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Contact Information

School of Economics
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Nationality: Brazilian

Research Experience: Postdoctoral Fellow at School of Economics, Singapore Management University (2022 - Present)
Principal Investigator: Takashi Kunimoto

Graduate Studies:

Singapore Management University, 2018 to 2022.
Thesis Title: Essays on Social Choice and Implementation Theory
Advisor: Shurojit Chatterji

Masters Level Work:

M.Phil. in Economics, Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio, 2011

Undergraduate Studies:

Bachelor in Economics, FACE, Universidade de Brasilia, 2008.

Research Papers

“Compellingness in Nash Implementation” *co-authored with Kunimoto and Chatterji (Job market paper)*

Abstract: A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism in which every Nash equilibrium outcome coincides with that specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. We call a mixed strategy equilibrium “uncompelling” if its outcome is strictly worse than the outcome induced by the SCF for any agent. We show that if the finite environment and the SCF to be implemented jointly satisfy what we call *Condition COM*, we construct a finite mechanism which Nash implements the SCF in pure strategies and its any mixed strategy Nash equilibrium outcome is either consistent with the SCF or uncompelling. Our mechanism has several desirable features: transfers can be completely dispensable; only finite mechanisms are considered; integer games are not invoked; and agents' attitudes toward risk do not matter. These features make our result quite distinct from many other prior attempts to handle mixed strategy equilibria in the theory of implementation.

“Minimum Reversals Domains: a link between median rules and monotonicity” *(revised and resubmitted at Games and Economic Behavior)*

Abstract: We show that any monotonic, anonymous, unanimous and tops-only rule defined on a

MAT-connected domain must be a median voter rule on a tree. Moreover, a median voter rule on a tree is monotonic if and only if the domain is a minimum reversals domain, which is a weakening of known preference domains. These two results are combined to obtain a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of monotonic, anonymous, and unanimous rules on a MAT-connected domain.

Conference and Seminar Presentations:

Sep 2023 - Singapore Joint Economic Theory Workshop, SMU Singapore

Jul 2023 - Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in East and Southeast Asia (AMES), NTU Singapore.

Jul 2022 - 3rd Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design, National University of Singapore.

Jul 2022 - 2022 SAET Conference, Australian National University

Dec 2021 - 16th Annual Conference on Economic Growth and Development, Indian Statistical Institute Delhi

Professional Activities: Credit Risk Modeling Analyst at Itaú-Unibanco – São Paulo (06/2011 – 06/2012)

Credit Risk Modeling Analyst at Itaú-BBA – São Paulo (06/2012 – 06/2013)

Controller Specialist at Postalís Instituto de Previdencia Complementar – Brasilia (10/2014 – 10/2017)

Reviewer for Journals: Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Research and Teaching Interests

Research fields: Social Choice, Implementation Theory, Game Theory

Teaching fields: Microeconomics, Mathematic for Economists

Teaching Experience: Teaching Assistant for Microeconomics Analysis, Economic Dynamics and Microeconomics II (graduate); Instructor for Microeconomics II (undergraduate)

Computer Skills:

Experience in programming in R, Matlab, SAS and VBA.

Languages:

Portuguese (native) and English (fluent)