showSidebars ==
showTitleBreadcrumbs == 1
node.field_disable_title_breadcrumbs.value ==
Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information
|
TOPIC:
|
TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
|
ABSTRACT
Under standard assumptions about players’ cost functions, we show that a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a pure strategy equilibrium. Next we study Tullock contests in which players have a common value and a common state-independent linear cost function. A two-player contest in which one player has an information advantage has a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium both players exert the same expected effort, and although the player with an information advantage wins the prize with probability less than one-half, his payoff is greater or equal to that of his opponent. When there are more than two players in the contest, having information advantage leads to higher payoff, but the other properties of equilibrium no longer hold.
Please click here to view paper.
|
|

|
Presenter
Ori Haimanko
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
|
Research Fields
Mathematical Economics, Game Theory
|
Date:
27 September 2013 (Friday)
|
Time:
4pm - 5.30pm
|
Venue:
Seminar Room 5.1, Level 5
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
90 Stamford Road
Singapore 178903
|
|
|
|
|