

Hervé Moulin
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Born: 1950, Paris, France
Citizenship: French, U.S., British

EDUCATION

1975: Ph.D. in Mathematics, University of Paris (Doctorat d'Etat)
1971: Agrégation de Mathématiques, Paris
1968–1971: Student of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

2013– D.J. Robertson Chair in Economics, University of Glasgow
1999–2013 George A. Peterkin Professor of Economics, Rice University
1989–1999 James B. Duke Professor of Economics, Duke University
1987–1989 University Distinguished Professor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
1984–1987 Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
1977–1984 Professor of Mathematics, University of Paris at Dauphine
1976–1977 Associate Professor of Mathematics, Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et Administration Economique (E.N.S.A.E.) Paris
1975–1976 Military service (French Navy)
1974–1975 Research Fellow, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (C.O.R.E.) Louvain, Belgium

MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES:

The Econometric Society
The Society for Social Choice and Welfare
Game Theory Society

AWARDS:

Fellow of the Econometric Society, 1983
President of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, 1998–1999
Fellow of The Royal Society of Edinburgh, 2015
President of the Game Theory Society, August 2018–July 2020
Fellow of the British Academy, 2018

EDITORIAL WORK:

Editor in Chief Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 – present
Editor in Chief, Mathematical Social Sciences, 1993 – 2005
Co-Editor, Economic Theory, 2015–2020

Associate Editor, International Journal of Game Theory, 1984 – 1999, 2004
– present
Associate Editor, Games and Economic Behavior, 1988 – 1993, 2006-2020
Associate Editor, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2006-2020
Associate Editor Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2011-present
Associate Editor, Social Choice and Welfare, 1984 – 2011
Associate Editor, Mathematical Social Sciences, 1982-1993, 2005-2011
Associate Editor, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1980 – 1988
Associate Editor, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 1998 – 2006

Ph.D. Students (primary advisor) and first job

Gilbert Laffond, 1982, *Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, Paris.*
Jean-Charles Rochet*, 1985, *Université de Toulouse, France.*
Dominique Henriot, 1985, *Université d'Aix-Marseille, France.*
Gabrielle Demange*, 1986, *Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.*
Yves Sprumont, 1990, *Université de Montreal.*
Amy Farmer Curry, 1991, *University of Tennessee, Knoxville.*
Alison Watts, 1993, *Vanderbilt University, Nashville.*
Eric Ralph, 1995, *Department of Telecommunications, George Washington University.*
William Drake, 1996, *Department of Justice, US Government.*
Yan Yu, 1999, *University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong.*
Wen Zhou, 2000, *University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong.*
Elisabeth Gugl, 2003, *University of Victoria, British Columbia.*
Justin Leroux, 2005, *HEC Montreal, Université de Montréal.*
Hatice Oszoy, 2007, *California Institute of Technology.*
Ruben Juarez, 2008, *University of Hawaii.*
Rajnish Kumar 2010, *Louisiana State University.*
Jung Sok You 2010, *Public Finance Research Institute, Seoul, South Korea.*
Jingyi Xue, 2013, *Singapore Management University.*
Sinan Ertemel, 2013, *Istanbul Technical University.*
Emre Dogan, 2014, *The High School in Economics, Moscow.*
Yan Long, 2016, *New York University in Abu Dhabi.*
Josue Ortega, 2017, *University of Essex.*
Li Nie, *University of Durham.*

* Partial supervision only, due to my departure from France in 1984

ORGANIZATION OF CONFERENCES:

- June 2017 EC 17: 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computations, Boston, June 26-30; Co-Chair of the Program Committee
- Jan 2005 New Trends in Cooperative Game Theory, CIMAT, Guanajuato, Mexico; principal organizer
- Dec. 2001 NATO Workshop on “Mathematical theories of discrete resource allocations,” Sabanci University, Istanbul, co-organizer.
- Oct. 2000 Twelfth Southeastern Economic Theory and International Economics meeting, Rice University, principal organizer.
- June 1992 First meeting of the Society “Social Choice and Welfare,” Caen, France, Chair of the Program Committee.
- July 1989 International Conference on “Social Choice and Welfare,” Valencia, Spain, co-organizer Salvador Barbera.
- June 1986 International Conference on “Cooperative Games and Distributive Justice,” Blacksburg, Virginia; principal organizer.
- April 1982 International Conference on “Social Choice and Incentive Compatibility,” Paris, France; principal organizer
- Sept. 1981 International Conference on “Games of Incomplete Information,” Luminy, France; co-organizer

SPONSORED RESEARCH:

- 6/11-5/14 Principal investigator, NSF Grant CCF 1101202, “Impartial decision-making in distributed systems”
- 11/04-10/07 Principal investigator, NSF Grant SES 0414543, “Axiomatic Models of Scheduling: Fairness and Incentive Compatibility”
- 8/01-7/04 Principal investigator, NSF Grant SES 0112032, “Voting, Assignment and Matching under Dichotomous Preferences”
- 8/98-7/01 Principal investigator, NSF Grant SES 0096230, “Probabilistic Mechanisms for Cost Sharing, Rationing and Queuing”
- 6/92-4/93 Principal investigator, NSF Grant SES 9109005, “Non Manipulable and Fair Allocation of Private Goods”
- 6/87-4/89 Principal investigator, NSF Grant SES 8618600, “Monotonicity Properties in Games of Production and Exchange”
- 6/85-4/87 Principal investigator, NSF Grant SES 8419465, on “The Separability Axiom in Economic Environments”
- 9/81-12/83 Principal investigator, Research contract with the “Commissariat Général au Plan”, Paris, on “Strategic allocation mechanisms”

Publications

Books

1. Game Theory for the Social Sciences: 1st edition in English: 1982, New York University Press, 304 p. 2nd and revised edition: 1986, New York University Press, 278 p. (with a companion volume: 89 exercises with solutions, 156 p.) Original edition in French: Théorie des jeux pour l'économie et la politique, 1981, Hermann, Paris, 248 p. Russian translation, Teoria Igr, s. Primerami is Matematicheskoi Economiki, 1985, Mir Editions, Moscow.
2. The Strategy of Social Choice: 1983, North-Holland, Advanced Textbooks in Economics, No. 18, 214 p.
3. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making: 1988, Monograph of the Econometric Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 332 p. Russian translation, Cooperativnoe Prinyatie Reshenii Aksiomy i Modeli, 1991, Mir Editions, Moscow.
4. Cooperative Micro-economics: A Game Theoretic Introduction, 1995, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press and London: Prentice Hall.
5. Fair Division and Collective Welfare, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2003, 289 p.
6. Edited Book: Social Choice, Welfare and Ethics (co-Editors, Barnett, Moulin, Salles and Schofield), 1995, Cambridge University Press.

Articles

1. "Extensions of Two Person Zero Sum Games," Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Application, 55, 2, 490–507, 1976.
2. "Cooperation in Mixed Equilibrium," Mathematics of Operations Research, 1, 3, 273–286, 1976.
3. "Strategically Zero Sum Games: the Class of Games Whose Completely Mixed Equilibria Cannot Be Improved Upon," (with Jean-Philippe Vial), International Journal of Game Theory, 7, 3/4, 201–221, 1978.
4. "Correlation and Duopoly," (with Louis-André Gérard-Varet), Journal of Economic Theory, 19, 1, 123–149, 1978.
5. "Two and Three Person Games: a Local Study," International Journal of Game Theory, 8, 2, 81–107, 1979.
6. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, 47, 6, 1337–1351, 1979.
7. "On Strategy-proofness and Single Peakedness," Public Choice, 35, 437–455, 1980.
8. "Implementing Efficient, Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice Functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 7, 249–269, 1980.
9. "Prudence Versus Sophistication in Voting Strategy," Journal of Economic Theory, 24, 3, 398–412, 1981.
10. "Deterrence and Cooperation: a Classification of Two-Person Games," European Economic Review, 5, 179–183, 1981.

11. "Implementing Just and Efficient Decision Making," *Journal of Public Economics*, 16, 193–213, 1981.
12. "The Proportional Veto Principle," *Review of Economic Studies*, 48, 407–416, 1981.
13. "Voting with Proportional Veto Power," *Econometrica*, 50, 145–161, 1982.
14. "Core of Effectivity Functions and Implementation Theory," (with Bezalel Peleg), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 10, 1, 115–145, 1982.
15. "Non Cooperative Implementation: a Survey of Recent Results," *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 3, 243–258, 1982.
16. "Generalized Condorcet Winners for Single Peaked and Single Plateau Preferences," *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1, 127–147, 1984.
17. "Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 33, 1, 32–45, 1984.
18. "The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 51, 157–170, 1984.
19. "Dominance-solvability and Cournot Stability," *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 7,1, 83–102, 1984.
20. "Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-linear Bargaining," *Econometrica*, 53, 1, 49–67, 1985.
21. "From Social Welfare Orderings to Acyclic Aggregation of Preferences," *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 9, 1–17, 1985.
22. "The Separability Axiom and Equal Sharing Methods," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 36, 1, 120–148, 1985.
23. "Choice Functions over a Finite Set: A Summary," *Social Choice and Welfare*, 2, 147–160, 1985.
24. "Choosing from a Tournament," *Social Choice and Welfare*, 3, 4, 271–291, 1986.
25. "Characterizations of the Pivotal Mechanism," *Journal of Public Economics*, 31, 53–78, 1986.
26. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-fairism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 769–783, 1987.
27. "Equal or Proportional Division of a Surplus, and Other Methods," *International Journal of Game Theory*, 16, 3, 161–186, 1987.
28. "Egalitarian Equivalent Cost-sharing of a Public Good," *Econometrica*, 55, 4, 963–977, 1987.
29. "A Core Selection for Pricing a Single Output Monopoly," *The Rand Journal of Economics*, autumn, 18, 3, 397–407, 1987.
30. "Can Everyone Benefit from Growth? Two Difficulties," (with William Thomson), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 17, 339–345, 1988.
31. "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 45,1, 53–64, 1988.
32. "Monotonic Surplus Sharing: Characterization Results," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 1, 250–274, 1989.
33. "Public Ownership of the External World and Private Ownership of Self," (with John Roemer), *Journal of Political Economy*, 97, 2, 347–367, 1989.

34. "Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies," *International Journal of Game Theory*, 19, 219–232, 1990.
35. "Fair Division under Joint Ownership: Recent Results and Open Problems," *Social Choice and Welfare*, 7, 2, 149–170, 1990.
36. "Interpreting Common Ownership," *Recherches Economiques de Louvain*, 56, 3–4, 303–326, 1990.
37. "Joint Ownership of a Convex Technology: Comparison of Three Solutions," *Review of Economic Studies*, 57, 439–452, 1990.
38. "Uniform Externalities: Two Axioms for Fair Allocation," *Journal of Public Economics*, 43, 3, 305–326, 1990.
39. "Welfare Bounds in the Fair Division Problem," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 54, 2, 321–337, 1991.
40. "The Solidarity Axiom in Parametric Surplus Sharing Problems" (with Hans Keiding), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 20, 3, 249–270, 1991.
41. "Implementing a Public Project and Distributing its Costs," (with Matthew Jackson), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 57, 1, 125–140, 1992.
42. "All Sorry to Disagree: a General Principle for the Provision of Non-rival Goods," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 94, 37–51, 1992.
43. "Welfare Bounds in the Cooperative Production Problem," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 4, 373–401, 1992.
44. "Serial Cost Sharing," (with Scott Shenker), *Econometrica*, 50, 5, 1009–1039, 1992.
45. "An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money," *Econometrica*, 60, 6, 1331–1349, 1992.
46. "Serial Cost Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," *Review of Economic Studies*, 61, 305–325, 1994.
47. "Average Cost Pricing Versus Serial Cost Sharing: an Axiomatic Comparison" (with Scott Shenker), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 64, 1, 178–201, 1994.
48. "On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs," *Japanese Economic Review*, 46, 4, 303–332, 1995.
49. "Cost-sharing under Increasing Returns: a Comparison of Simple Mechanisms," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 13, 225–251, 1996.
50. "Traffic Based Cost Allocation in a Network," (with Dominique Henriot), *Rand Journal of Economics*, 27, 2, 332–345, summer 1996.
51. "Two Versions of the Tragedy of the Commons," (with Alison Watts), *Economic Design*, 2, 399–421, 1997.
52. "Incremental Cost Sharing: Characterization by Group Strategyproofness," *Social Choice and Welfare* 16, 279–320, 1999.
53. "Distributive and Additive Cost Sharing of an Homogeneous Good," (with Scott Shenker), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 27, 299–330, 1999.
54. "Rationing a Commodity along Fixed Paths," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 84, 41–72, 1999.
55. "Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus," (with Eric Friedman), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 87, 2, 275–312, 1999.

56. “Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods,” *Econometrica*, 68, 3, 643–684, 2000.
57. “Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency,” (with Scott Shenker), *Economic Theory*, 18, 3, 511–533, 2001.
58. “Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority,” (with Hervé Crès), *Operations Research*, 49, 4, 565–577, 2001.
59. “A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem,” (with Anna Bogomolnaia), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 100, 295–328, 2001.
60. “Three Solutions to a Simple Commons Problem,” *Seoul Journal of Economics*, 14, 3, 245–267, 2001.
61. “A Simple Random Assignment Problem with A Unique Solution,” (with Anna Bogomolnaia), *Economic Theory*, 19, 3, 623–636, 2002.
62. “The Proportional Random Allocation of Indivisible Units,” *Social Choice and Welfare*, 19, 2, 381–413, 2002.
63. “Fair Queuing and other Probabilistic Allocation Methods,” (with Richard Stong), *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 27, 1, 1–31, 2002.
64. “Commons with Increasing Marginal Costs: Random Priority versus Average Cost,” (with Hervé Crès), *International Economic Review*, 44, 3, 1097–1115, 2003.
65. “Filling a multicolor urn: an axiomatic analysis,” (with Richard Stong), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 45, 1, 242–269, 2003.
66. “Characterization of additive cost sharing methods,” (with Rakesh Vohra), *Economic Letters*, 80, 399–407, 2003.
67. “Random matching under dichotomous preferences,” (with Anna Bogomolnaia), *Econometrica*, 72, 1, 257–279, 2004.
68. “Collective choice under dichotomous preferences,” (with Anna Bogomolnaia and Richard Stong), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 122, 165–84, 2005.
69. “On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing,” (with Yves Sprumont), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 125, 1–35, 2005.
70. “Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing,” (with Yves Sprumont), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 55, 152–188, 2006.
71. “Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: recent results”, (with Yves Sprumont), *Revue d’Economie Politique*, 117, 1, 1–36, 2007.
72. “On scheduling fees to prevent merging, splitting and transferring of jobs,” *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 2,32, 266–283, 2007.
73. “Minimizing the worst slowdown: off-line and on-line”, *Operations Research*, 55, 5, 876–889, September 2007.
doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0447
74. “The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing”, *Economic Theory*, 36:379–405, 2008 (September).
doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0275-y
75. “Proportional Scheduling, split-proofness and merge-proofness”, *Games and Economic Behavior*, 63, 567–587, 2008 (July).
doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.002
76. “Impartial division of a dollar”, (with Geoffroy De Clippel and Nicolas Tideman), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 139, 176–191, 2008 (March).

- doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.06.005
77. "Almost budget balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects", *Journal of Economic Theory*, 144, 1, 96-119, 2009.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.03.003
78. "Pricing traffic in a spanning network", *Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic commerce, EC09*, July 6-10, 2009, Stanford California.
79. "Decentralized pricing in minimum cost spanning trees" (with Jens Leth Hougaard and Lars Peter Osterdal), *Economic Theory*, 44, 2, 293-306, 2010. doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0485-6
80. Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the Folk solution (with Anna Bogomolnaia), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 69, 238-248, 2010. doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.11.001
81. "Bargaining among groups: an axiomatic viewpoint," (with Suchan Chae), *International Journal of Game Theory*, 39, 1, 71-88, 2010.
doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0157-6
82. "Sharing the cost of a capacity network", (with Anna Bogomolnaia and Ron Holzman), *Mathematics of Operations Research*, 35,1, 173-192, 2010. doi.org/10.1287/moor.1090.0435
83. "Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms", *Social Choice and Welfare*, 34, 193-216, 2010. doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0393-5
84. "An efficient and almost budget-balanced cost sharing method", *Games and Economic Behavior*, 70, 107-131, 2010.
doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.028
85. "Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints" (with Francois Laigret), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 72,314-320, 2011.
doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.002
86. "Cost sharing in networks: some open questions", *International Game Theory Review*, 15,2, 2013.
doi.org/10.1142/S021919891340001X
87. "Balancing Supply and Demand under Bilateral Constraints", (with Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilklic, and Jay Sethuraman), *Theoretical Economics*, 7,3, 395-424, 2012. doi.org/10.3982/TE893
88. "Impartial nominations for a prize", (with Ron Holzman), *Econometrica*, 81, 1, 173-196, 2013. doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10523
89. "Egalitarianism under Earmark Constraints", (with Olivier Bochet and Rahmi Ilklic), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 148, 535-562, 2013. (March)
doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016
90. "The bipartite rationing problem", (with Jay Sethuraman), *Operations Research*, 61 (5). pp. 1087-1100, 2013 (October).
doi.org/10.1287/opre.2013.1199
91. "The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network", (with Rodrigo Velez), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 81, 11-26, 2013. (September)
doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.012

92. "Loss calibrated rationing methods for bipartite rationing", (with Jay Sethuraman), Proceedings of the 14th Electronic Commerce Conference 2013 (EC13), June 20-24, 2013, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
93. "Pricing traffic in a spanning network", Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 475-490, 2014 (July) doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.06.002. (longer version of item 78)
94. "Improving Nash by Coarse Correlation" (with Indrajit Ray and Sonali Sen Gupta), Journal of Economic Theory, 150, 852-865, 2014. doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008
95. "Sharing the cost of redundant items", (with Jens Hougaard), Games and Economic Behavior, 87, 339-362, 2014. doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008
96. "Size versus Fairness in the assignment problem" (with Anna Bogomolnaia), Games and Economic Behavior, 90, 119-127, 2015. doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.006
97. "Entropy, Desegregation, and Proportional Rationing", Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 1-20, 2016. doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.002
98. "The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare", (with Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Ariel Procaccia, Nisarg Shah and Junxing Wang), Proceeding of the AMC Conference EC16, July 24-28, Maastricht, The Netherlands. doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940726
99. "One-dimensional mechanism design", Theoretical Economics, 12, 2, 587-619, 2017. doi.org/10.3982/TE2307
100. "Consistent Bilateral Assignment", Mathematical Social Sciences, 90, 43-55, November 2017. doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.09.004
101. "Sharing the cost of risky projects" (with Jens Hougaard), Economic Theory, 65, 3, 663-679, 2018. doi 10.1007/s00199-017-1034-3.
102. "Competitive division of a mixed manna" (with Anna Bogomolnaia, Fedor Sandomirskyi and Elena Yanovskaia), Econometrica, 85, 6, 1847-1871, November 2017. doi/10.3982/ECTA14564/full
103. "Dividing bads under additive utilities" (with Anna Bogomolnaia, Fedor Sandomirskyi and Elena Yanovskaia, Social Choice and Welfare, 52(3), 395-417, 2019. doi 10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x
104. "Fair Division in the Internet Age" Annual Review of Economics, 11:407-41, 2019. doi 10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025559
105. "Fair Mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences" (with Haris Aziz and Anna Bogomolnaia), Proceeding of the AMC Conference EC19, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, June 24-28, 2019.
106. "Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment", (with Anju Seth and Bart Taub) Economic Theory Bulletin, 8, 1-11, 2020. doi 10.1007/s40505-019-00163-7
107. "The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare", (with Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Ariel Procaccia, Nisarg Shah and Junxing

Wang), *long version of item 98*, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 7, 3, Article 12 (September 2019), 32 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3355902>.

108. “A polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation” (with Haris Aziz and Fedor Sandomirskiy), Operations Research Letters, 48, 573-578, 2020.

109. “Fair Mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences” (with Haris Aziz and Anna Bogomolnaia), *long version of item 105*, ACM Trans. Econ. Comput., 2020.

110. "Taxing Congestion of the Space Commons" (with Sylvain Beal and Marc Deschamps), Acta Astronautica, 177, 313-319, 2020.

Working papers

1. A simple Online Fair Division problem (with Anna Bogomolnaia and Fedor Sandomirskiy) March 2019

2. Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game (with Trivikram Dokka, Indrajit Ray and Sonali Sen-Gupta) May 2019

3. Guarantees in Fair Division: general and monotone preferences (with Anna Bogomolnaia), [arXiv.org > econ > arXiv:1911.10009](https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.10009)

Chapters in Books

1. “Extensions of Two Person Zero Sum Games,” The Theory and Application of Differential Games. Edited by J. D. Grote, D. Reidel Pub., 1975.

2. “On the Asymptotic Stability of Agreements,” Systèmes Dynamiques et Modèles Economiques. Edited by G. Fuchs, Colloques Internationaux du C.N.R.S., Editions du C.N.R.S., Paris, 1977.

3. “On the Uniqueness and Stability of Nash Equilibrium in Non-cooperative Games,” (with Daniel Gabay), Applied Stochastic Control in Economics and Management Science, Edited by A. Bensoussan, Kleindorfer, Tapiero, North-Holland, 1980.

4. “Application of Game Theory to the Multicountry Models: Methodology and an Example with Comet,” (with Gonzague d’Alcantara) Modèles Internationaux, Paris, Economica, 1981.

5. “Stability by Threats and Counterthreats in Normal Form Games,” (with Gilbert Laffond), Mathematical Technics of Optimization, Control, and Decision, Edited by J-P. Aubin, A. Bensoussan, and I. Ekeland, Boston: Birkhauser, 1981.

6. “Fairness and Strategy in Voting,” Fair Allocation, AMS Short Course Lecture Notes, 33, Edited by H.P. Young, Providence, Rhode Island, 1985.

7. “Marquis de Condorcet,” (with Peyton Young). The New Palgrave of Economics, 1988.

8. “Monotonic Surplus-sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources,” Game Theory and Applications, Edited by I. Ichiishi, A. Neyman and Y. Tauman, Academic Press, 1990.

9. “Strategic Interactions in Economics: the Game Theoretic Alternative,” (with Marina Bianchi), *Appraising Economic Theories*, Edited by M. Blaug, N. de Marchi, and Edward Elgar, 1991.
10. “On the Fair and Coalitionstrategyproof Allocation of Private Goods,” *Frontiers of Game Theory*, Edited by K. Binmore, A. Kirman and P. Tani, Cambridge, MIT University Press 1993.
11. “Social Choice,” *Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications*, Vol.2, Edited by R. Aumann and S. Hart, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1994.
12. “An Appraisal of Cooperative Game Theory,” *Revue d’Economie Politique*, 105, 4, 618–632, 1995.
13. “Stand Alone and Unanimity Tests: A Re-examination of Fair Division,” *Ethics, Rationality, Economic Behavior*, Edited by F. Farina, F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
14. “Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems,” (with William Thomson), *Social Choice Reexamined*, Editors, K. Arrow, A. Sen, and K. Suzumura, IEA Conference Volume #116, London, MacMillan, 1997.
15. “Axiomatic Cost and Surplus-Sharing,” *the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare*, Arrow, Sen and Suzumura, Editors, North-Holland, 2002.
16. “Normative microeconomics and the social contract,” third Taesung Kim Memorial lecture, Seoul National University, Korea, 2001.
17. “Social Choice”, Chapter 21 in the *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, B. Weingast and D. Wittman Editors, Oxford U. Press, 2006.

Publications in French

1. Condition nécessaire et suffisante d’existence d’une solution du problème d’optimisation (avec J-P. Aubin), *Compte Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences*, Paris, t. 274, 547–549, Série A., 1972.
2. Itérations d’un jeu à deux personnes de somme nulle. *Publications Mathématiques de l’Université de Bordeaux I*, Fascicule 3, Octobre 1973.
3. Représentation d’un préordre convexe par une fonction d’utilité concave différentiable, *Compte Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences*, Paris. t. 278, Série A, p. 483–485, 1974.
4. Rationalité et irrationalité d’un jeu dont les fonctions d’utilité sont linéaires, *Compte Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences*, Paris. t. 179, p. 29–32, 1984.
5. Rationalité locale d’un jeu régulier, *Compte Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences*, Paris, t. 279, p. 73–76, Série A, 1974.
6. Rationalité et formation des coalitions dans un jeu régulier à n joueurs. *International Symposium of Mathematical Control Theory and Computer System Modelling*. A. Bensoussan ed., Springer Verlag, 1975.
7. Sur l’équation diophantienne. *Séminaire Delange-Pisot-Poitou*, 16ème année, G. 14, 1975.
8. Prolongement des jeux à deux joueurs de somme nulle. *Bulletin de la Société Mathématique de France*, Mémoire no. 45, THESE, 1976.

9. Théorie des Jeux et Sciences Sociales. La Recherche, no. 89, p. 449–456, 1978.
10. La Convexité dans les mathématiques de la décision (avec Françoise Fogelman-Soulié) Hermann, Paris, p.286, 1979.
11. Aspects stratégiques de l'agrégation des préférences (avec Pierre Bataillon), Analyse et Agrégation des Préférences, Economica, Paris, 1981.
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