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## Contact Information

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## Personal Information:

Date of birth: 03/15/1995
Gender: Female
Citizenship: Chinese

## Undergraduate Studies:

**Renmin University of China**, Beijing, China
B.A. in Economics, School of Economics, 2013 - 2017

**The University of Manchester**, Manchester, UK
Exchange student, course work in Economics, 09/2014 – 02/2015

## Masters Level Work:

**Tufts University,** Massachusetts, US
M.S. in Economics, School of Arts and Sciences, 2017 – 2019

## Graduate Studies:

**Singapore Management University,** 2019 to present
Expected Completion Date: May 2024

Thesis Committee and References:

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**Teaching and Research Fields**:
    Primary fields: Urban and Regional Economics, Economic Geography
    Secondary fields: International Trade

**Teaching Experience:**
**Teaching Assistant:**
2023 Organizational Economics, Economics and Society
2022 Economics and Society, Economics of Globalization
2021 Urban Economics and Policies
2020 Economics and Society

**Research Experience:**

**Research Assistant Experience:**
2022 Research Assistant for Professor Yuan Mei, Singapore Management University
2018 Research Assistant for Professor Ujjayant Chakravorty, Tufts University

**Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**
2023-2024 Presidential Doctoral Fellowship, Singapore Management University
2019-2023 Graduate Full Scholarship (Ph.D. Program), Singapore Management University
2017-2019 Tuition Scholarship, Tufts University

**Research Papers:**

**"Education Migration in China" (Job Market Paper)** *with Lin Ma*

**Abstract:** Educational resources are distributed unevenly across space and could contribute to spatial inequality. We develop a dynamic spatial model with life-cycle elements to study the impacts of location-specific educational resources. In the model, individuals determine whether and where to attend college, weighing on the distance to home, the expected option value of education, and the educational resources in the destination. Locations with more colleges attract more students. Moreover, as mobility costs increase with age, many college graduates stay in the city of their alma mater, leading to long-term changes in skill composition. We quantify the model to the context of China and structurally estimate the cost of obtaining a college degree in each location. We show that the college expansion between 2005 and 2015 had minimal impacts on welfare and skill composition, as it diverts resources towards the locations already well-endowed with colleges. More evenly distributed colleges could improve aggregate welfare and reduce spatial inequality at the same time.

**"(Trade) War and Peace: How Can International Sanctions Be Imposed Most Cost Efficiently?"** *with Gustavo de Souza, Haishi Li, and Yuan Mei, 2023.* **R&R Journal of Monetary Economics.**
**Media coverage: [VoxEU](VoxEU)**

**Abstract:** Trade sanctions are a common instrument of diplomatic retaliation. To guide current and future policy, we ask: What is the most cost-efficient way to impose trade sanctions against Russia? To answer this question, we build a quantitative model of international trade with input-output connections. Sanctioning countries simultaneously choose import tariffs to maximize their welfare (measured with real income) and to minimize Russia's welfare, with different weights placed on these objectives. We find, first, the sanctioning countries can cause moderate economic damage in Russia, with Russian welfare falling 1.3% to 2.9%, depending on whether Russia retaliates or not. Second, for countries with a small willingness to pay for sanctions against Russia, the most cost-efficient sanction is a uniform, about 20% tariff against all Russian products. Third, if the European Union (EU) is willing to pay at least US$0.67 for each US$1 drop in Russian welfare, an embargo on Russia's mining and energy sector products and about 50% tariffs on all other imports from Russia is the most cost-efficient policy. Finally, if countries target politically relevant sectors, a global embargo against Russia's mining and energy sector is the cost-efficient policy even when there is a small willingness to pay for sanctions.

**"Tariffs as Bargaining Chips: A Quantitative Analysis of US-China Trade War"** *with Yuan Mei and Tong Ni*

**Abstract:** The Biden administration maintains Trump tariffs on Chinese imports, contrary to Biden's campaign commitments. We investigate the hypothesis that these tariffs serve as a leverage in future trade talks with China. Our quantitative model, incorporating disaggregated U.S. regions and international trade linkages, estimates bargaining power and simulates tariff bargaining outcomes. Results show consistent post-trade war negotiation improvements in U.S. welfare regardless of bargaining power. With an estimated U.S. bargaining power of 0.47, the post-war negotiation yields additional 0.04% gains for U.S. taking the trade war impacts into account.

## Computer Skills:
MATLAB, R, Julia, LaTeX

## Languages:
English (fluent), Chinese Mandarin (native)