

CURRICULUM VITAE

Zvika Neeman

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Personal

Born in Petach-Tikva, Israel, 1966. Married + 2.

Academic Degrees

B.Sc. Mathematics, Magna Cum Laude, Tel Aviv University, 1990.

M.A. Economics, Summa Cum Laude, Tel Aviv University, 1991.

Ph.D. Managerial Economics & Decision Science, Northwestern University, 1995.

Academic Appointments

2012 – present. Professor, Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Israel.

2013 – 2015. Visiting Professor, Cowles Foundation and Department of Economics, Yale University.

2009 – 2012. Head, Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Israel.

2006 – 2012. Associate Professor, Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Israel.

2003 – 2009. Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Boston University.

2000 – 2006. Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.

1995 – 2003. Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Boston University.

1995. Lecturer, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

Teaching Interests & Experience

Game Theory, Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism & Information Design, Law and Economics, Environmental Economics.

Journal Articles (refereed)

1. “On Determining the Importance of Attributes with a Stopping Problem,” *Mathematical Social Sciences* 29 (1995), 195-212.
2. “Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common p -Beliefs,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 12 (1996), 162-164.
3. “Common Beliefs and the Existence of Speculative Trade,” *Games and Economic Behavior* 16 (1996), 77-96.
4. “Herding and the winner’s curse in markets with sequential bids,” with Gerhard Orosel, *Journal of Economic Theory* 85 (1999), 91-121.
5. “The Freedom to Contract and the Free Rider Problem,” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15 (1999), 685-703.
6. “Termination and Coordination in Partnerships,” with Deborah Minehart, *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 8 (1999), 191-221.

7. "Property Rights and Efficiency of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," *Review of Economic Studies* 66 (1999), 679-691.
8. "Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," with Enriqueta Aragones, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12 (2000), 183-204.
9. "The Scope of Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," with Ehud Lehrer, *Review of Economic Studies* 67 (2000), 309-326.
10. "Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities," with Deborah Minehart, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 43 (2002), 303-324.
11. "Credits, Crises, and Capital Controls: A Microeconomic Analysis," with Gerhard Orosel, *Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy* 1 (2002), Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 6, <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art6>.
12. "A Theory of Post-Civil War Democratization," with Leonard Wantchekon, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 14 (2002), 439-464.
13. "The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules," with Eyal Baharad, *Review of Economic Design* 7 (2002), 331-340.
14. "The Effectiveness of English Auctions," *Games and Economic Behavior* 43 (2003), 214-238.
15. "Incentive Structures for Class Action Lawyers," with Alon Klement, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 20 (2004), 102-124.
16. "Contestable Licensing," with Gerhard Orosel, *Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy* 3 (2004), Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 1, <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/iss1/art1>.
17. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," *Journal of Economic Theory* 117 (2004), 55-77.
18. "Against Compromise: A Mechanism Design Approach," with Alon Klement, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 21 (2005), 285-314.
19. "On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," with Aviad Heifetz, *Econometrica* 74 (2006), 213-233.
20. "Markets Versus Negotiations: an Experimental Investigation," with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, *Games and Economic Behavior* 56 (2006), 121-134.
21. "On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests," with Gerhard Orosel, *International Review of Law and Economics* 26 (2006), 536-556.
22. "Robustness Against Inefficient Manipulation," with Eyal Baharad, *Social Choice & Welfare* 29 (2007), 55-67.

23. "Corruption and Openness," with Daniele Paserman and Avi Simhon, *B.E Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* (2008): Vol. 8: Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 50. Available at: <http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/iss1/art50>
24. "Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design Framework," with Alon Klement, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 164 (2008), 52-67.
25. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure: Comment," with Alon Klement, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 164 (2008), 130-133.
26. "Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: Examples and Observations," with Vincent Crawford, Tamar Kugler, and Ady Pauzner, *Journal of the European Economic Association* 7 (2009), 377-387.
27. "Markets versus Negotiations: The Predominance of Centralized Markets," with Nir Vulkan, *The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics* 10 (2010) : Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 6. DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1554
28. "Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, " with Lucian Bebchuk, *Review of Financial Studies* 23 (2010), 1089-1119.
29. "The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort," with Omer Moav, *Journal of Industrial Economics* 58 (2010), 642-660.
30. "Status and Poverty," with Omer Moav, *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8 (2010), 413-420.
31. "Saving Rates and Poverty: The Role of Conspicuous Consumption and Human Capital," with Omer Moav, *Economic Journal* 122 (2012), 933-956.
32. "Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design," with Gregory Pavlov, *Journal of Economic Theory* 148 (2013), 473-501.
33. "Does Information about Arbitrators' Win/Loss Ratios Improve Their Accuracy?," with Alon Klement, *Journal of Legal Studies* 42 (2013), 369.
34. "Personality Traits and Strategic Behavior: Anxiousness and Aggressiveness in ntry Games," with Tamar Kugler and Nir Vulkan, *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 42 (2014) 136-147.
35. "Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach, " with Alma Cohen and Alon Klement, *Journal of Legal Studies* 44 (2015), S133-S159.
36. "Geography, Transparency and Institutions," with Yoram Mayshar and Omer Moav, *American Political Science Review* (2017), 1-15. DOI:10.1017/S0003055417000132.
37. "Consumer Fraud, Misrepresentation, and Reliance" with Alon Klement and Yuval Procaccia, *International Review of Law and Economics* 54 (2017), 95.

38. “Differential Performance in High vs. Low Stakes Tests,” with Yigal Attali and Analia Schlosser, *Economic Journal* (2019), <https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uez015>.
39. “The Benefit of Collective Reputation,” with Aniko Öry and Jungju Yu, *Rand Journal of Economics* 50 (2019), 787-821.
40. “The rarity of consistent aggregators,” with Eyal Baharad and Anna Rubinchik, *Mathematical Social Sciences* to appear. DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.09.007.
41. “Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach,” with Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman, *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* to appear.

Invited Papers

42. “Mechanism Design,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition*, (2008) edited by William A. Darity, Jr. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA.
43. “Introduction,” with Al Roth and Nir Vulkan, the *Oxford Handbook of Market Design* (2013), Oxford University Press.
44. “A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems,” with Alon Klement, the *Oxford Handbook of Market Design* (2013), Oxford University Press.
45. “Markets vs. Negotiations: 3 case studies,” with Nir Vulkan, the *Oxford Handbook of Market Design* (2013), Oxford University Press.

Editing

46. Z. Neeman, A. Roth, and N. Vulkan, Eds., (2013) *Oxford Handbook of Market Design*, Oxford University Press.

Research Grants

- 1998-2000 “Mechanism Design, Reconsidered,” NSF (\$116K).
 2008-2010 “Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism Design,” ISF (NIS156K).
 2011-2013 “Electronic Auctions and Markets,” Google Inter-University Grant (\$90K).
 2012-2015 “Differential performance in high vs. low stakes tests,” ISF (\$116K).
 2015-2018 “Government Funding for R&D Startups,” ISF (\$120K).
 2019-2022 “How Bayesian Persuasion can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior,” ISF (\$150K).