assistant professor (1990–1996), Département de Sciences Économiques, C.R.D.E., and CIREQ, Université de Montréal.

Visiting fellow, Universidad Pablo de Olavide (September 2017–June 2018), Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (May 2017–August 2017), Université d'Aix-Marseille (March 2015 and May–June 1993), Indian Statistical Institute (August 2010–June 2011), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (August 2003–July 2004 and February–July 1994), Université de Cergy-Pontoise (May 2000), Northwestern University (January–July 1997), Tilburg University (October–December 1996), University of Rochester (May 1995).

Instructor, Virginia Tech (Summers 1989 and 1988), Research and teaching assistant, Facultés N-D de la Paix (1986 and 1983–1984).

Military Service (1985).

Teaching and supervising

Courses taught: undergraduate and graduate microeconomics, public economics, mathematics for economists, game theory, social choice.

Ph.D. students: E. Bahel (Ph.D. 2009, associate professor, Virginia Tech), C. Trudeau (Ph.D. 2009, professor, University of Windsor), Y. Wang (Ph.D. 2000, professor, University of Windsor), S. Ambec (Ph.D. 1999, professor, Université de Toulouse).

Director of Graduate Studies (1998–2000).

Awards and distinctions

Recipient of the Marcel Dagenais Prize (2015) (awarded every three years by the Société Canadienne de Science Économique for outstanding research contributions in the recent past).

Recipient of the John Rae Prize (2012) (awarded every two years by the Canadian Economic Association for outstanding research contributions in the recent past).

Recipient of the prize of the Belgian Institute for Public Finance (1985).

Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (since 2011).

Charter Member of the Game Theory Society (since 1999).

Plenary speaker at the 47th Atlantic Canada Economics Conference (2019), the 25th European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory in Glasgow (2016), the 15th Southwest Economic Theory Conference in Honolulu (2013); invited lecturer at the Canadian Economics Association Conference in Montreal (2006), the Summer School on Axiomatic Allocation Theory in Namur (1999), the Pacific Institute for the Mathematical Sciences Workshops in Vancouver (1998), 1997 NATO Advanced Institute in Stony Brook (1997).

Responsibilities and services

Associate editor of *Theoretical Economics* (since 2016), *Journal of Economic Theory* (since 2013), *Games and Economic Behavior* (2002–2013), *Mathematical Social Sciences* (1998–2013), and *Social Choice and Welfare* (1997–2013).

Council Member of the Game Theory Society (since 2017) and of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (2000–2004 and 2010–2014).

Referee for *Actualité Économique*, *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, *American Economic Review*, *American Economic Review: Insights*, *Annals of Operations Research*, *B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics*, *Canadian Journal of Economics*, *Econometrica*, *Economic Design*, *Economic Journal*, *Economics and Philosophy*, *Economics Letters*, *Economic Theory*, *Economic Theory Bulletin*, *European Journal of Operational Research*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *International Game Theory Review*, *International Journal of Game Theory*, *Japanese Economic Review*, *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, *Journal of Public Economics*, *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, *Mathematics of Operations Research*, *Review of Economic Design*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Revue Économique*, *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, *Social Choice and Welfare*, *Theoretical Economics*, *Theory and Decision*, *4OR*.

Reviewer for *Cambridge University Press*, *MIT Press*, and for *National Science Foundation (NSF, USA)*, *European Science Foundation (ESF, Europe)*, *Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC, Canada)*, *Fonds pour la Formation de Chercheurs et l'Aide à la Recherche (FCAR, Québec)*.

Member of the *Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council* research grants adjudication committee (1999).

Co-organizer of the CIREQ workshop on the foundations of resource allocation mechanisms, Montreal (2019), co-organizer of the 10th meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Montreal (2008); co-organizer of the CIREQ workshop on intertemporal resource allocation, Montreal (2006); co-organizer of the 26th Canadian economic theory meetings, Montreal (2001); organizer of the CRDE 1st international conference on the axiomatics of resource allocation, Montreal (1996); co-organizer of the 17th Canadian Economic Theory Meetings, Montreal (1992).

Grants

FQRSC four-year team research grants (2016, 2012, 2008).

SSHRC three-year research grants (2007, 2004, and 2001 with W. Bossert), (1998, 1994).

Spanish ministry of education research grant (2003).

FCAR three-year team research grants (2001, 1994, 1991).

SSHRC conference grants (1996, 1992).

European Community HCM fellowship (1994).

Publications and accepted manuscripts

Regular random choice and the triangle inequalities, *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, forthcoming.

Two-stage majoritarian choice (with S. Horan), *Theoretical Economics* **17** (2022), 521–537.

The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval voting (with G. Barokas), *Social Choice and Welfare* **58** (2022), 187–199.

Strategy-proof choice with monotonic additive preferences (with E. Bahel), *Games and Economic Behavior* **126** (2021), 94–99.

Nash welfarism and the distributive implications of informational constraints, *Economic Theory Bulletin* **8** (2020), 49–64.

Strategyproof choice of social acts (with E. Bahel), *American Economic Review* **110** (2020), 596–627.

Relative utilitarianism under uncertainty, *Social Choice and Welfare* **53** (2019), 621–639.

Belief-weighted Nash aggregation of Savage preferences, *Journal of Economic Theory* **178** (2018), 222–245.

Preference aggregation under binary uncertainty, *Journal of Mathematical Economics* **78** (2018), 64–67.

Ranking by Rating, *Theoretical Economics* **13** (2018), 1–18.

Welfare criteria from choice: an axiomatic analysis (with S. Horan), *Games and Economic Behavior* **99** (2016), 56–70.

Ordinally consistent set-ranking methods for tournaments, *Economics Letters* **145** (2016), 41–44.

Size invariant measures of association: characterization and difficulties (with M. Negri), *Mathematical Social Sciences* **75** (2015), 115–122.

Strategy-proof preference aggregation: possibilities and characterizations (with W. Bossert), *Games and Economic Behavior* **85** (2014), 109–126.

Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable (with W. Bossert), *Econometrica* **81** (2013), 2521–2534.

Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms, *Journal of Economic Theory* **148** (2013), 1102–1121.

On relative egalitarianism, *Social Choice and Welfare* **40** (2013), 1015–1032.

Resource egalitarianism with a dash of efficiency, *Journal of Economic Theory* **147** (2012), 1602–1613.

An axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method, *Econometrica* **78** (2010), 1711–1748.

Infinite-horizon choice functions (with G. Asheim, W. Bossert, and K. Suzumura), *Economic Theory* **43** (2010), 1–21.

Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach (with F. Maniquet), *Games and Economic Behavior* **68** (2010), 275–302.

Sharing the cost of a public good without subsidies (with M. Fleurbaey), *Journal of Public Economic Theory* **11** (2009), 1–8.

Non-deteriorating choice (with W. Bossert), *Economica* **76** (2009), 337–363.

Nearly serial sharing methods, *International Journal of Game Theory* **37** (2008), 155–184.

Weakened WARP and top-cycle choice rules (with L. Ehlers), *Journal of Mathematical Economics* **44** (2008), 87–94.

Monotonicity and solidarity axioms in economics and game theory, in P. Pattanaik et al. (eds.) “Rational Choice and Social Welfare,” *Studies in Choice and Welfare*, Springer (2008), 71–94.

Ordering infinite utility streams (with W. Bossert and K. Suzumura), *Journal of Economic Theory* **135** (2007), 579–589.

Fair allocation of production externalities: recent results (with H. Moulin), *Revue d’Économie Politique* **117** (2007), 7–37.

Rationalizability of choice functions on general domains without full transitivity (with W. Bossert and K. Suzumura), *Social Choice and Welfare* **27** (2006), 435–458.

Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing (with H. Moulin), *Games and Economic Behavior* **55** (2006), 152–188.

On the discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method, *Econometrica* **73** (2005), 1693–1712.

On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing (with H. Moulin), *Journal of Economic Theory* **125** (2005), 1–35.

Maximal-element rationalizability (with W. Bossert and K. Suzumura), *Theory and Decision* **58** (2005), 325–350.

Consistent rationalizability (with W. Bossert and K. Suzumura), *Economica* **72** (2005), 185–200.

Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments (with F. Maniquet), *Journal of Economic Theory* **120** (2005), 155–174.

Fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good (with F. Maniquet), *Econometrica* **72** (2004), 627–640.

What is a commodity? Two axiomatic answers, *Economic Theory* **23** (2004), 429–437.

Efficient and non-deteriorating choice (with W. Bossert), *Mathematical Social Sciences* **45** (2003), 131–142.

Sharing a river (with S. Ambec), *Journal of Economic Theory* **107** (2002), 453–462.

Upper-semicontinuous extensions of binary relations (with W. Bossert and K. Suzumura), *Journal of Mathematical Economics* **37** (2002), 231–246.

Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies (with W. Bossert), *Economic Theory* **20** (2002), 777–791.

Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations (with M. Koster, E. Molina, and S. Tijs), *International Journal of Game Theory* **30** (2001), 567–599.

Paretian quasi-orders: the regular two-agent case, *Journal of Economic Theory* **101** (2001), 437–456.

Coherent cost sharing, *Games and Economic Behavior* **33** (2000), 126–144.

On the testable implications of collective choice theories, *Journal of Economic Theory* **93** (2000), 205–232.

On resource monotonicity in the fair division problem (with F. Maniquet), *Economics Letters* **68** (2000), 299–302.

A note on ordinally equivalent Pareto surfaces, *Journal of Mathematical Economics* **34** (2000), 27–38.

Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies (with F. Maniquet), *Economic Theory* **14** (1999), 583–596.

Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies (with L. Zhou), *Journal of Mathematical Economics* **31** (1999), 321–339.

Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods, *Social Choice and Welfare* **15** (1998), 543–558.

Ordinal cost sharing, *Journal of Economic Theory* **81** (1998), 126–162.

Balanced egalitarian redistribution of income, *Mathematical Social Sciences* **33** (1997), 185–201.

On the game-theoretic structure of public-good economies, *International Journal of Game Theory* **26** (1997), 455–472.

Axiomatizing ordinal welfare egalitarianism when preferences may vary, *Journal of Economic Theory* **68** (1996), 77–110.

A note on strategyproofness in Edgeworth-box economies, *Economics Letters* **49** (1995), 45–50.

Strategyproof collective choice in economic and political environments, *Canadian Journal of Economics* **28** (1995), 68–107.

Intermediate preferences and Rawlsian arbitration rules, *Social Choice and Welfare* **10** (1993), 1–15.

The division problem with single-peaked preferences: a characterization of the uniform allocation rule, *Econometrica* **59** (1991), 509–519.

Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility, *Games and Economic Behavior* **2** (1990), 378–394.

Multiplicateur keynésien et interdépendance des secteurs de production, *Annales de l'INSEE* **57** (1985), 27–50.

Discussion papers and work in progress

Anonymous and strategy-proof social choice under uncertainty (with E. Bahel), work in progress.

Strategyproof game forms (with S. Horan), work in progress.

Aggregating choice functions, work in progress.

Comparative Rationality, work in progress.